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B I O M E D I C A L E T H I C S AND G E N E T I C E P I D E M I O L O G Y 
Michael Whong-Barr 
Abstract 
Biomedical ethics developed in the late twentieth century as a challenge to the self-
regulatory ethic that previously governed medical practice. Yet in recent years 
bioethics has come under scrutiny from the social sciences, which claim that the field 
relies upon an idealised notion of moral agency and fails to consider the extent to 
which ethical discourse is embedded in a wider societal context. In addition, 
bioethical concepts such as patient autonomy and informed consent have also recently 
been challenged by the rise of genetic medicine. After evaluating debates in the 
historical and philosophical development of biomedical ethics, this thesis uses a case 
study in genetic epidemiology (commonly referred to as biobanking) to examine 
competing normative and empirical claims made by bioethicists and social scientists. 
The study investigates the views and experiences of potential donors to a biobank in 
north-west England. Data analysis gives particular emphasis to socio-ethical issues 
such as consent, genetic donation, altruism, and benefit-sharing. Evidence from the 
case study illustrates that bioethics is susceptible to many of the charges levelled 
against it - namely that it lacks proper understanding of the processes by which moral 
concepts and categories are embedded in ongoing forms of social practice and 
experience. The thesis concludes with suggestions as to how bioethics may better 
combine philosophical and sociological methods. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: biomedical ethics and genetic epidemiology 
Indeed he knows not how to know who knows not also how to un-know.' 
— Richard Francis Burton 
This thesis began as a work of history. Dissatisfied with conventional accounts of the 
emergence and growth of bioethics and motivated by the fact that no one, to date, had 
adequately researched the history of the field in Britain, I laid out in considerable detail a 
project designed to fill the gap in scholarship. At the end of my first year of study, 
however, I was invited to participate in a Wellcome Trust summer school on genetics and 
society. This experience, and the employment that followed, took me away from the 
history of bioethics and deep into the ethics of genetic epidemiology (commonly referred 
to as biobanks, DNA banks, or genetic databases). As a result, the investigation which 
follows blends an analysis of the history and philosophy of bioethics with a case study in 
genetics. My aim has been to critically examine the birth of bioethics and the normative 
assumptions that bioethicists make, then to evaluate many of the sociological critiques of 
the field and, finally, to view both normative and empirical claims in light of the case 
study. 
First, however, I must address the question of terminology. How does medical ethics 
differ from bioethics and why have I chosen to title my thesis biomedical ethics? The 
word 'bioethics', it seems, was coined one night in 1970 in Sargent Shriver's Bethesda 
living room.^ He used it in reference to plans to develop the Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
Apparently, however, around the same time in Wisconsin, Van Rensselaer Potter also 
invented the word to refer to an ethic that paid greater attention to ecological issues, as 
' Cited in B. Flyvbjerg, 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Wliy Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can 
Succeed Again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 166. 
^ W. T. Reich, 1995. The word bioethics: its birth and the legacies of those who shaped its meaning. 
-Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 5:319-336. 
well as medical ones.^  Originally considered an Americanism, the term 'bioethics' is now 
commonly used throughout the world. It, in effect, differs from medical ethics in that it 
signifies a shift in the post-War era from an ethic of medical self-regulation to one that 
permits far greater involvement of non-medical persons (so-called outsiders) in the 
adjudication of right and wrong behaviour.'* 
In this study, I have chosen the term biomedical ethics for my title in order to capture the 
full range - that is, both clinical and research - of ethical issues in the life sciences. 
However, following most others in the field, I unashamedly use medical ethics, bioethics 
and biomedical ethics interchangeably in my actual writing. I do not use bioethics as Van 
Rensselaer Potter initially proposed. I do recognise, and indeed argue, however, that a 
true bioethic would certainly expand its agenda to incorporate the nexus between 
environmental, ecological and medical health. 
At this point, it is also useful to make a distinction between biomedical ethics as a clinical 
encounter and as an academic discipline. As I see it, the former deals with patients, 
physicians, research subjects, ethics committees, and actual decision-making. The latter is 
the body of literature where concepts and issues used in clinical and research settings are 
created and debated. Clearly, the two cannot be neatly separated and are mutually re-
enforcing. Yet there is a difference, I think, between bioethics in the ward and bioethics 
in the journals. To the extent that they can be split my target is primarily bioethics as an 
academic discipline - but, as Chapters Seven and Eight indicate, the whole point is to 
improve praxis. 
Setting the scene 
It is now a truism to say that genetic medicine raises many challenges for biomedical 
ethics. The familial nature of genetic information and the rapid development of 
biotechnology tests the limits of existing ethical theories. For example, what constitutes 
^ V. Rensselaer Potter, 1970. Bioethics, the science of survival. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 14: 
127-152. 
"* R. Ashcroft, 2001. Emphasis has shifted fi-om medical ethics to bioethics. British MedicalJoumal 322: 
7281:302b. 
informed consent? How is confidentiality best protected? How much, i f at all, should the 
public be consulted on matters pertaining to the life sciences? But i f genetics serves as a 
challenge to ethics, it has also served as a boon. I f ethics cannot keep up with the science, 
then obviously we need more ethicists. And yet, amidst the growth and popularity, 
bioethics has come under heavy and sustained attack. Critics of bioethics have attacked 
on all fronts: its history, its method, its assumptions, its self-importance, its financial 
entwinement with those it is supposed to be guarding against. It is this situation, in which 
biomedical ethics is increasingly cited yet increasingly criticised, that forms part of the 
background to the current investigation. In other words, I have sought to ask the question 
'what is bioethics?' - in its historical development, its categories and concepts, its 
practice and problems. This question, inevitably, has also forced me to ask 'what is 
bioethics notT. What has been lost, marginalised, or displaced in the rapid growth of the 
field? 
Two things follow on from this. First, I did not want to set up a straw figure that I 
conveniently knock down later in the thesis. My decision to incorporate a case study 
involving empirical fieldwork, I hope, has provided some protection against this. Second, 
and allied to this, i f I really wanted to understand what bioethics was all about, I reasoned 
that I needed to go out and get involved. This was a key reason why, after my Wellcome 
Trust course, I initiated a grant proposal with Erica Haimes at the Policy, Ethics, and Life 
Sciences Research Institute (PEALS), where I have been employed since 2001. Apart 
from the practical experience, one premise behind the grant research was that very little 
was known about the views of actual donors to genetic projects, especially donors to 
population based genetic research. Crucially, even less was known about those who had 
been asked to donate but refused. Are the views of these two seemingly opposed camps 
really at diametrical odds? Are those who refuse to donate better or less informed about 
genetics research? What perceptions of genetics do donors have? How do those 
perceptions impact their decision to donate? Above all, perhaps, do people really care 
about informed consent as much as ethicists do? 
It was against this backdrop that the current investigation was conceived. 
Thesis outline 
Chapters Two through Four of the investigation focus on the history, philosophy, and 
sociology of biomedical ethics. Chapters Five and Six explore the issue of genetic 
epidemiology. The remainder of the thesis returns to my examination of bioethics in light 
of the findings and insights generated from my study of biobanking. For the reader's 
convenience each chapter ends with a bullet point summary and conclusion that 
corresponds (more or less) to chapter sub headings. 
The proceeding chapter, then, shows how medical ethics, for the greatest part of Western 
history, was a matter of physicians prescribing for other physicians how and how not to 
act. Whilst many have dismissed the history of medical ethics as mere etiquette, I argue 
that such an interpretation is an example of presentism, (the fallacy of reading the past as 
i f it were the present) and fails to appreciate the context and moral content of medical 
issues in previous eras. My short history concludes in the mid twentieth century. 
Chapter Three discusses in detail the historical and philosophical development of 
biomedical ethics, focusing on events in Britain and the US. I aim to show how early 
informed consent guidelines were largely ignored by the research establishment until the 
mid 1960s when wider social trends (such as the rights movement) impacted the medical 
profession and gave impetus to change. In telling the story of bioethics, I concentrate on 
the role played by 'strangers' in slowly breaking down the self-regulatory nature of 
medical ethics described in Chapter Two. The chapter ends with an evaluation of the role 
of religion in the birth of bioethics and its subsequent marginalization as the demand for a 
secular ethic grew - the so-called four principles approach, or principlism as most refer to 
it. 
Chapter Four evaluates some of the criticisms of mainstream biomedical ethics through a 
discussion of alternative methods such as casuistry, care and virtue ethics. My focus, 
however, is on the social science critique which targets both the method of bioethics and 
the primacy it gives to the principle of autonomy. The central theme of this chapter is that 
mainstream bioethics lacks sufficient understanding of the wider context in which 
medical decision making transpires. 
In order to deepen the critique of bioethics and to test the competing claims made by 
bioethicists, social scientists, and historians (that is, the claims put forth thus far in the 
thesis), Chapter Five introduces the issue of genetic epidemiology. Genetic databases are 
population wide collections of DNA, which are combined with a donors' medical history 
and lifestyle information for the purpose of epidemiological analysis. The aim of 
biobanking is to better understand the relative contributions of genetic, environmental 
and lifestyle factors on the causes of common disease, most notably chronic diseases such 
as cancer, diabetes, and heart disease. My discussion here begins with a short history of 
the public health movement (of which genetic epidemiology is an extension), and then 
considers the range of the socio-ethical issues of biobanking by drawing on examples 
from Iceland, Estonia, the United States and Britain. The bulk of my ethics discussion in 
this chapter is on the issue of informed consent. DNA banking presents particular 
problems for consent guidelines since samples are stored indefinitely and at the time of 
their collection, not even the researchers know the full range of possible uses. Thus, how 
can consent be truly 'informed'? I examine the main responses to this problem. 
Chapter Six examines these issues in greater detail by drawing on empirical research into 
a local biobank in Cumbria. Particular attention is paid to the issues of participation, 
donation, consent, altruism, and benefit-sharing. Again, the theme of context is 
highlighted as I draw out critical distinctions between the normative ethics literature and 
findings from my empirical study. Simply put, many of the sociological charges against 
mainstream bioethics seemed to hold true. 
A key question in light of my case study is how biomedical ethics can overcome these 
charges and develop a form in inquiry that can accommodate both philosophical and 
empirical methods. The beginnings of an answer, as I suggest in Chapter Seven, lies in 
the Aristotelian concept of phronesis (practical wisdom), critically combined with a 
method that uncovers the ways in which our ethical ideas are embedded in socio-political 
practices - practices so ingrained that we tend to forget that they too have a history. 
Following the work of Bent Flybvjerg, I aim to explore and expand the notion of context 
- a central theme throughout the thesis. 
Chapter Eight applies these methodological sketches to actual issues in bioethics, 
including but not limited to DNA banking. It also brings the thesis full circle with a 
discussion of how historians may better situate bioethics into a socio-historical 
framework that better understands some of the causal factors - the attitudes, beliefs, and 
existential commitments, as well as medical, scientific and commercial pressures - which 
have governed developments not only in ethics, but crucially in medicine and technology, 
as well. 
The Conclusion re-caps the overall theme of the thesis and briefly considers both its 
limitations and directions for fiiture work. Finally, I have included two Appendices. The 
first provides a brief summary of my role in the Wellcome Trust project that serves as the 
basis for Chapter Six. Appendix I I is the detailed interview schedule used in that study. 
Inclusion of interview questions is common, even expected, in theses that involve an 
element of empirical social research such as this one and I add it in the interests of 
research transparency. It should provide the reader with some insight and background 
into the findings and analysis presented in Chapter Six. 
Caveats and cautions 
In some ways the principal target of this work is principlism. It is easy enough, I admit, to 
take pot shots at principlism. Many have done so and some have even built entire careers 
on it. In my less secure moments, one fear I have for this work is that I do not present a 
balanced enough approach. That is to say, I fully recognise that principles are an integral 
part of moral reasoning and that philosophy's commitment to first principles are 
extraordinary useful in clarifying what is at stake in ethical dilemmas. Perhaps better than 
anyone in the field, Onora O'Neill has justified the use of principles, albeit in conjunction 
with practical judgements. My work here does not rely on Kant as explicitly as hers, but I 
do take her point that 'there is no way of dispensing with principles, unless it is possible 
to establish a quite radical form of ethical particularism, a task of the greatest 
epistemological difficulty.'^ I f my writing leads me astray into such radicalism, it is no 
doubt because of my experience as lead researcher on a major empirical study - whose 
central findings were, in essence, that context counts and that we have good reasons to 
doubt certain claims made by normative bioethics (which, in large measure, is principle 
based). As one commentator has aptly put it, there are 'good sociological reasons for bad 
bioethical outcomes.'^ 
This leads me to another topic worth addressing: what follows, in all honesty, resembles a 
work of sociology at least as much as it does philosophy or history. Of course it 
incorporates elements of all three disciplines, the boundaries of which I feel are often 
over-stated and needlessly, perhaps even dangerously, reinforced by the harsh realities of 
academia (e.g. budgets, Research Council remits, RAEs and so on). To a large degree my 
disciplinary promiscuity is intentional and reflects my own particular background. My 
BA is in political science, my MA is in theology and my PhD is in philosophy. Yet my 
thesis supervisor is a historian of medicine and my employment at PEALS has been, as I 
indicated above, heavily informed by sociology. To top it off, before undertaking post-
graduate work I spent four years as an English teacher and administrator (in China and in 
Egypt). Such a varied approach comes at a certain cost. I fear that at times the current 
investigation is miles wide but only skin deep. That is to say, since I roam fi-eely over 
source material and since the investigation does not focus on one thinker alone, there are 
many topics that I touch on but do not fully consider. What binds it together, I think, is 
my focus on the competing claims of biomedical ethics in light of the case study in 
genetic epidemiology. 
To sum up, Barbara Nicholas asks, 
'Is bioethics becoming a means by which present social structures and assumptions are 
supported and regulated? Or is it a discipline that is contributing to a fundamental 
'O. O'Neill, 2001. Practical Principles and Practical Judgements. Hastings Center Report 3\ : 20. 
* R. Fox and R. Devries, 1998. Afterward: The sociology of bioethics. In R. DeVries, and J. Subedi, 1998. 
Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise. NJ: Simon & Schuster, p. 272. 
questioning of the values that inform relationships between individuals and between 
different groups?'^ 
The study which follows suggests that it is the former but begins to chart a path in which 
the latter may be realised. 
^B. Nicholas, 1999. Power and the teaching of medical ethics'. Journal of Medical Ethics 25: 509. 
Chapter Two 
A short history of medical ethics 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide a brief but critical review of the history of medical ethics from 
Antiquity to the early twentieth century. My aim is to provide the necessary background 
to better situate and contextualise the primary target of the thesis, contemporary 
bioethics. Of course covering more than two thousand years of history in a short chapter 
cannot do justice to the richness of the topic with all its colourful characters, texts, and 
controversies. To skipping detail in order to arrive at my primary target, post War 
bioethics, I plead guilty. But the general theme and argument of this chapter, I believe, is 
accurate and well supported: that for the better part of Western history medical ethics was 
an internal affair, a method by which doctors self regulated other doctors in order to 
establish medicine as a credible and viable profession. In providing this brief sketch of 
the self regulatory nature of medical ethics, I have of course not touched on many details, 
such as the complex interaction between the classical tradition and Christian virtues, the 
influence of Arab medicine on Western practice, and the relationship between the 
philosophy of and actual practice of medicine. I begin by addressing recent histographical 
debates in medical ethics. 
Ethics and etiquette: clarifying terminology 
Robert Veatch has argued that the Hippocratic Oath is an 'immoral basis' for the practice 
of medicine since it lacks recognition of rights, autonomy, or jusfice. Veatch asserts that 
the Oath 'offends Kantians, social utilitarian[s], anyone who is Jewish or Christian or 
Marxist, Muslims, Hindus, Confucians, and those who subscribe to various Afiican tribal 
religions'^. The Oath, according to Veatch, is 'individualistic, consequentialistic, and 
paternalistic, a combination that virtually no moral tradition anywhere in the world 
should find acceptable'.^ 
R. Veatch, 2003. Revisiting/4 Theory of Medical Ethics: Main Themes and Anticipated Changes. In J. 
Walter and E. Klein, eds. The Story of Bioethics: From Seminal Works to Contemporary Explorations. 
Washington: Georgetown University Press, p. 70. 
' Veatch. 2003, p. 70. 
Now whilst it is true that the Oath lacks obligations of veracity and says nothing about 
the need for workers of all classes to unite, it does contain mention of the duty of 
confidentiality ('whatever I see or hear, professionally or privately, which ought not to be 
divulged, I will keep secret and tell no one''*'), and more famously, obligations of non-
malfeasance and beneficence ('I will use my power to help the sick to the best of my 
ability and judgement; I will abstain from harming or wronging any man by i t ' " ) . 
I believe that Veatch's claims, as Vivian Nutton points out, seem to reveal more about 
twentieth century medical ethics than those of the fifth century BC'^. In other words, 
Veatch seems to attribute a false unity on the Hippocratic corpus and credits the Oath's 
wording and interpretation with a universal and unchanging validity that does not reflect 
the ancient medical world. The corpus of medical ethics texts were far more varied than 
the mere Oath alone, as historians have shown, and cannot be confined to one document 
or author, as Veatch seems to do. Indeed, it is likely that the Oath held minimal influence 
in the fifth century and did not gain its normative status or authority until the Christian 
era, a time in which the Oath's prohibitions against abortion and 'fatal draught' 
(euthanasia) fit neatly with the concerns of Christian morality. As Robert Baker has aptly 
put it, as the 'West converted to Christianity so did the Oath'.'^ 
Like Veatch many commentators believe that prior to our enlightened era (i.e. the late 
twentieth century), 'medical ethics' was a misnomer.''* Chauncey Leake's famous 
distinction between 'ethics' and 'etiquette' set the terms of reference. According to 
Leake, 'ethics' were concerned with the ultimate consequences of physicians' conduct 
ne Hippocratic Oath. Reprinted in R. Porter, 1997. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History 
of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present. London: Fontana Press, p. 63. 
" ne Oath, in Porter 1997, p. 63 
V. Nutton, 1993. Beyond the Hippocratic Oath. In A. Wear, J. Geyer-Kordesch, and R. French, eds. 
Doctors and Ethics: The Earlier Historical Setting of Professional Ethics, p. 10-37.1 assume that here 
Nutton is referring to Veatch's desire to forge a universal ethical system in the face of anxieties regarding 
moral diversity and pluralism. 
R. Baker 1993. The History of Medical Ethics. In W.F. Bynum and R. Porter, eds.. Companion 
encyclopedia of the history of medicine, London: Routledge, p. 855. 
'''C. Leake, 1975. Introductory Essay. In C. Bums, ed., Percival's Medical Ethics. New York: Robert 
Krieger. (Reprint of Leake's edition), p. 1. Leake's analysis for the most part dealt with the work of 
eighteenth century writer Thomas Percival but his criticism of ethics and etiquette applies to pre-eighteenth 
centuiy medical ethics as well. 
10 
toward patients and society as a whole, while 'etiquette' denoted 'the conduct of 
physicians toward each other ' .Following these definitions, Leake argued that 'medical 
ethics' in fact referred only to rules of etiquette developed to regulate physicians' 
contacts with each other. 
Nearly fifty years later, sociologists Ivan Waddington and Jeffery Berlant supported 
Leake's conclusions. Waddington argued that sociologists had traditionally and 
erroneously believed that the development of professional ethics ought to be seen within 
the context of practitioner-client relationships.'^ According to the fraditional view, 
ethical codes helped patients distinguish between competent and incompetent or 
honourable and dishonourable doctors. Waddington, however, believed that this approach 
to the growth of medical ethics lacked empirical evidence. Instead, Waddington 
suggested that the importance of the doctor-patient relationship for an understanding of 
medical ethics had been grossly overstated and he, like Leake, believed that the 
development of medical ethics had more to do with regulating relationships between 
physicians. To support his claim that ethics dealt primarily with intra-professional 
relationships, Waddington emphasized the long portions of Thomas Percival's Medical 
Ethics [1803] that dealt with physician/surgeon consultation. 
Utilizing Max Weber's theory of monopolization, Berlant described medical ethics as an 
'organizational tool' that operated by subordinating individual interests to the collective 
of the profession.'* Ethics, in other words, were little more than appeals to honour, to 
bring about cooperation within the medical profession for the good of the group as a 
whole. In short, these 'revisionists' have re-categorized professional ethics as mere 
"Leake, 1975, p. 2. 
Waddington, 1975. The development of medical ethics - a sociological analysis'. Medical History 19: 
38. 
" Waddington seemed to overlook Article II of Perival's work, which dealt withpa//e«/j' requests to be 
treated by a 'favorite practitioner' as well as Article III on how to attend to a patients feeling and emotions; 
and Article XII which contended with 'new remedies and new methods of chirurgical treatment,' or as 
Baker writes, 'the regulation of experimentation on human subjects.' Furthermore, it is not the same thing 
to say that medical ethics in the past were only intra-professional as it to say that they were self-regulatory. 
The former deals only with doctor-doctor relations whilst the latter relates to physicians regulating other 
physicians doings with both those within the profession, as well as with patients and the wider society. 
J.L. Berlant, 1975. Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 68-97. 
11 
etiquette and dismissed such writings as being having nothing to do with ethics at all. 
But as a matter of course, the revisionists have been revised and rightly so in my opinion. 
According to Robert Baker, the early critics were guilty of 'presentism' ~ the fallacy of 
reading the past as i f it were the present. By confusing the ethic of one time period with 
etiquette, it seems that the revisionists let contemporary controversies influence their 
reading and interpretation of past texts. I fully agree with Baker's reading and on this 
issue, I take inspiration from Alastair Maclntyre, who writes that we should allow 'the 
history of philosophy to break down our present-day preconceptions, so that our too 
narrow views of what can and cannot be thought, said, and done are discarded in the face 
of the record of what has been thought, said, and done'.'^ In regards to medical ethics, 
Andrew Morrice seems correct when he points out that the historiographical problem is a 
problem of semantics, generated by the changing content of medical ethics '^'. Many 
•historians' of medical ethics, after all, have either been sociologists or health practitioners 
who have developed an interest in the historical and philosophical basis of medicine. 
Perhaps it is too much to ask that such scholars look for moral content in a professional 
ethic that can easily be read and rejected as self-serving. But as Roger French writes, 
'Modem medical ethics derives from a particular nature of modem medicine and the 
society in which it exists. So a history of medical ethics is a history of medicine and of 
society and of the problems that looked ethical to them, but not necessarily to us. Looked 
at it in this way it soon becomes clear that ethics have a function, for the group that 
practices them, other than the intemal, explicit injunctions that are normally seen as 
"ethical" in some abstract way ... Ethics comprise a system of mles that not only 
characterises the group but which in directing the behaviour of the group contributes to 
its success'.^ ' 
" A. Maclntyre, 1998. A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to 
the Twentieth Century led. London: Routledge, p. 4. 
A. Morrice, 2002. 'Honour and Interests: Medical Ethics and the British Medical Association. In A. H. 
Maehle and J. Geyer-Kordesch, eds. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics: 
From Paternalism to Autonomy? Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 11-35. 
" R. French, 1993. The Medical Ethics of Gabriele de Zerbi. In A. Wear, J. Geyer-Kordesch, and R. 
French, eds. Doctors and Ethics: The Earlier Historical Setting of Professional Ethics, p. 72. 
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On that note, I shall now turn to a short survey of the history of medical ethics. 
Medical ethics: From Hippocrates to Enlightenment 
The paradigm of Western medical ethics has largely been set by the Hippocratic Oath, 
which dates anywhere between the third and fifth centuries BC^^. Whilst, as I cited 
earlier, the Oath is not the only text from Antiquity to address the topic of ethics in 
medicine, it is possible to identify at least two key themes throughout ancient writings . 
The first is what we now refer to as deontology - that is, the prescription of duties and 
rules that physicians were required to observe i f they wished to enter the profession. A 
second theme was that a doctor's love for the art of medicine was to be reflected in 
proper decorum, which was the conduct befitting a member of the profession and 
included appearance, speech and comportment to put the patient's confidence to rest. 
These twin themes run throughout medical ethics in the Middle Ages, through the 
Renaissance and into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.^ '* 
For example Gabriele de Zerbi's -vioxk Advice to Physicians [1528] illustrates the self-
regulatory nature of the medical profession^^ At that time, fees were a crucial ethical 
issue and Zerbi wrote that it was a physician's duty to cure their patient as quickly as 
possible since prolonged treatment would raise suspicions that the physician was only 
interested in securing greater fees. He also recommend taking cases where a fee may not 
be forthcoming (e.g. from paupers) since ' i t generates a laudable reputation'.Zerbi's 
text provided advice and sfrategies for preserving the reputation of both individual 
physician and the art as a whole. Echoing the ancient of proper decorum, Zerbi believed 
that a doctor must cultivate a life similar to that of a priest, acting faithfully for the good 
Scholarly debates over the interpretation, authorship and influence of the Oath He well beyond this thesis. 
See L. Edelstein, 1967. Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein. O. Temkin and C. 
Temkin, eds., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, and T. Rutten, 1993. Recent Scholarship on the Hippocratic 
Pseudepigrapha. Society for Ancient Medicine Review 21, pp. 148-160. 
" M. Whong-Barr, 2001. Medical ethics in historical contexts. Medicine, Healtii Care and Philosophy 4: 
233-235. 
W. Schleiner, 1995. Medical Ethics in the Renaissance. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
D. E. Linden, 1999. Gabriele de Zerbi's De Cautelis Medicorum and the Tradition of Medical Prudence. 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 73: 19-37. 
Zerbi, 1528, f.lxix v. Cited in French, 1993, p. 77. 
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of the sick. To maintain the proper image, Zerbi thought that a doctor ought to avoid 
public displays such as dancing, or singing, or use of a weapon in hunting. 
Subsequent medical texts similarly employ 'language and conceptions of medical 
practice, decorum, etiquette, and moral propriety that would be readily understood by 
ancient Greek or Roman practitioners'.^' This claim is evident in an examination of 
eighteenth century medical ethics. 
The medical ethics of John Gregory and Thomas Percival 
Many observers claim that the roots of what we today refer to as bioethics lie in the work 
of John Gregory and Thomas Percival. Laurence McCullough, for example, claims that 
Gregory was the first to use philosophical and secular medical ethics to address medical 
problems and that Gregory laid the groundwork for the profession of medicine as an 
intellectual and moral enterprise.^ * True or not, an evaluation of Gregory's work shows 
that medical ethics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can still accurately be seen 
as an internal affair. 
Gregory, a Scotsman, was Professor of Practice of Physic at the University of Edinburgh. 
His Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician, published in 1772, were the 
textual account of oral lessons given to medical students, fellow physicians, and curious 
intellectuals of the time. His conception of medical ethics, no doubt, were heavily 
influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment and it is within that context that they should be 
seen. '^ 
"Baker, 1993,p. 861. See, for example, R. aCastro 1614. Medicus Politicus. Hamburg: Ex bibliopolio 
Frobeniano. 
See the two volumes: L. McCullough, ed., 1998a. John Gregory's writings on medical ethics and 
philosophy of medicine, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers; L. McCullough, ed., 1998b. John 
Gregory and the invention ofprofessional medical ethics and the profession of medicine, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
" In addition to his adoption of Hume's work, Gregory also relied heavily on Francis Bacon and the 
Baconian scientific method for his philosophy of medicine and natural science. As is well known, Bacon 
rejected dogmatic adherence to authorities and systems of abstract classification that were not based on 
careful description of symptoms and disease categories. Instead, Bacon asserted that the foundation of 
knowledge ought to be observation and open mindedness to results of experimentation. According to 
Gregory, evidence that contradicts a doctor's long held beliefs must be accepted. See Gregory's Lecture V 
in McCullough, 1998a, pp. 215-230. 
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According to Gregory, a professional was someone who lived according to 'fiduciary 
obligations' of service to patients rather than the dictates of self-interest.^" Gregory's 
'invention' of medicine as such was in response to the considerable disarray that 
characterized eighteenth century medicine. This state, described as an 'open world', 
derived partly from the fact that there were competing accounts of the origins of disease 
and illness. (Of course such circumstances were not unprecedented and could be found in 
Antiquity, where competing groups vied for patients and medical power). Given the high 
numbers of practitioners and the lack of a dominant clinical science to evaluate what 
physicians did, patients in Britain could summon any number of doctors or healers, or 
merely 'self-physick'. In this context, trust and character often provided the basis for a 
patient to select their doctor. However, this manner of choosing a physician eventually 
became problematic. Inferring from ones manners to their actual character became 
difficult, as 'counterfeit men of feelings' merely feigned their manners in order to suit 
their own purposes. '^ According to McCullough, Gregory's response to this so-called 
commodification of character was to base his ethics on moral sense philosophy. 
According to McCullough, Gregory based much of his medical ethics on Hume's 
understanding of moral sense.^ ^ Of critical importance to both Hume and Gregory was 
the idea of sympathy, which both believed to be a natural part of human instinct and the 
cause of many natural sentiments. Sympathy, as Hume used the term, referred not just to 
^"McCullough, 1998a, pp. 283-293. The phrase is McCullough's. 
"For more on this, see: M. Fissel, 1993. Innocent and Honorable Bribes: Medical Manners in Eighteenth-
Century Britain. In R. Baker D. Porter, R. and Porter, eds., The codification of medical morality: historical 
and philosophical studies of the formalization of Western medical morality in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Vol. I, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 19-46. 
•"^  This point is in dispute. Haakonssen believes that Gregory drew his notions of sympathy from Adam 
Smith's work as much if not more than Hume's. The difference, according to Haakonssen, is that 
'sympathy for Hume, consists of an identification of the sentiments of the object of sympathy so that these 
sentiments become those of the sympathising person as well' whilst for Smith' sympathy consists in putting 
oneself imaginatively in the situation of the other person, which may or may not lead one to have the same 
sentiments as this person', (p. 71) Again, the finer points of historical interpretation whilst important and 
interesting, do not concern my overall thesis and are beyond the scope of this work. See L. Haakonssen, 
1997. Medicine and morals in the Enlightenment: John Gregory, Thomas Percival and Benjamin Rush, 
-Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
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a 'particular sentiment but to a psychological capacity to feel and arrive at sentiments'.^ ^ 
In Hume's moral theory, a person was capable of receptively and responsively sharing 
another's opinion, distress, pleasure, or emotion. Hume believed, for example, that when 
we see another person in pain, this impression leads to the same impression of pain in 
ourselves. 
According to Gregory's philosophy of medicine, sympathy, properly trained and 
regulated, ought to lead to one having the same pain or experience as the sick patient. 
This feeling then motivates appropriate medical action. Gregory understood sympathy as 
generating 'tenderness', an asexual virtue that moves us to enter into the suffering of 
others. The duty of a physician, then, was to relieve that suffering and cure disease. 
Gregory writes, 
'The chief of these [moral qualities required of a physician] is humanity; that sensibility 
that makes us feel for the distresses of our fellow creatures, and, which, of consequence, 
incites us in the most powerful of ways. Sympathy produces an anxious attention to a 
thousand little circumstances that may tend to relieve the patient; an attention which 
money can never purchase ... Sympathy naturally engages the affection and confidence of 
a patient, which, in many cases, is of utmost consequence to his recovery ... Real 
sympathy is never ostentatious; on the contrary it rather strives to conceal itself.^'' 
Real sympathy, in other words, showed strength of character that Gregory believed could 
be used as a means of distinguishing between counterfeit and genuine doctors. It is this 
moral basis that differentiates those who practise medicine as an art and those who 
practised it primarily as a trade. Gregory believed that only a moral physician could cure 
the il l since it was through sympathy that the physician engaged the patient, enhancing 
the likelihood of an effective cure. Al l other practitioners of medicine were motivated by 
gain and sought to perpetuate the 'sick trade'^'. 
" D . Hume, 1998. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Reprinted in T. Beauchamp, ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 220. 
"* Gregory's Lectures, in McCullough, 1998b, p. 170. 
" Quoted in Jonsen, 1999, p. 61. 
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Gregory's work has been described as laying the basis for bioethics and on this point I'd 
like to take a brief digression. McCullough claims that Gregory's Lectures 'invented 
philosophical, secular medical ethics'. McCullough's argument is that Gregory 
anticipated many of bioethics' themes, particularly by 'laying medicine open' to 
accountability using the tools of ethics and philosophy^^. McCullough credits Gregory 
with writing the first feminine medical ethics, where feminine indicates an ethic based on 
a 'feminine consciousness that regards the gender traits associated with women as 
positive human traits'.''' (Following Rosemarie Tong, McCullough contrasts this with 
'feminist ethics', which McCullough takes to mean a political agenda to redress 
oppression at the hands of men.) For Gregory, women of learning and virtue provided 
role models for physicians who were concerned with physician-patient relationships. 
Such relationships should be asexual and disinterested, but not detached. 
This claim, to me, seems spurious. While not wanting to wade too deeply into debates on 
interpretation of eighteenth century texts, I 'd suggest that McCullough attributes too 
much to Gregory and ignores the integral role philosophy has played in the formation of 
medical practice and ethics prior to the Enlightenment. Much depends on how one 
defines bioethics. My own understanding of the field has less to do with doctors making 
use of philosophical texts (something which has always happened) and more to do with 
non-medical actors directly influencing the professions' judgements of right and wrong 
behaviour. This is not the case in regards to Gregory who was a respected physician. In 
other words, there is a difference between Gregory using the work of Hume and Hume 
himself being called to testify before Parliament on medical ethics. 
Whether one agrees with McCullough or not, it is evident fi-om Gregory's work that 
medical ethics was still a matter of doctors prescribing to other doctors how to behave 
when dealing with each other, their patients, and the wider society. The same thread is 
evident in Thomas Percival's work. 
L. McCullough, 1999. Laying medicine open: Understanding major turning points in the history of 
medical ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9: 7-23. 
"McCuUough, 1998a. pp. 6-7, 
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Percival's Medical Ethics (sometimes referred to as the Code, shortened from its full title 
and to signify its later importance in the codification of professional medical ethics) was 
written in response to a request by the Manchester Infirmary to develop ethical guidelines 
for the city's new hospital.^* One the central aspects of this work was that Percival 
advocated that individual judgment be subordinated to collective decision making. Such 
an approach was necessary, in part, because of the nature of hospitals and the real 
possibility of professional differences between physicians, surgeons and apothecaries 
(and, of course, trustees). Divergent judgments over treatment were likely given the 
different training and traditions that each specialization derived from. Percival, by 
emphasizing formal conferences (today called rounds) and collaboration attempted to 
solve conflict by suspending the usual hierarchy, favouring collective decisions over 
individual ones, and providing a hospital faculty board for arbitration and adjudication. 
However, historians have differing interpretations of Percival's Code. As I mentioned 
earlier, Percival's desire to limit professional conflict is seen by Leake, Waddington and 
Berlant as evidence of his obsession with etiquette. Baker, meanwhile, views it as a 
contractual duty which enabled Percival to write 'the epitaph for individualistic virtue 
ethic in medicine', replacing it with notions of a 'collaborative profession committed to 
the development of a scientific, empirically based medicine, dedicated to treating the 
sick, whether rich or poor, and subjecting the treatment decision of individual 
practitioners to intra-subjective validation by their peers.'^' Jonathan Pickstone believes 
^^Historians of the hospital have pointed to numerous factors in the rise of the hospital, including the 
growth of trade, expansion of towns, increased social and geographical mobility, and recognition of the 
utility of having a single place to study disease and train professional doctors. The 'raison d'etre' of 
hospitals was their charity function: they were aimed at the 'deserving poor', i.e. the working poor, those 
from 'respectable' families who held promise of returning to the work force and criteria for admission 
tended to favour young and productive members of the labour force, afflicted by acute but brief illnesses 
from which rapid recovery was expected. See G. Risse, 1998. Medicine in the age of Enlightenment, pp. 
149-195, and L. Granshaw 1998. The rise of the modem hospital in Britain, pp. 197-218. Both in A. Wear, 
ed.. Medicine in Society: Historical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and, G. Risse, 1986. 
Hospital Life in Enlightenment Scotland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
" R . Baker, 1993. Deciphering Percival's Code. In R. Baker, D. Porter, and R. Porter, eds., TTie codification 
of medical morality: historical and philosophical studies of the formalization of Western medical morality 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Vol I, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 179-211. 
Baker does recognize the influence of biopolitics on Percival, but his account is questionable for two 
reasons: (1) his distinction between biopoHtics and bioethics is dubious, and (2) he argues that Percival was 
that Medical Ethics was the consequence of an Infirmary dispute in which Percival was a 
cenfral player.'*" Pickstone argues that the Manchester Infirmary Board wanted to make 
certain that a publicly embarrassing conflict over staffing numbers did not happen again 
and so asked Percival to devise a code of conduct. While this account is clearly accurate, 
I think it misses part of the picture. I agree fully with Haakonssen that an important and 
overlooked part of Medical Ethics was Percival's obsession with hygiene and fever 
confrol. In other words, the Code serves as an early (and exceptional) example of the 
connection between medical ethics and public health.'*' 
Evidence for this connection is throughout Medical Ethics. One fear was the risk of 
spreading disease within hospital wards. Measures to combat hospital bom illness pre-
occupied Percival. Much of the 'Notes and lUusfrations' section of Medical Ethics is 
filled with detailed prescriptions of how to sanitize wards and properly structure hospital 
grounds. Included are internal regulations for the House of Recovery, such as rules on 
changing bed linen, cleaning clothes, sanitizing floors and walls and proper removal of 
the dead.'*^  
At least one thing not in dispute is that Medical Ethics was syncretic in nature. The large 
number of sources that Percival drew upon include: an advisory committee of Manchester 
practitioners, which gathered existing regulations from hospitals across Britain; the work 
of John Gregory, from which Percival's language of moral sense and sympathy derives; 
and Thomas Gisbome, whose work provided Percival with the notion that the office of 
medicine had a professional duty, based in a societal-professional confract, to serve 
citizens in return for privileges such as the right to secure a 'lucrative occupation'.'*^ 
'transformed' from a biomedical politician to a biomedical ethicist, but such a transformation seems not 
only overly dramatic, it also (again) overstates the distinction between politics and ethics, 
^"j. Pickstone, 1993. Thomas Percival and the Production of Medical Ethics. In Baker, et al. The 
codification of medical morality, pp. 161-178. 
Haakonssen, 1997. 
"^ercival's Code, in Leake, 1975, p. 167-178. 
""For more on Gisbome, see: R. Porter 1993. Thomas Gisbome: Physicians, Christians and Gentlemen. In 
A. Wear, et al. eds. Doctors and Ethics, pp. 252-273. Porter argues that works like Gisbome's did not have 
a profound impact on medical ethics per se, but upon 'the ethics behind medicine'. Through their family 
and education, most doctors were familiar with Gisbomian precepts such as the value of the golden rule 
over raw ambition or personal glory. Porter credits Gisbome with influencing Percival to the extent that the 
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Albert Jonsen writes that after the 'significant works' of Gregory and Percival, Great 
Britain produced little original work in medical ethics for more than a century'*'*. The 
notion that doctors knew best how to regulate doctors was not challenged. According to 
Roy Porter, 'In a characteristically British manner, professional bodies judged that the 
decision [of ethical behaviour] must be left to the doctor's scmples. The ingrained habits 
of individuality, specific to English liberal politics, and the cult of the gentleman that 
formed the unspoken code of male elites ... meant that in professional eyes and, to a 
large degree, equally in the public mind the ethical dilemmas raised by medicine were 
best handled not by the law courts, jurists, academic philosophers or Parliament but by 
the integrity of private practitioners following clinical judgement and their own 
consciences''* .^ 
In evaluating the ethics of Gregory and Percival, we have seen that medical ethics was a 
topic discussed almost exclusively by doctors. Despite the changes in the medical world 
in the following century, this fact remained largely unchanged. 
Nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
Medical ethics in the nineteenth century was defined by increased codification of ethical 
standards.'*^ Again, this was a process done from within the medical profession. Indeed, 
Percival's work was instrumental in this regard. But in order to understand something of 
Code was deontological and not utilitarian. His article also aims to show the continued but sometimes 
neglected influence of religion in eighteenth century medical ethics. 
Jonsen, 1999, p. 62. 
R. Porter, 1995. Medical ethics, history of nineteenth century Great Britain. In W. T. Reich, ed. 
Encyclopedia ofBioethics, Vol. III. NewYork: Simon and Schuster MacMillan, p. 1553. 
In the United States Percival's Medical Ethics had been influential in the development of a Code of 
Ethics for the American Medical Association (AMA). Led by the efforts of Benjamin Rush, the AMA's 
Code accepted both Gregory's medical humanism (based on sympathy) and Percival's regulations on 
professional consultation and adjudication of disputes. For more on the AMA and its impact, see: R. Baker, 
A. Caplan, L. Emanuel, and S. Latham, eds., 1999. The American Medical Ethics Revolution: How the 
AMA's Code of Ethics has Transformed Physicians' Relationships to Patients, Professionals, and Society. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. For more on reciprocity in Anglo-American medical ethics, 
see C. Bums, 1995. Reciprocity in the Development of Anglo-American Medical Ethics, 1765-1865. In R. 
Baker, ed. The codification of medical morality: historical and philosophical studies of the formalization of 
Western medical morality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Vol. II, London : Kluwer, pp. 135-
14_4. 
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nineteenth century medical ethics, it is useful to first examine the context of medical 
practice. Impetus for greater regulation/codification in medical ethics lies in the diverse 
and confused state of the medical 'profession' in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The so-called tripartite division of medical men (as many have pointed out, it usually was 
men) consisted of physicians, surgeons and apothecaries. Physicians held university 
degrees and did not undertake manual labour. They were recognized as the highest order 
of the division and because of their education, had the right to oversee the other two 
branches. Surgeons treated external complaints (e.g. skin conditions, wounds), set 
broken bones, and performed simple operations. At the lowest part of the division, 
apothecaries dispensed prescriptions written by physicians but were forbidden - in 
theory, not practice - fi-om directly treating patients. 
Part of the need for greater regulation lay in the fact that the medical field was greatly 
overcrowded. Estimates indicate that there were approximately 10.7 practitioners per 
10,000 people in the 1840s for England and Wales'". This is almost double the amount of 
practitioners as in France during the same time period. Part of the reason lies in popular 
and thriving medical schools and part in the proliferation of alternative healers, which 
helped to crowd the market place of medical care. Overcrowding often meant greater 
choice and cheaper service for the public, but less income for the profession. Irvine 
Loudon shows how between 1781 and 1851, nominal earnings for surgeons and doctors 
was far below that of barristers, clergy, and engineers'**. In this context, it is not 
surprising that medical practitioners would advocate formal regulation of medical 
qualification and practice. 
The nineteenth century saw the formation of the the General Medical Council (GMC), 
the most important body in the UK for regulating the medical profession. With its powers 
granted firom Parliament, the GMC controls the register of those people judged competent 
T. Gelfand, 1993. The history of the medical profession. In W.F. Bynum and R. Porter, eds. Companion 
encyclopedia of the history of medicine. London: Routledge, pp. 1119-1150. 
I. Loudon, 1986. Medical care and the general practitioner, 1750-1850, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
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to practice medicine'* .^ The Council regulates entry to the register by deciding what 
qualifications are necessary to practice and has the authority to remove practitioners from 
the register temporarily, or permanently, when they have been judged incompetent and 
unfit to practice. The Council exercises it powers by coordinating medical education 
within the UK, including the inspection and accreditation of medical schools. As far as 
competency of practitioners, the GMC also examines complaints against the physical or 
mental fitness of registered doctors. As the GMC has no inspectorate, (i.e. it cannot act as 
a 'police force') it must rely upon outside parties to initiate complaints regarding 
professional misconduct^ * .^ 
In order to regulate the profession, the GMC established a single public register to 
recognize all legal practitioners. The profession was, in other words, symbolically united 
and defined over and against the 'Other', i.e., quacks, healers and fradesmen.^' The 
practice of healing by non-registered practitioners was not made illegal, but people not on 
the register were disqualified from holding public medical office. The primary rationale 
for the establishment of the GMC was 'to enable the public to identify those who were 
acceptably qualified as opposed to the one in three then thought to be practicing without 
qualifications'.^^ Added to this of course, was the demand within the profession to create 
the circumstances in which income and status could be improved and insured. 'Interests 
of the public', writes Stacey, 'were a secondary, not a primary consideration.'^^ 
R.G. Smith, 1995. Legal Precedent and Medical Ethics: Some Problems Encountered by the General 
Medical Council in Relying upon Precedent when Declaring Acceptable Standards of Professional 
Conduct, pp. 205-218. In R. Baker, Ed., 1995. The codification of medical morality: historical and 
philosophical studies of the formalization of Western medical morality in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries Vol. II, London : Kluwer; R.G. Smith, 1994. Medical discipline: the professional conduct 
jurisdiction of the General Medical Council, 1858-1990, Oxford : Clarendon Press; M. Stacey, 1993. The 
British General Medical Council and Medical Ethics. In G. Weisz, ed.. Social Science Perspectives on 
Medical Ethics, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 163-184; M. Stacey, 1992. Regulating 
British medicine : the General Medical Council, New York: Wiley. 
'"Stacey, 1992, p. 215. 
" R . Porter, 1993. Disease, medicine and society in England, 1550-1860. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 48 
"Stacey, 1992, p. 1. 
"Stacey, 1992, p. 20. GMC Minutes from 1858 to 1990 show that the types of cases include allegations of 
sexual, drug and alcohol offenses, financial improprieties, matters pertaining to abortion, drug prescription, 
breach of confidence/consent, and obtaining registration by fraudulent means. For a detailed correlation 
between the types of cases and the years they were brought before the Council, see Stacey, 1992, pp. 231-
366, 
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The GMC, Margaret Stacey believes, is often confused in the public mind with the BMA. 
While the former is a statutory body charged by an Act of Parliament, the BMA is a 
voluntary association of medical practitioners concerned to improve their own 'terms and 
conditions of service'^''. In accomplishing this, the BMA is naturally keen on making sure 
its members offer the best possible health care. It often seeks to influence the GMC on 
behalf of its members and on matters it considers important to the profession. However, 
neither the BMA, nor the Royal Colleges can directly influence the medical curriculum or 
strike practitioners off the register. 
The BMA, founded in 1832, was set up by medical doctors who were frustrated at the 
way in which their professional life was organized under the Royal Colleges and wanted 
a new organization to promote their needs. The primary aims of the early Association 
was to collect medical information, increase the spread of medical knowledge throughout 
England. During the 19th century, attempts to form a medical ethics committee within the 
BMA came to nothing. The subject was not entirely ignored, but ethical issues were 
addressed on an ad hoc basis. It was not until 1902 that a Central Ethics Committee 
(CEC) was set up to support the BMA's aim of maintaining the 'honour and interests of 
the medical profession'.^^ The CEC was the first time ordinary doctors in Britain had a 
national body to hear ethical matters without having to resort to hearings before the Royal 
Colleges or GMC. It was also the first time a national body had been available to settle 
disputes between individual practitioners^^. 
BMA ethics drew heavily from the work of Jukes Styrap, who recommended his own 
Code of Medical Ethics as the professional standard for Britain.^' The BMA did not adopt 
'^ Stacey, 1992, p. 14. 
" A. Morrice, 1999. 'Honors and Interests': medical ethics in Britain, and the work of the British Medical 
Association's Central Ethical Committee, 1902-1939. Unpublished MD thesis, University of London. 
'*According to Morrice, the medico-political pressures that finally contributed to the formation of the CEC 
included the availability of free medical care in outpatient voluntary hospitals, overcrowding, and 
interference of non-medical authorities in the profession. See Morrice, 1999 and 2002. 
" P. Bartrip, 1995. An Introduction to Jukes Styrap's A Code of Medical Ethics (J878) In R. Baker, 
Codification of medical morality, pp. 145-148; J. Styrap, 1878. A Code of Medical Ethics: The duties of 
medical practitioners to the public and to the profession at large, to each other, and to themselves. In 
Baker, pp. 149-172. 
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his offer, but Styrap's Code was recognized as the de facto, i f not de jure authority. Styrap 
drew heavily fi-om Percival in his advice to 'unite tenderness with firmness' in dealing 
with patients, to limit visits so as to not diminish the authority of the practitioner, to avoid 
'gloomy prognostications' and to not use 'secret nostrums' (medicines of undisclosed 
composition). Styrap also placed a high value on the merit of consultation with other 
doctors.'* 
Issues brought before the BMA and GMC in the 19th and early 20th centuries included 
both intra-professional disputes and issues with wider society.^' Morrice has shown that 
one key issue brought before the BMA and GMC was advertising, a significant problem 
within the profession. Adverts were associated with 'secret nostrums' (Percival's phrase) 
and unlawful abortions. Placing adverts was regarded as making an overt claim to 
superior quality, and therefore was considered to be not gentlemanly, i.e. unethical. 
Rather than associating themselves with profit making and trade, doctors relied on word 
of mouth for new clients. Advertising was seen as damaging to the professions social 
status and opposed to the ideal of a 'disinterested' professional. Success in curbing 
adverts was deemed vital in distinguishing practitioners from tradesmen and 'quacks'. 
Within the profession, there were disputes between registered and non-registered 
practitioners. For instance, warnings were issued against associating or seeking 
consultation from those not on the official register. In addition, the status of homeopaths 
created tension as to the definition and proper theories of acceptable therapeutics. 
Another issue was how to define the difference between 'general practitioners' and 
'consultants' and ensuring that non-registered practitioners were not being used in 
consultations. But the most crucial problem may have been finding a proper balance 
regarding trust amongst physicians (i.e. within the profession), and a doctors' duty to the 
well being of their patient. In other words, who maintained 'control' over the patient was 
a particular cause for ethical concern and debate.. 
Morrice, 1999. 
" The following list is compiled from Morrice, 1999 and 2002; and, J. S. Homer, 1994. The Development 
of Medical Ethics Within The British Medical Association, 1832-1993. Unpublished MD thesis. University 
of Manchester 
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In relation to physician-patient relationships, secrecy was a prime source of concem. This 
was often connected with sexual relations (i.e. abortion, illegitimate pregnancy, or 
divorce proceedings) and venereal disease. Interestingly, matters of consent were raised 
in the context of confidentiality more than in relation to surgery or other freatment. 
Morrice notes that this had more to do with 'honor and interests' than rights and 
autonomy. He writes, 
'In medico-legal texts consent for surgery (especially for sterilizing operations) was 
mentioned in the 1920s and to a greater extent in the 1930s. In terms of medical ethics, 
consent was cited in connection with the revelation of secrets. 'It is tempting to argue that 
the most dangerous thing a doctor could do to his best-paying patients at this time was 
not so much harm them physically without consent, but to rain them socially without 
consent. The injury in the latter case seemed as important to both doctor and patient as 
the possibility of physical harm, i f not more so'.^'' 
Medical ethics, it seems, was largely a virtue ethic based on gentlemanly values of group 
and individual honour, mediated by duties to fellow professionals. The goal of ethics was 
to distance medicine from notions of a 'trade' and establish 'disinterested' norms of 
medical conduct. 
As Morrice aptly puts it, 'medical ethics can be seen as an integral part of medicine's 
strategy of professionalization, by adjudicating between right and wrong behaviour where 
this is not defined by the law. It plays a key part in the continual re-negotiation of the 
social contract between profession, patients, and society, in the definition of the 
characteristics and role of doctors, and in the definition of who and what lies beyond the 
medical pale. Whilst the way in which attempts to maintain and promote the position of 
medicine have shifted as the medical and social context shifted, this basic formulation 
arguably holds trae in all periods.'^' 
' Morrice, 1999, p. 287. 
Morrice, 2002. p. 30. 
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Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that: 
• The sociological writings of Waddington, Berlant and Leake mischaracterise the 
history of medical ethics by conflating the term ethics with etiquette. Whilst 
historically medical ethics did appeal to the honour of physicians and the 
profession, this does not mean that issues lacked moral content. 
• The historiographical problem presented by the changing content of ethics can 
best be dealt with, in Maclntyre's words, by allowing the history of philosophy to 
break down our contemporary preconceptions, so that our parochial views of 
'what can and cannot be thought, said, and done are discarded in the face of the 
record of what has been thought, said, and done'. 
The Hippocratic Corpus in many ways set the tone for medical ethics by 
emphasising the importance of duties (i.e. beneficence) and decorum, that is the 
conduct befitting a member of the profession. The Oath, specifically, is 
paradigmatic of the history of medical ethics in that it can be read as an attempt 
by those trained in medicine to debate and adjudicate moral issues in their field. 
That is to say, medical ethics was self-regulatory. 
Evidence for this claim can be seen in the work of physician Gabriele de Zerbi's 
influential text Advice to Physicians which laid out a series of duties regarding the 
taking of fees and the preservation of the reputation of both individual doctors and 
the art of medicine as a whole. 
Further evidence for the self-regulatory nature of medical ethics can be found in 
the work of Gregory and Percival. The former based his system of ethics largely 
on Scottish moral sense philosophy as a means of promoting the credibility of the 
profession in a time of extreme variation amongst different types of healers and 
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medicines. Percival, another prominent physician, wrote a series of guidelines for 
hospital medicine, which developed a code that encouraged physicians, surgeons 
and apothecaries to limit professional rivalry and disputes - again, for the sake of 
not only patient health but the honour of medicine. 
• The nineteenth century, which witnessed a growth in the codification of ethics, 
still was largely a matter of doctors regulating doctors. As bodies such as the 
AMA, GMC, and BMA were established, it gave physicians the means by which 
to mediate infra-professional disputes. Critical issues during this time were the 
collection of fees, proper rules for consultation, secrecy, and advertising. 
I have provided this survey in order to better contextualise the birth of bioethics, in which 
the centuries long tradition described above began to break down in the face of wider 
social, political and technological change. 
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Chapter Three 
The birth of biomedical ethics: a history 
'And the final model [of the history of bioethics] which the people who drifted toward it 
would probably not identify as a model, is the one that most of us really secretly believe. 
This is the model that says history is one damned thing after another. "^^ 
— Daniel Fox 
Introduction 
In the last chapter we saw that historically moral issues were debated and resolved from 
within the medical profession itself. Whilst some have dismissed this as mere etiquette, 
I've argued that such distinctions fail to appreciate the moral content of past eras. In this 
chapter I explore the birth of bioethics, defined as a shift away from intra-professional 
regulation to a situation which allowed a greater role for outsiders in judging right and 
wrong in medical affairs. I begin with historians' views on the emergence of the field, 
and move into the aftermath of World War Two. I then examine the role of the courts and 
academia in the development of biomedical ethics. An underlying theme of the narrative 
is the growth of the principle of patient autonomy and the associated doctrine of informed 
consent. My discussion focuses on events primarily in the US and Britain and includes 
examples and cases from both clinical and research settings. Whilst there is distinction 
between the two, there is also potential and important overlap as I show in Chapter Six. 
That is, it is often in the clinical setting that samples for research are requested, consented 
to, and collected. Thus, the lines between clinic and research are sometimes blurred. 
Received views of the rise of bioethics 
There seem to be two main views or models as to the history of biomedical ethics. One 
common view is that bioethics developed in response to new and unprecedented medical 
technologies. This view, commonly identified with Albert Jonsen, holds that the field is 
the product of the incredible technological developments of the post-War era. Traditional 
62 D. Fox, 1993. View the second. The birth of bioethics: Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 23: 
S12. 
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moral arguments, this version goes, seem unsuited or unable to address new problems 
such as who should receive kidney dialysis or i f (and when) a person could be removed 
from life support machines. In light of technology's intervention into what were 
previously and only natural processes, religious and medical traditions have become 
incapable of resolving new dilemmas. An ethic internal to medicine could not solve these 
new problems that were more population based rather than patient focused (as in the case 
of the Tuskegee scandal in the US, or resource allocation conflict with dialysis). Jonsen 
writes, that 'Almost all the ethical problems faced by the old ethic could be resolved 
within the framework of a relationship between the professional and the patient; the 
ethical problems posed by the new medicine reflect the omnipresence of the population 
that stands behind the patient'.^^ 
A second view of the history of bioethics is that the turbulent 1960s rights movements 
spilled over into patient's rights. Warren Reich, for instance, argues along these lines.^ '* 
As the rights movement grew and courts progressively intervened on behalf of 
individuals, physicians increasingly feared prosecution. Yet doctors also found it difficult 
to forgo the beneficence model and simply accede to individual's wishes when those 
wishes meant harm and in some cases, the death of the patient. Some have suggested that 
bioethics, when pared down to its basics, is nothing more than assertion of patients' right 
to autonomy. At face value, this account does have appeal. One of the central tenets of 
bioethics, consent, is an effort to recognise and protect autonomy. As one observer of the 
conflict between beneficent paternalism and self-determination put it, the dialogue 
between professional and patient seemed to be: 'you may be trying to croak buddy, but 
I'm going to keep you alive whether you want to or not'.^ ^ 
Allied to both of these models is David Rothman's view that so-called 'strangers' or 
'outsiders' increasingly played a greater role in answering questions that were once the 
exclusive domain of medical professionals. Rothman, like Reich, links human research 
" A. Jonsen, 1990. The New Medicine and Old Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 35. 
" Reich, 1995; Whong-Barr. 2001. 
" S. Alexander, 1993. Thirty years ago. The birth of bioethics: Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 
23: S5 
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and patients' rights to the larger rights-oriented movements of the 1960s. Such linkage 
was assured because the 'great majority of research subjects were minorities, drawn from 
the ranks of the poor, the mentally disabled, and the incarcerated'.^^ Rothman sought to 
explain the transference of medical decision-making in the US from the authority of 
individual physicians to committees of lawyers, academics and government advisors. 
Rothman writes, 'attitudes and practices initially formulated to cope with laboratory 
practices' quickly spread to bedside practices, and as a result the social distance between 
doctor and patient widened, as it did between hospitals and communities (thus the 
'strangers' in his well known book title reflects a double meaning, as both physician and 
ethicist were suddenly outsiders to the patient).^' In time as doctor and community moved 
apart, the 'practical wisdom that the practitioner had accumulated over the years of 
clinical experience seemed less impressive and relevant than the wisdom that the 
philosopher or lawyer had accumulated through the study of first principles. In effect, 
bedside ethics gave way to bioethics'.^^ 
In my view, these models are not mutually exclusive, although, at times, proponents of 
them seem to suggest so. Whilst I do not mean to minimize differences or conflate 
accounts, I do believe that various models can be read as more or less complimentary. In 
the following section, I examine the context and issues that gave rise to changes in 
medical decision making. 
The impact of the Second World War: Nuremburg and Helsinki 
The atrocities of the Second World War gave new imperative to the need for the 
international codification of medical ethics and the involvement of non medical officials 
in developing regulations. The resulting codes gave primacy to the concept of informed 
consent but it must be noted that the history of consent pre-dates the Nuremburg Trials. 
In the nineteenth century there was a considerable body of literature on the dangers of 
human research, the most celebrated being Claude Bernard who wrote that one should 
D. Rothman, 1991. Strangers at the bedside: a history of how law and bioethics transformed medical 
decision-matdng. New York: Basic Books, p. 10. 
*'Rothinan, 1991, p. 11. 
_^othiTian, j 991, p. 11. 
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never perform an experiment 'which might be harmful', no matter the utility of the 
results.^ ^ Years later, in 1900, a directive from the Prussian Minister of Religious, 
Educational and Medical Affairs prohibited experiments on incompetent persons and 
required the consent of subjects in non-therapeutic clinical trials.™ And finally 
(somewhat ironically) in 1931 the German Reich had issued relatively strict guidelines 
(Richtlinien) regarding therapeutic and non-therapeutic human experimentation. The 
provisions, no less stringent than the Nuremberg Code, addressed questions of consent, 
research design, and special protection for vulnerable subjects. 
Despite these early guidelines, human experimentation continued unregulated and 
unabated. Experiments conducted during the Second World War are well known and 
require little introduction: oxygen deprivation; prisoners frozen to death; others infected 
with malaria, typhus, cholera, smallpox, then 'treated' experimentally; forced sterilization; 
twin studies that involved transplanted genitals and other organs; simulated battle 
wounds, allowed to infect, then either ignored or selected for sulphanilamide treatment. 
In Nuremberg, twenty German physicians and three administrators were charged with 
murders, tortures and other atrocities committed in the name of medical science.''" Seven 
defendants were imprisoned, nine were hung, and the remainder were acquitted'^. As part 
of the case, the Tribunal articulated ten basic principles to ensure ethical non-therapeutic 
medical research. These principles are now known as the Nuremburg Code [1947], the 
first tenet of which states: 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the 
person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be 
Quoted in Rothman, 1991, p. 23. 
™ A. H. Maehle, 2000. Assault and Battery, or Legitimate Treatment? German Legal Debates on the Status 
of Medical Interventions without consent, c. 1890-1914. Gesnerus 57: 206-221. 
'^ T. Beauchamp, R. Faden, and N. King, 1986. A history and theory of informed consent. New York: 
Oxford University Press, p. 154. 
Whilst it is generally assumed that Americans were largely responsible for the Nuremberg Tribunal, Paul 
Weindling has shown how British agencies contributed significantly to the process by conducting their own 
inquiries, briefing their American counterparts and providing extensive forensic evidence for the trial. See 
P. Weindling, 2001. The Origins of Informed Consent: The International Scientific Commission on 
-MedicaLWar Crimes, and the Nuremberg Code. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 75: 37-71. 
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able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, 
fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and 
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject 
matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision''^. 
The remainder of the first principle goes on to state the investigators' duty to disclose the 
nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to 
be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects 
upon the subject's health or person which may possibly come from their participation in 
the experiment.^ '* 
Subsequent principles addressed duties such as: the need for research to be directed 
towards a human good and not be random in nature; for research to be based on the 
results of animal experimentation; the need to avoid unnecessary physical or mental 
injury or death; and requirement that all work be conducted by scientifically qualified 
researchers. The Code also allows for the subject to withdraw from research and instructs 
the investigator to end experiments that develop in ways which seem likely to result in 
harm. 
The medical profession had many reservations about Nuremberg. Foremost amongst 
these was the concern that the Code seemed to forbid research on unconscious patients, 
psychiatric patients, and children. In addition, 'the Code's professional origin outwith 
[sic] medicine was a hindrance for its acceptance by the medical research community''^. 
As a result, the World Medical Association drafted the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) to 
address the different types and complexities of medical research and to allay scientists' 
concerns that Nuremberg may have been too restrictive on legitimate research. Helsinki 
introduced a division between therapeutic and non-therapeutic investigations. The former 
" The Nuremberg Code, United States v Karl Brandt, et al, 2000. Reprinted in J. Tobias and L. Doyal, eds. 
Informed Consent in Medical Research. London: BMJ Books, p. 3-4. 
Nuremberg Code, 2000, in Tobias and Doyal, p.3-4. 
U. Troehler, 2002. Human Research: From Ethos to Law, from National to International Regulations. In 
A. H. Maehle & J. Geyer-Kordesch, eds. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics: 
From Paternalism to Autonomy? Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 101. 
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is defined as research 'combined with patient care', whilst the latter is defined as purely 
scientific research without therapeutic value or purpose for the subjects studied. The 
Declaration introduces the concept of proxy consent for those incompetent to decide and 
for therapeutic research reads that consent is not required i f it is not 'consistent with 
patient psychology''* - a fairly vague phrase that, according to two observers, relies on 
the same beneficence-based premises as the physician's therapeutic privilege in [clinical] 
medical practice''. Successive versions of the Declaration made new amendments, 
including the introduction of the concept of ethics committees as a buffer between 
investigators and their research subjects.'^ 
In 1953, in between the Nuremburg and Helsinki codes, Britain's Medical Research 
Council's (MRC) issued guidelines regarding proper conduct in human research. The 
MRC document is worth quoting at some length since it nicely captures the British 
attitude at the time towards human experimentation: 
'To obtain consent of the patient to a proposed investigation in not in itself enough. 
Owing to the special relationship of trust which exists between a patient and his doctor, 
most patients wil l consent to any proposal that is made. Further, the considerations are 
nearly always so technical as to prevent their being adequately understood by one who is 
not himself an expert. It must, therefore, be frankly recognised that, for practical reasons, 
an inescapable responsibility for determining what investigations are, or are not, 
undertaken on a particular patient will rest with the doctor concerned'.'^ 
This extended quote illustrates the tension between an international movement to give 
research subjects greater rights and centuries long habit of leaving such decisions to 
physicians. It seems that whilst these codes set the goal for medical researchers, they in 
Declaration of Helsinki, 1964. British Medical Journal 2: 177. 
" Beauchamp, et al, 1986, p. 156. 
For a personal insight on the evolution of Helsinki and a commentary on its strengths and weaknesses, 
see P. Riis, 2003. Thirty Years of Bioethics: the Helsinki Declaration 1964-2003. New Review of Bioethics 
1: 15-25. 
-^Medical-Research Council, 1953. Draft Statement on Clinical Investigations, 9 October. 
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fact 'had virtually no impact on the research community, or the medical elite in Britain'*", 
or in clinical research elsewhere.*' In other words, the language and culture of beneficent 
paternalism pervaded the medical establishment as it sought to safeguard its reputation 
and control of research practice. The continuation of the status-quo is perhaps best 
illustrated by reference to two so-called 'whistle-blowers' who drew public attention to 
experiments conducted without consent. 
Beecher and Pappworth 
Another impetus for change in medical decision making came when two 'whistle-
blowers', Henry Beecher in the US, and later Maurice Pappworth in the UK, published 
articles exposing unethical design and practice in human research.*^ American physician 
Henry Beecher evaluated published accounts of scientific experiments and noted that 
consent had been achieved in only two out of fifty cases. Some of the experiments he 
highlighted involved a high degree of risk to the research participants, whom were often 
fi"om disadvantaged or minority populations and were unaware that they were being 
experimented upon. In one case, for example, investigators substituted placebos for a 
treatment that was known to be safe and effective. Beecher took his cases fi-om published 
academic journals and reasoned that even if 'only one quarter of them is truly unethical, 
this still indicates the existence of a serious situation'. Beecher wrote that it was 
'absolutely essential to strive for' informed consent and that for the concept to have any 
meaning, it was necessary that subjects understand what is being undertaken and hazards 
involved.'*^ Beecher further wrote that most of the violations derived fi-om 
'thoughtlessness and carelessness' and that only a 'truly responsible investigator' could 
safeguard against abuses.*" 
In Britain, another physician, Maurice Pappworth, drew considerable attention by also 
J. Hazelgrove, 2002. The Old Faith and the New Science: The Nuremberg Code and Human 
Experimentation Ethics in Britain, 1946-73. Social History of Medicine 15: 109-135. 
" Riis, 2003, p. 16. 
H. Beecher, 1966. Ethics and Clinical Research. The New England Journal of Medicine 274: 1354-1360; 
M. Pappworth, 1968. Human Guinea Pigs, Harmondsworth: Penguin, The term 'whistle-blower' has been 
used by Rothman, 1991. 
" Beecher, 1966, p. 1360. 
'iBeecher. 1966. p. 1356; p. 1355. 
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publishing accounts of unethical work. Pappworth had collected over five hundred 
papers that he believed involved unethical research. Pappworth attempted to publish his 
findings several times in the Lancet and was rejected each time, apparentiy being told 
that 'there is a wrong time and a right time to address issues like this publicly'^^ Having 
chosen the wrong time one too many times, a fi^strated Pappworth resorted to publishing 
his research as a book. Human Guinea Pigs, which makes for uncomfortable reading. In 
it, he detailed experiments on children, newborn babies, pregnant women, the mentally i l l 
and the dying. Pappworth emphasized the need for 'free and comprehending consent' 
with 'no coercion'.According to him, 'the voluntary system of safeguarding patients' 
rights has failed and new legislative procedures are absolutely necessary'. Pappworth 
recommended review prior to the conduct of research, compulsory disclosure during the 
experiment, especially of any possible risks no matter how minor. He thought that 
'public-spirited citizens, generous and courageous enough to accept the unpleasantness 
and the risk' would choose to volunteer as subjects, even i f the real purpose and 
procedures of the experiment were revealed.*' 
Curiously, the responses to Beecher and Pappworth differed dramatically. Beecher, while 
greeted with some scepticism, received considerable attention and was able to maintain 
his considerable public and professional standing. TIME magazine, for example, referred 
to him as 'Harvard's Dr. Beecher' and his writings were widely cited and reprinted as 
evidence in the ensuing debates over human experimentation in the US. Pappworth, on 
the other hand, was called a 'shrill', his work was described as 'slanted' and he was said to 
'lack the restraint' to write a 'more effective book'.** The Lancet, for instance, called his 
book a 'bitter analysis' by a 'dissatisfied man'. And, unlike Beecher's work. Human 
Guinea Pigs was barely cited in academic literature (and, I've discovered, is not easy to 
locate). 
P. Edelson, 2000. Henry K Beecher and Maurice Pappworth: informed consent in human 
experimentation and the physician's response. In J. Tobias and L. Doyal, eds. Informed consent in medical 
research. London: BMJ Books, p. 24. 
Pappworth, 1968, p. 209. 
" Pappworth, 1968, p. 217. 
JiEdelson, 2000, p. 24. _ 
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It must be noted, however, that Beecher's and Pappworth's allegations were remarkably 
similar and in some cases, they had unearthed and reported upon the same experiments. 
In fact, due to his work being in book form, Pappworth actually provided greater 
evidence and documentation for his claims, including author's names and institutions*^. 
Yet Beecher suffered none of the personal attacks that Pappworth received, and in many 
respects became a symbol and sponsor of medical reforms.^^ 
Official medical bodies in the UK also dismissed Pappworth. The reader will re-call that 
the GMC is the body responsible for disciplining physicians. Yet when a patient 
advocacy group wrote to the GMC asking what action they would take in light of 
Pappworth's book, the response was, 'The Council [is] not empowered to deal with 
matters of professional conduct which, though they may be open to criticisms, do not 
raise the question of infamous conduct'.'' Although the GMC did eventually launch a 
working party to examine standards of ethical human research, it took six years to make 
any recommendations public. 
The government was hardly more supportive. Responding to a series of questions about 
Pappworth's allegations, government spokesmen gave the following replies; 'Allegations 
that doctors in the UK have carried out unauthorised experiments on NHS patients are not 
based on fact'; The allegations cannot be ground on which the apparatus of public 
scrutiny should be brought into play. They have been promptly denied by hospital 
authorities', and; 'The medical profession have for generations been guided by strict 
codes'.'^  
Critical to understanding these differences is the stature and position of both Beecher and 
Pappworth. Paul Edelson has argued that the responses to Beecher's and Pappworth's 
allegations were 'intimately associated' with the professional status of each man and not 
" Surprisingly, Edelson does not make the connection, but indeed one must wonder if Pappworth's naming 
of violators was a contributing factor in his dismissal by the British medical establishment. 
Writing retrospectively, Pappworth has taken issue with attacks on his professionalism, writing 'those 
who dirty the linen and not those who wash it should be criticised'. M. Pappworth, 1990. "Human guinea 
pigs" - a history. British Medical Journal 301: 1456-1460. 
'^ Edelson, 2000, p.25. 
'i£delson,_2000,_p..25. 
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the objective quality of their evidence^^ When he published his accounts, Beecher was at 
the peak of a brilliant career that included over two hundred published articles, a chair at 
Harvard and a post as head of an internationally recognised anaesthesiology programme. 
Meanwhile, Pappworth was a junior physician and a free-lance medical teacher, 
specialising in preparing medical students for the enfrance examinations to the Royal 
College of Physicians. According to Edelson, Pappworth was told that he 'would never be 
appointed to a hospital consultancy' or become a medical specialist since he was 
Jewish.''* This, of course, is difficult to prove, but the response to his allegations, in 
comparison to Beecher's are noteworthy and disturbing. 
I agree with Edelson's conclusion that the different reactions to Beecher and Pappworth 
highlight the social context in which medicine operates, in which personal and 
professional spheres are not necessarily separated. Edelson argues that no matter the 
objective and scientific validity of an argument and its supporting data, the acceptance of 
a thesis is dependent upon personal judgements, preferences, and prejudices of those 
living in particular cultures, and at specific historical times. Although such contingencies 
affect whether a community accepts or rejects ethical norms, this point is not often 
discussed. But, as Edelson writes, 'it should be no surprise that, whatever activities 
human beings participate in, they are clearly coloured by human culture'.'^ 
This rather simple point, I believe, is often overlooked - or, when acknowledged, not 
given its proper weight. Later, when discussing genetic epidemiology, I shall return to 
this theme and evaluate the role of social processes that shape the presentation, 
acceptance and/or rejection of ethical issues in genetics. 
Next, however, I examine the growth of consent requirements as dictated by the courts in 
the UK and US. 
The development of informed consent 
" Edelson, 2000, pp. 22-27. 
Edelson, 2000, p. 23. 
Edelson, 2000, p. 26. _ 
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Since informed consent originated as a legal concept, it is not surprising that lawyers and 
judges were the first outsiders to challenge the authority of the medical profession. 
However, I again stress that these phases in the development of biomedical ethics overlap 
and are not mutually exclusive. At different times and in different places, both internal 
and external actors can be seen to be at play to varying degrees. Whilst the role of 
outsiders grew, obviously this did not necessarily translate into an immediate cessation of 
authority on behalf of the medical profession. At times the courts involvement did not 
mean a diminution of physician's authority. For example, courts often left it largely to the 
profession to decide the standard of information necessary to convey, as well as diagnosis 
and treatment options. 
Historians offer two differing historical interpretations regarding consent. Martin Pemick 
argues that 'truth-telling and consent seeking have long been part of an indigenous 
medical tradition, based on medical theories that taught that knowledge and autonomy 
had demonstrably beneficial effects on most patients' health' .He acknowledges that the 
social context of previous eras were not rights oriented, but asserts that legal writings on 
informed consent can be traced back to at least the early twentieth century. 
However, Jay Katz believes that 'the history of the physician-patient relationship from 
ancient times to the present... bears testimony to physicians' inattention to their patients' 
rights and need to make their own decisions. Little appreciation of disclosure and consent 
can be discerned in this history'.^^ Katz argues that none of the previous historical 
attempts to provide truthfulness are based on a felt need that patients should comprehend 
their situation so as to be able to determine for themselves whether they wish to 
participate. While Katz accepts that consent to surgical intervention is an ancient legal 
concept, he believes that 'there was no right for patients to decide, after having been 
informed, whether an intervention was agreeable to them in light of its risks and benefits 
M. Pemick, 1982. Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed 
Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, pp. 1 -33. 
J. Katz, 1984. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. New York: Free Press. 
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as well as available alternatives'.^* 
In discussing these interpretations, Beauchamp and Faden make a usefiil distinction 
between a beneficence model and autonomy model of a physician's responsibilities to 
their patient.^ ^ The latter, as they use the term, is the view that 'the physician's 
responsibilities of disclosure and consent seeking are established primarily by the 
principle of respect for autonomy' and self-determination.A beneficence model depicts 
the need to disclose information to a patient on the basis that a doctor's chief duty is to 
provide medical benefits and maximize the patient's health, even i f a decision 
contravenes the patient's expressed wishes.'*" I would endorse Beauchamp and Faden's 
distinction and their view that physicians historically have operated out of a beneficence 
model when 'consenting the patient'. They write, 'The beneficence model not only 
traditionally dwarfed any nascent autonomy model in medical practice but led to an 
environment in which autonomy figured insignificantly or not at all in reflections about 
disclosure. The consent practices emerging from this context were not meaningful 
exercises of autonomous decision-making, despite the bows in the direction of respect for 
autonomy and truth-telling found in a few codes, treatises, and practices.'*'^  
The evidence, in my view, seems to support Katz. As early as 1767 courts introduced the 
idea that patients needed to know certain details about the proposed treatment but only in 
order to maximise the chances of a successful surgery. In that year the British courts 
heard the case of Slater v Baker and Stapleton, in which the plaintiff (Slater) hired two 
doctors to remove bandages from his leg, which had been broken and set. Over the 
plaintiffs protests, the doctors re-fractured the leg and used an experimental apparatus to 
sfretch and sfrengthen it. Slater took the case to court, which ruled in his favour. My 
point, however, is that the courts decision was made not from a commitment to patient 
self-determination but rather out of a practical requirement of preparing the patient for 
Katz, 1984. 
" Beauchamp and Faden, 1986, p. 59. 
Beauchamp and Faden, 1986, p. 59. 
Beauchamp and Faden, 1986, p. 59. 
'"^  Beauchamp and Faden, 1986, p. 60. Italics are original. Beauchamp and Faden, then, largely support 
Katz' thesis. 
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treatinent. Before administering anesthesia, it was thought to be 'reasonable that a patient 
be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put himself in such 
a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation.''^^ 
Whilst a detailed frans-Atlantic comparison is beyond this thesis, there is some evidence 
that the doctrine of self-determination had a greater resonance in the US, which is not 
entirely surprising given the American ethos of individualism (a topic I shall return to in 
the next chapter). In 1914, the landmark case Schloendorff v Society of New York 
Hospital firmly established the legal principle of self-determination. The importance of 
this case was that it established that even i f physical harm did not result, it was the 
unauthorised physical touching of the patient and the subsequent affront to bodily 
integrity that constituted a battery. Even the motives, no matter how benign or noble, of 
the 'aggressor' were irrelevant. Justice Cardozo's famous declaration has been widely 
cited in medical jurisprudence: 
'Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without the patient's 
consent commits an assault.' 
As Mason and McCall Smith note, however, 'the theory, then, is quite simple - the 
reality is somewhat different.'"'^ 
For instance, in Britain, the 1957 case Bolam v Friem Hospital Management Committee 
left decisions as to the amount of information necessary to disclose to the physician.'*'* In 
Bolam, a man with schizophrenia was administered elecfroconvulsive therapy (ECT) 
without being consfrained or being administered relaxant drugs. At the time, there were 
contrary opinions on whether patients receiving ECT should be given relaxants or else be 
manually restrained. The debate centred on whether or not such control would increase 
Beauchamp and Faden, 1986, pp. 53-77. 
J. Mason and A. McCall Smith, 1999. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths, p. 245. 
105 1 Mason and McCall Smith, 1999, p. 245. 
Mason and McCall Smith, 1999, pp. 280-282. 
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or decrease the patients' chances of injury due to their convulsive movements caused by 
the shocks. As it happened, the plaintiff in the case dislocated both of his hip joints and 
fractured his pelvis, direct results of the shock treatment. 
The court, however, found that in restraining the patient and not informing him of the 
risks of physical injury associated with ECT, doctors had not in fact breached their duties. 
In a statement that has since become the benchmark of standards, Justice McNair wrote: 
'[A doctor] is not guilty of negligence i f he has acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art.' 
Named the 'Bolam Principle', this essentially leaves it to the medical profession to 
dictate the standards of conduct and has been found to apply to cases of diagnosis, 
freatment, and information disclosure. 
This decision was supported and extended in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the 
Bethlem Royal Hospital 1985.'°' In this case, English courts were given their first chance 
to determine the extent of a doctors duty of disclosure. Mrs. Sidaway required an 
operation to alleviate recurrent neck and shoulder pain. The procedure left her partially 
paralyzed, as a result of damage to her spinal column. However, there was no question of 
negligence of performance on the surgeons behalf The operation carried between a one 
and two percent risk of damage to the nerve root, a risk that the physician considered too 
slight to mention. Unfortunately, the doctor died before the start of the trial leaving little 
hard evidence as to what was said. This however did not stop the court from reaching a 
fairly conclusive verdict. Although the court agreed that Mrs. Sidaway would not have 
chosen to have the operation i f she had been more informed (thus electing to live with the 
recurrent pain), the judges nonetheless upheld the professional judgment standard. In 
other words, the Bolam principle was deemed as applicable to information disclosure. 
Judges Bridge and Lord Keith agreed that the degree of disclosure 'must primarily be a 
matter of clinical judgment' to be determined 'primarily on the basis of expert medical 
evidence, applying the Bolam test'."^* 
Mason and McCall Smith, 1999, pp. 280-283. 
H. Teff, 1994. Reasonable care: legal perspectives on the doctor-patient relationship. Oxford: 
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It should be noted that much has been made of a dissenting view in Sidaway. Lord 
Scarman, writing in the minority, embraced a patients' rights doctrine of informed 
consent, arguing that the professional standard 'leaves the determination of a legal duty to 
the judgment of doctors.' Lord Scarman's view, while a minority in the courts, is 
reflected in wider opinion. Even while the Bolam Principle remains the accepted legal 
standard, even many medical organizations recognizes that the true ethical position is 
indeed Lord Scarman's opinion.'''^ 
As years passed, the general culture of patients' rights took hold, medical bodies have 
responded to the changing environment. For example, the BMA's 1980 Ethics Handbook 
contains two pages on consent; its 1993 edition contains over thirty-five pages on the 
subject. The later edition states, 'As a prerequisite to choosing treatment, patients have 
the right to receive information from doctors and to discuss the benefits and risks of 
appropriate treatment options.'"" On how much information to provide, 'the ethical 
viewpoint' is that 'the criteria should be as much information as the patient needs or 
desires.'"' 
I do not wish to overstate the uniqueness of outsiders having an interest in medical ethics. 
Critics of the conventional view of bioethics are right to point out that philosophers and 
theologians have debated medical issues since the dawn of medicine. The difference, I 
believe, is that non-medical actors have had greater influence in clinical and research 
settings in a way previous generations of 'strangers' did not. The 'new outsiders' ( if I 
may use such a phrase) have come to hold considerable power by serving on committees, 
seeking media attention, and appearing before and on government panels (the very 
establishment of which is further evidence of outside authority being placed on 
medicine). Many concepts and rules put forward by the new outsiders have come to be 
Clarendon Press, p. 209. 
For example, see British Medical Association's Handbook on Ethics, 1980. 
BMA, 1993, p. 3. 
BMA, 1993, p. 3. What these cases show, I believe, is the uneven development and appUcation of 
consent requirements. Historical change is rarely straight forward or linear. Whilst the twentieth century 
witnessed a dramatic growth in self-determination, the actual enforcement was slow given centuries long 
practice of beneficent paternalism. 
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adopted and promoted by the medical profession, in part, because they have considered it 
to be in their own interest. 
The story of consent forms only part of a larger picture regarding the birth of bioethics. I 
now turn to the role played by theologians and philosophers in developing many of the 
normative claims adopted by mainstream bioethics. 
Academia joins the party 
It is conventional wisdom that the birth of bioethics was greatly encouraged and 
facilitated by theologians and academic religious scholars. A number of Christian 
theologians played a leading part in challenging the expanding power of medicine. In this 
section I wish to continue the story by briefly looking at some of the early writings of 
these figures before moving on to discuss a particular case where theologically trained 
persons external to medicine played a critical role in the transition from medical ethics to 
bioethics. My particular case is that of ethics teaching in British medical schools. From 
this example, it is clear that whilst religion was present at the birth of bioethics, it soon 
became marginalised under the demands to reach a wider audience and to achieve greater 
input in a largely secular society. This point then leads to the following section, where 
analytical philosophy enters the stage and we see the emergence of the four principles 
approach, bioethics' most cherished method. 
According to Daniel Callahan, 'In the early days of bioethics there was an interesting 
debate between the views of Joseph Fletcher - who never said no- and Paul Ramsey -
who usually said no and who argued that the capacity to do so was a test of moral 
seriousness ... It appears that Fletcher won the day.' Known for the idea of 'situation 
ethics' (a topic I return to in chapter seven) Fletcher's ideas seemed radical in the mid 
1960s when they were first published, but have become standard fare and part of 
establishment thinking today. Fletcher advocated a re-thinking of fraditional Protestant 
notions of ethics. He believed that without the freedom to choose and the right to know 
the truth, patients were only 'puppets', and that 'choice and responsibility' lay at the 
D. Callahan, 1996. Bioethics, our crowd, and ideology. Hastings Center Report 26: 3-4. 
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'heart of ethics.' Such ideas committed Fletcher to being far more open minded about 
topics such as abortion and euthanasia than most theologians at the time (or, perhaps 
today even, not withstanding my claim about his ideas now seem commonplace in secular 
bioethics)."^ 
On the other end of the spectrum, as Callahan indicated, was Paul Ramsey who adopted 
more orthodox Protestant views."'* Central to Ramsey's thinking was the idea of a 
covenant and a cardinal canon of loyalty which joined people together. Ramsey declared 
that consent was ' statement of fidelity' and developed a bioethic that challenged the 
medical establishment to see the 'patient as person'. His work was instrumental in 
establishing the importance of fiduciary obligations between professionals and patients 
and in highlighting the vulnerability of the latter when i l l . 
Never to be outdone. Catholic writers also entered the fray. Or, to be more precise, re-
entered since Catholic moral theology had long been concerned with medical matters"^. 
One of the most prominent writers was Richard McCormick who advocated a theological 
notion of human dignity. According to McCormick, the highest possible end of human 
life was a person's ability to love God and neighbour. I f person's illness led to a quality 
of life that seriously diminished their ability to love God, then for that person, life had 
ceased to have value (even though the person themselves were undoubtedly valued by 
their loved ones)"^. Thus, under such circumstances, the removal of technological 
measures would be permitted. According the McCormick, the very purpose of life could 
be put at risk by serious illness and physical suffering even more than by death, where, 
presumably the i l l would be able to resume their love of God in the Kingdom of Heaven. 
Of course my brief review of these three Christian theologians is highly selective and 
simply intended to illustrate that in the very early days of bioethics, the theologically 
' " j . Fletcher, 1966. Situation Ethics. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, p. 33 and p. 10 respectively. 
"•* P. Ramsey, 1970. TTie Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics, New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
C . Curran, 2003. The Catholic Moral Tradition in Bioethics. In J. Walter, et al. The Story of Bioethics: 
From Seminal Works to Contemporary Explorations, pp. 113-130. 
R. McCormick, 1974. To save or let die. Journal of the American Medical Association 229: 172-176. 
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minded were active in the field."' My own research on medical ethics teaching in Britain 
supports this view, as I explore in some detail in the following section. 
From medical ethics to bioethics in British medical schools"^ 
Today, ethics is an established component of medical education."^ This was not always 
the case however. Whilst John Gregory, discussed in the previous chapter, taught ethics 
to his students in eighteenth century Edinburgh, ethics has historically been a very minor 
element of medical education and only recently a part of formal curriculum. In the US, 
for instance, one of the first medical ethics programs was initiated in only 1967 at the 
Pennsylvania State University College of Med ic ine .By 1972, however, seventeen US 
institutions had special programmes on medical ethics, four schools had a required 
course, and ethics was discussed, though not the subject of a special class, in eighty-one 
US institutions.'^' 
In Britain, the history of medical ethics education makes for a nice example of an 
outsider (with theological but no medical training) coming to exert considerable influence 
on the establishment of ethics curriculum through the London Medical Group. 
Origins 
The London Medical Group (LMG) was an independent, non-partisan, multi-disciplinary, 
and largely student run organization'^^. Established in 1963, four years before 
Pappworth's famous critique of human experimentation, the LMG was one of the earliest 
I have omitted any number of religious voices - not to mention Churches and the Vatican themselves 
which weighed in from time to time (and still do) with bioethical pronouncements. For a thoughtful 
analysis that explores the tensions between religion and bioethics, see: C . Messikomer, R. Fox, and J. 
Swazey, 2001. The presence and influence of religion in American bioethics. Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 44: 485-508. 
This section is based on: M. Whong-Barr, 2003. Clinical ethics teaching in Britain: a history of the 
London Medical Group. New Review in Bioethics 1: 73-84. 
K. W. M Fulford,., A. Yates, and T. Hope, 1997. Ethics and the G M C core curriculum: a survey of 
resources in U K medical schools. Journal of Medical Ethics 23: 82-87. 
'^ ^ D. Barnard, and K . D. Clouser, 1989. Teaching medical ethics in its contexts: Penn State College of 
Medicine, Academic Medicine 64: 744-746. 
R. Veatch, and S. SoUitto, Medical ethics teaching: report of a national medical school survey. Journal 
of the American Medical Association 235: 1030-1033. 
' ^ This section is based on L M G literature and interviews with two key figures in the history of the 
Medical Groups, Ted Shotter (former Dean of Rochester) and Kenneth Boyd (University of Edinburgh). 
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attempts of the medical profession to respond to 'new' ethical dilemmas in medicine. For 
twenty-five years, the LMG organized a series of lectures, symposia and conferences 
throughout London's twelve teaching hospitals and was an early impetus for more formal 
'non-dogmatic' medical ethics teaching.'^ ^ 
The LMG's roots lie in the ecumenical movement of the 1960s when an American (note 
the irony!) physician and clergyman, Andrew Mepham, first highlighted the need for 
such an organization (Boyd, forthcoming). In the early 1960s, Mepham was 
commissioned by the Student Christian Movement (SCM), the student wing of the 
ecumenical movement within the UK, to study the needs of British medical school 
students. Mepham's conclusions echoed a frequent criticism of modem medical practice: 
that it risked becoming pre-occupied with scientific training and diseased tissue, instead 
of a thorough understanding and care for the 'patient as person'. In response to the report, 
the SCM asked one of its staff, Ted Shorter, to devise a way for clinical medical students 
to engage with medical humanities and the wider society. 
Shorter, then a university chaplain, was instrumental to the success of the LMG. In 1963, 
with a budget of only forty pounds, he organized a series of lectures to encourage a 
dialogue between interested parties. His role grew in time and he eventually became 
Director of Studies, one of the few paid staff members of the LMG. Funding for the 
group came from charitable donations. The Queen provided an annual donation and the 
group relied heavily on funds fi-om the King Edward VII Hospital Fund for London. It 
also received annual grants fi-om the Trustees and Deans of the twelve London teaching 
hospitals and medical schools and the Diocese of London.'^ '* Such diverse sources of 
funding illustrate the significant interest in ethics not only on behalf of the profession by 
charitable bodies, as well. 
^" R . Gillon, 1987. Editorial: Medical ethics education. Journal of Medical Ethics, 13: 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 . 
' ^ • • E . F . Shotter, 1984 . Unpublished paper delivered to the G M C conference on the teaching of medical 
ethics. The elements involved in teaching medical ethics to doctors and medical students: the view of the 
Society Jbr the Study of Medical Ethics. _ 
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Activities and organization 
Initially, the LMG ran twice weekly symposia, which were held throughout London's 
teaching hospitals. Crucial to the success of the group was the manner in which topics 
and speakers were chosen. Topics were first selected by a representative council of 
approximately twenty medical students. A consultative council comprised of senior 
members of the medical faculty helped identify the speakers appropriate for the topic 
chosen by students. It then became Shotter's responsibility to liase with speakers, who 
included both clinicians and non-medical specialists from areas such as law, theology, 
and the social sciences. On average the LMG hosted two hundred speakers per year, all 
of whom spoke without fee. Presenters never spoke in their own hospital, which allowed 
sensitive topics to be discussed without the risk of personalizing them or jeopardising 
confidentiality. Talks were free and open to the public; average attendance varied widely 
but was approximately one hundred per session.'^ ^ 
Although Shotter was an outsider, certain segments of the British medical establishment 
were keen in debating the dilemmas posed by technological medicine. The system 
described above, where students selected the topics and consultants identified the 
speakers, prompted Lord Rosenheim, President of the Royal College of Physicians, to 
describe the LMG as 'a pincer movement on the profession', undertaken by its 'cadets 
and senators' The implication was that i f the current and next generation of leaders in 
medicine combined forces, then the profession as a whole was somehow squeezed into 
openly debating delicate issues that it may otherwise wish to keep behind closed doors. 
But, somewhat paradoxically, this process, or 'pincer movement', helped to allow 
sensitive topics to be raised and openly debated without jeopardizing the position of 
participants. In Shotter's view, once students became junior doctors, they 'lost their 
tongue' and sacrificed their ability to publicly question contentious issues without risking 
their newfound position.'^' It seems a plausible claim to make: arguably, medical 
students are often allowed fi-eedoms not enjoyed once they formerly enter the profession 
and undertake clinical responsibilities. At the same time, consultants were somewhat 
' ^ ' E . F . Shotter, ed. 1988. Twenty-five years of medical ethics, London; Institute of Medical Ethics. 
Shotter, 1984. 
E . F . Shotter, 2002. Transcript from personal interview with author. 
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protected by their senior status. The LMG offered them an opportunity to reflect on 
changing clinical possibilities that occurred in their careers, such as transplantation and 
128 
euthanasia. 
In line with my overall thesis, however, it is clear that the LMG was not entirely an 
internal movement. Shotter's position as a non-medical official was crucial to the success 
of the group. Not trained in medicine, he was able to ask questions about medical 
decision-making that students or doctors could not ask - either because they were 
expected to be part of the consensus, or else they could not publicly admit to not knowing 
the answers. Shotter describes his role in the formation of the LMG as being a 'catalyst' 
who facilitated and helped coordinate dialogue on potentially contentious issues. His role 
was a delicate one. One colleague at the time described his efforts as a 'fool rushing in 
where angels fear'.'^' Interestingly, in twenty-five years of involvement, Shotter never 
gave a paper and only chaired two sessions ~ one, when a presenter went to the wrong 
hospital leaving the LMG in a bind. 
Unsurprisingly, there was a degree of resistance to public discussion of ethical issues in 
medicine. The history of the LMG suggests a reluctance amongst some segments of the 
profession to allow greater public debate. Shotter has claimed that 'When I started it was 
quite clear that there was a body of opinion [that] didn't want these topics discussed at 
all.''^*' One senior paediatrician at the time is known to have said that such issues were 
only to be discussed 'by consultants with consultants and in camera'.'^' Resistance, 
however, was weakened by both the structure described above and, arguably, by the sheer 
pace of developments. Debates in the 1960s on topics such as abortion were subsumed in 
the 1970s and 1980s by technological developments in reproductive medicine and 
genetics. 
K. Boyd, 2002. Transcript from personal interview with author. 
Shotter interview, 2002. 
Shotter interview, 2002. 
Boyd, forthcoming. 
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According to Shotter, allowing students to select the topic helped maintain interest and 
contributed to the appeal of the LMG. Lecture lists reflect both student interest and 
societal context. Topics often extended beyond traditional medical issues. They included 
discussions of: marriage guidance, bisexuality, war, nuclear power and weapons, 
cannabis use, obesity, guilt, poverty, the welfare state, and unemployment. Alongside 
these were lectures considered standard fare for today's bioethical agenda, such as: truth-
telling, mental health, animal ethics, end of life issues, new reproductive technologies, 
AIDS, resource allocation, and ethical problems raised by clinical t r i a l s . I n addition to 
weekly lectures, the LMG held study seminars and an annual conference that attiacted 
several hundred attendees.'^ ^ 
Evolution and influence of the LMG 
The success of the LMG enabled it to extend to other locations outside of London. 
Kenneth Boyd (also theologically trained) coordinated the second group in Edinburgh in 
1967; the same year Newcastle became the third group to form. By 1987, the Medical 
Groups had expanded to seventeen medical schools across England, Scotland, and Wales. 
Al l Medical Groups followed a similar organizational structure, with student 
representative councils and senior consultative councils. Each group also had a 
coordinating secretary that helped facilitate events. The spread of the LMG into an 
autonomous but affiliated network of Medical Groups helped illustrate that the relevance 
of the issues were not limited to London's teaching hospitals. 
During its twenty-five years, the LMG underwent several re-organizations and gradually 
severed itself fi"om its theological roots. It grew independent of the Student Christian 
Movement in 1974 and joined the Society for the Study of Medical Ethics (SSME), a 
body developed by former LMG students who wanted to expand ethical discussion 
beyond the undergraduate level to public and professional discourse. A year later, the 
LMG and SSME evolved into the Institute of Medical Ethics (IME), which is still active 
today. Amongst the IME's projects is the highly successful Journal of Medical Ethics 
L M G lecture hsts, 1963-1989. 
Shotter, 1984. 
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{JME) which began in April 1975 with fiinding fi-om the Kleinwort Foundation. 
According to Shorter, members of the Foundation became interested in the issue of 
artificial prolongation of life when an employee had been sustained artificially. The 
Foundation wanted to impact the debate, so Shotter asked them to help fund the start of 
the JME. As a result, Kleinwort underwrote the Journal with charitable fiinding for its 
first ten years. Today, the Journal is a partnership between the IME and the BMJ 
Publishing Group. It pulls approximately one third of its readership from UK, one third 
from the US, and a third firom the rest of the world.Interestingly, the first editor of the 
JME, Alaistair Campbell, was theologically trained and taught Christian ethics. Recent 
editors, however, have been two of the most anti-religious and secularly minded 
bioethicists in the business - John Harris and Julian Savulescu. 
A number of seminal research projects were also supported by the Medical Groups and 
the IME. These include The Dictionary of Medical Ethics, which appeared in 1977. 
Revised in 1984, many of its contributors had been Medical Group presenters. Another 
project was The Pond Report on the Teaching of Medical Ethics. Published in 1987 and 
edited by Boyd, the Report was named after its chairman. Sir Desmond Pond FRCPsych, 
who died before the findings were made public. The Pond Report aimed to survey the 
field of medical ethics teaching in Britain, discuss future options, and make 
recommendations. The report's findings highlighted the influence of the Medical Groups. 
Twenty-one of twenty-six medical school Deans responded that students were 
encouraged to participate in their local Medical Group and that many staff also attended. 
One Dean stated that the Medical Group 'effectively produced a good alternative 
curriculum' 
This quote suggests, however, that the Medical Groups, paradoxically, limited the growth 
of ethics curriculum in medical education. With the existence of a group in a medical 
school, there was, arguably, less incentive for Deans to outlay financial and human 
Shotter interview, 2002. 
K . Boyd., ed. \9il.Report of a working party on the teaching of medical ethics. London: I M E 
Publications, p. 25. 
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resources to develop a more formal ethics curriculum or hire an ethics lecturer.'^^ It is 
difficult to assess how much truth there is to this claim. According to the Pond Report, 
Deans were reluctant to introduce ethics as a 'separate subject' and preferred informal 
clinical teaching. In line with this, the Pond recommendations suggested multi-
disciplinary teaching spread at regular intervals throughout a student's medical education. 
In many ways, this is why medical ethics teaching today is spread out through a student's 
education and not in one-off 'ethics' classes. 
As the Pond recommendations were implemented, both the GMC and BMA lent their 
weight to the establishment of an ethics curriculum in British medical schools. 
However, as Deans began appropriating funds for ethics lecturers, the LMG received a 
decrease in contributions. In Shotter's view, this development was a sign of success, that 
the LMG has essentially fulfilled its task of generating greater opportunities for students 
to discuss medical humanities and ethical issues raised by the practice of medicine. In 
1989, the LMG officially disbanded, although today a smaller group still organises events 
(e.g. at Guy's, St. Thomas's, and the Royal Free hospitals in London). 
Given the influence of the Medical Groups, it is not surprising that many senior figures in 
British biomedical ethics have in one way or another been associated with them. The late 
Sir Douglas Black, a pioneer in British medicine and Chairman of the Black Report 
(famous for its devastating critique of health inequalities) was also a former IME 
President. At least two Chief Medical Officers, Kenneth Caiman and Liam Donaldson 
were coordinating secretaries of their local Medical Groups (Glasgow and Leicester, 
respectively). 
TTie declining influence of religion in bioethics 
Looking at the origins of British bioethics, we have seen that the LMG began with 
considerable religious influence. The report which led to the establishment of the LMG 
was commissioned by the student ecumenical arm of the Church. Many key figures in the 
Shotter interview, 2002. 
Gillon, 1987. 
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Medical Groups, including speakers, coordinators, and JME editors, were theologically 
trained. In addition, the first LMG lecture lists state that the organization aims 'to create 
in the medical schools a dialogue between belief and non-belief. By the end of the 1960s 
however, the lecture lists describe the LMG as 'a student group for the study of issues 
raised through the practice of medicine which concern other disciplines'.'^* According to 
Shotter and Boyd (personal communication) the change was not a question of abandoning 
a religious stance as much as an attempt to involve the widest possible audience of 
students and staff. It must be said however, that the effect is the same: a decline in 
religious input. 
As the LMG sought to broaden its appeal, it also narrowed its focus. Both the Pond 
committee and medical school Deans were concerned to avoid medical ethics as a 
specialist subject, a phenomenon that, in their view, came to dominate US ethics 
teaching. There was also a consensus on the need to concentrate on clinical issues.'^' 
Undoubtedly, the emphasis on clinical matters has been crucial to the success of the 
LMG and the JME. Yet such a focus also comes with a price: it discourages analysis of 
the social processes that combine to create the very technology that helps generate moral 
dilemmas in the first place. For example, we have seen that medical students identified 
issues such as nuclear weaponry and the status of nature as ethical matters for discussion. 
Yet these issues have been marginalized in recent medical education in favour of debate 
on the ethical status of specific medical procedures and cases. Of course I do not deny the 
tremendous need to debate clinical dilemmas that students will face upon graduation. But 
critical review of the LMG lecture topics makes it evident that the agenda narrowed 
considerably to strictly medical issues. This is an issue I shall address further in Chapter 
Seven. 
The history of the LMG raises the interesting question of the declining influence of 
theology on bioethics in general. In her work, Renee Fox has shown how a tendency to 
focus on practical problem solving (as in the LMG, for instance) encouraged the 
138 
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development of a secularly oriented bioethics, whose aim was to maximise policy input 
and to achieve consensus in a pluralistic society.''*" 
Fox observes that secularisation in bioethics is also an 'instrumental, political, and moral 
response to a basic societal question that the whole phenomenon of American Bioethics 
poses: How can, and should, an advanced modem, highly individualistic pluralistic, and 
religiously resonant society, like the United States, founded on the precept of governance 
"under law", rather than "under men", and the sacredly secular principles of separation of 
church and state and freedom of belief, try to achieve collective and binding consensus 
about the kinds of bioethical issues that are now in the public domain?'''" 
As Fox notes, the need for consensus in a religiously pluralistic and increasingly secular 
society has played a large part in bioethics' methodological and practical commitment to 
principles. In attempting to adjudicate issues, it is not surprising that Beauchamp and 
Childress ground their approach on common morality theories, the so-called four 
principles approach, which I now turn to. 
The mother of all methods: principlism 
Arguably, the most dominant method in bioethics is principle-based. The hegemony of 
this approach owes much to the success of Tom Beauchamp's and James Childress' 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, now in its fifth edition.''*^ In early editions of 
Principles, Beauchamp and Childress adopt an approach of 'convergence' between rule 
utilitarianism and rule deontology.'''^ Thus, they emphasized prima facia duties (a term 
borrowed from W. D Ross's work and meaning, in general terms, that principles are not 
absolute but can be subordinated to other principles in particular circumstances) for the 
promotion of the welfare of others. By the fourth edition (1994) Beauchamp and 
Childress still accepted such a convergence but fi-amed their argument instead on the 
R. Fox, 1990. The evolution of American bioethics: A sociological perspective. In G . Weisz, Ed. Social 
Scientific Perspectives on Medical Ethics, Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Fox, 1990, p. 208. 
'"^T. Beauchamp, and J. Childress, 2001. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
For insights into the development of this seminal text, see: J . Childress, 2003. Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics: Reflections on a Work in Progress. In J. Walter, et al. The Story of Bioethics, pp. 47-66. 
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assumed existence of a common human morality that, while not comprehensive, forms 
the starting place of ethical theory. Common morality 'takes its basic premises directly 
from the morality shared in common by the members of a society ~ that is, un-
philosophical common sense and tradition' that does not necessarily require shared 
metaphysical commitments.''*'* 
The theoretical foundations of this work are four principles that may be applied, in 
tension with one another, to clinical cases. These principles have arisen dialectically over 
time firom 'considered judgments in the common morality and medical tradition'.'"** 
Briefly, the principles are as follows: Respect for autonomy is recognising the agent's 
right to self-governance or self-determination. The two primary conditions for autonomy 
are having 1) independence fi-om controlling influences and 2) the capacity for intentional 
action.''*^ Unsurprisingly, disagreement exists over the interpretations of these conditions 
and the necessary criteria for their being met. Non-maleficence refers to a moral 
obligation to avoid intentionally inflicting harm. Beneficence, by contrast, carries a 
positive injunction to act for the benefit of others through preventing or removing harm or 
promoting good.''*'' Both non-maleficence and beneficence trace their roots to the 
Hippocratic oath, which states ' I will use treatment to help the sick according to my 
ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them.' Finally,yM^/ice is 
fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is due or owed to persons.''** In 
their discussion, Beauchamp and Childress typically refer to a distributive justice, which 
takes into account the allocation of goods and rights under conditions of scarcity and 
competition — conditions particularly prevalent in modem medical practice. 
Direct application of these principles, as Beauchamp and Childress note, are a rare 
luxury, precluded by the complexity of moral life. It is often necessary to favour one 
principle over another in an attempt to minimize inconsistency. When applied to detailed 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2000, p. 100. 
""Beauchamp and Childress, 2000, p. 37. 
"^Beauchamp and Childress, 2000, p. 121. 
""Beauchamp and Childress, 2000, p. 190. 
'"'Beauchamp and Childress, 2000, p. 327. 
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cases, abstract norms (i.e. autonomy) run the danger of being indeterminate and unable to 
assist in settling disputes. The method by which principle-oriented ethicists overcome 
such problems is known as 'specification and balancing.'*'*' Specifying a principle entails 
developing its scope and content. The definition of a principle may be narrowed or 
expanded, depending upon the circumstances. Balancing refers to judgments made about 
the relative weight attached to different norms. Principles, in other words, are 'prima 
facie'. 
Principlism, then, begins by evaluating which of the four principles are at play. It then 
either specifies and/or balances those principles to reach a decision which coheres with 
other judgments and ethical theories. This process relies upon a common morality 
framework designed to reach the highest possible degree of consensus about what to do. 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that: 
• The conventional view of the history of bioethics attributes the rise of the field to 
a combination of interrelated factors. These included: a) the impact of the Second 
World War; b) the effect of 'whistle-blowers' such as Henry Beecher and Maurice 
Pappworth, who exposed ethical violations in human experimentation; c) the 
impact of new technologies, such as dialysis machines, which created 
unprecedented moral dilemmas, and; c) the rise of minority social movements that 
carried over into new demands for patients' rights. The result of these events was 
the breakdown of an ethic internal to medicine (a bedside ethic to use Rothman's 
phrase). 
• The early informed consent guidelines, as developed at the Nuremburg trials and 
in the Helsinki Declaration(s), had a limited impact on human experimentation 
and generated a tension between an international movement to give research 
subjects greater rights and the centuries long habit of leaving such decisions to 
i'^Beauchamp and Childress, 2000, pp. 28-37. 
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physicians. Related to this, I argued that the reception of Beecher's and 
Pappworth's 'whistle blowing' was dramatically different in the US than in the 
UK and the reason for this lied in a range of contingent factors such as the 
professional status of each man, the wider societal context, and the personal 
judgements, preferences, and prejudices of the medical profession in both 
countries. 
Thus, the growth of consent requirements was uneven across time and place. This 
was because of the sustained influence of the centuries long 
beneficence/paternalism model of medical care, which depicted the need to 
disclose information to a patient on the basis that a doctor's chief duty was to 
provide medical benefits and maximize the patient's health, even i f a course of 
action contradicted the patient's expressed wishes. However, with a series of 
landmark legal cases the then nascent patient autonomy model began to dwarf 
traditional patterns and informed consent reached a level of primacy that is still 
palpable today. 
• The birth of biomedical ethics as an academic discipline began, in large measure, 
with the input of theological ethicists who, in fact, had been debating medical 
ethics for centuries (but crucially, without the impact they came to hold in the 
post-War era). I illustrated this through the story of the London Medical Group, 
which organized a series of lectures, symposia and conferences throughout 
London's twelve teaching hospitals and was an early impetus for more formal 
'non-dogmatic' medical ethics teaching. The LMG's roots lay in the ecumenical 
movement of the 1960s and was established with the efforts of clergyman Ted 
Shotter. 
• Theology's contribution to biomedical ethics diminished in time, however, due to 
the need to reach a wider 'audience', and due to the associated goals of reaching 
moral consensus for the sake of achieving an influence on public policy. The best 
example of religion's declining power in bioethics is in the growth of principlism. 
56 
which bases itself on a 'common morality' - that is, a morality shared in common 
by members of a society who may not share 'metaphysical commitments.' 
In the next chapter I provide a range of critiques and criticisms of bioethics. 
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Chapter Four 
The dearth of bioethics: a critique 
I do not have the sales figures for the four editions [now five] of Beauchamp and 
Childress ... I will assume that many copies have been sold and read to justify so many 
editions. Ida not have the figures for the number of medical professionals who have 
attended summer workshops at Georgetown, but will assume that the numbers are high. 
The point is that the principles have been replicated so many times -printed in so many 
textbooks, spoken in so many meetings - that it becomes hard to imagine any other way 
of making decisions. The fact that principlism is also the legally required decision-
making system for recipients offederal research funds also encourages this process'. '^^ 
— John Evans 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I described the rise of analytical methods and normative writings 
which problematised medicine's internal discourse of ethical judgement. In this chapter I 
aim to evaluate the main critiques of bioethics method and assumptions.'^' Specifically, I 
discuss casuistry, care, virtue, and social scientific alternatives to standard bioethics 
(largely defined by principlism). It is important to stress fi-om the start that these critiques 
are interrelated - that is, they share a common dissatisfaction with bioethics tendency to 
reify the principle of autonomy."^ This chapter adopts the view that notwithstanding 
attempts to 'break through the domination of the field by the abstract "principlism" of 
analytic philosophy, and to 'incorporate other philosophical systems into the matrix of 
J. Evans, 2000. A Sociological Account of the Growth of Principlism. Hastings Center Report 30: 37. 
I say 'method' since I do not, in this chapter at least, deal with numerous other problems with bioethics, 
such as its financial connection to pharmaceutical companies or its tendency to merely affirm/justify 
whatever science does. But in Chapter Eight I touch upon these charges. 
I wish to draw notice to two views at opposing ends of the methodological spectrum. There is some 
debate in bioethics between what H. Tristram Engelhardt claims is an irreducible diversity of methods and 
Mark Kuczewski's assertions that a consensus on method has been achieved. Here my chief concern is less 
with articulating a single method than with what current approaches ignore and why. See H. T. Engelhardt, 
1996. The Foundations Of Bioethics, 2nd Ed. Oxford: OUP; M. Kuczewski, 1997. Bioethics' consensus on 
method: fVho could ask for anything more? [original italics] In H. L . Nelson, Ed., Stories and Their Limits. 
London: Routledge, pp. 134-149. 
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bioethical thought... relatively little change has occurred in the contours, context, style 
of thought, or the ideology of bioethics'.'^^ 
As Daniel Callahan points out, principlism is itself a form of reductionism.'^'* It is hard to 
escape the idea that, in the end, all four principles more or less come down to autonomy. 
For example, Callahan writes that non-maleficence derives essentially fi-om the principle 
of respect for persons and their bodily sovereignty. And justice, in the end, is a desire for 
people to have equal opportunity to pursue their autonomous life goals within a system of 
fair access. Indeed, at times, it does seem that what matters most to bioethics is not the 
content of choice but simply the right to have a choice. 
One of the early critiques of the philosophy of bioethics came fi-om within philosophy 
itself Writing in 1990 after the third edition of Beauchamp and Childress's seminal text, 
K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert penned the memorable and now famous quote 
'throughout the land, arising fi-om the throngs of converts to bioethics awareness, there 
can be heard a mantra "... beneficence ... autonomy ... justice ...'".'^^ According to 
Clouser and Gert, the problem with principlism was that it lacked systematic unity and 
offered no real course of action in real situations. They write, 
'Principles fimction neither as adequate surrogates for moral theories nor as directives or 
guides for determining the morally correct action. Rather they are primarily chapter 
headings for a discussion of some concepts which are only superficially related to each 
other ... At best principles operate primarily as checklists naming issues worth 
remembering when considering a biomedical moral issue. At worst principles obscure 
and confiise moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic and 
unsystematic use of moral theory'.'^^ 
An adequate moral theory, according to the authors, ought to provide explanation of 
R. Fox, 1999. Is Medical Education Asking too much of Bioethics? Daedelus 128, p. 11. 
D. Callahan, 1999. The social sciences and the tasks of bioethics. Daedelus 128, p. 283. 
K. Clouser, and B. Gert, 1990. A critique of principlism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15:219. 
Clouser and Gert, 1990, p. 221; 220. 
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moral agreement (and disagreement), and yield plausible account of what is and is not 
relevant to ethical judgements. As Beauchamp and Childress put it in the fifth edition of 
Principles, 'Clouser and Gert expect a strong measure of unity and systematic connection 
among rules, a clear pattern of justification, and a practical decision procedure that flows 
fi-om a theory, whereas other philosophers are sceptical of one or more of these 
conditions, and even the language of theory 
However, Clouser and Gert are certainly not the only philosophers to highlight bioethics 
inadequacies. A potential ally in the attack on bioethics methodological reductionism is 
moral phenomenology. Writers such as Drew Leder and Richard Zaner argue that when 
making diagnostic judgements, medicine has substituted objective laboratory evidence in 
favour of judgements based on the patient's lived experience and oral testimony.'^* Such 
reasoning is not unlike Ramsey's work, briefly discussed in the previous chapter, that 
modem medicine has dehumanised the i l l by relying on technological machinery and 
procedures that leave no space for the embodied subjectivity of the patient. 
I shall now turn to the variety of other methods that have arise to challenge the four 
principles 'mantra'. 
Casuistry: using paradigm cases 
Casuistry owes its roots to Aristotle, who believed that in ethics, first principles were 
derived fi-om what was known in concrete human actions and practice. Influential in 
Catholic moral theology, casuistry fell into disrepute in the late 17th century with the rise 
of Protestant and pietistic moral systems. Its most forcefiil critic was Blaise Pascal who 
denounced casuistry for its tendency to qualify general moral rules. In recent years, 
however, Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have revived the method.'^^ 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 408. 
D. Leder, 1990. The Absent Body. Chicago: Chicago University Press; R. Zaner, 1981. The Context of 
Self: A Phenomenological Inquiry using Medicine as a Clue. Athens: Ohio University Press. For an erudite 
analysis of these two authors, see G. McKenny, 1997. To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics. 
Technology, and the Body. New York: SUNY. 
McKenny, 1997, pp. 184-198. 
" ' A . Jonsen, and S. Toulmin, Tlie Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.. 
60 
It is worth quoting Jonsen's and Toulmin's definition. Casuistry, according to them, is: 
the analysis of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning based on 
paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation of expert opinions about 
the existence and stringency of particular moral obligations, framed in terms 
of rules or maxims that are general but not universal or invariable, since they 
hold good with certainty only in the typical conditions of the agent and 
circumstance of action.'^" 
Casuistry, according to the authors, is unavoidable.'^' Deductive moral reasoning works 
only in situations where the application of principles and the relevancy of considerations 
are not in doubt ~ a rarity. Therefore, moral analysis is best grasped i f ethicists disregard 
'theoretical cant' (a shot at Beauchamp and Childress, one assumes) and pay close 
attention to insights acquired in the course of 'pedestrian concrete practical 
experience.''^^ Moral knowledge, according to a casuist, is particular — so conflict 
resolution must be grounded in specific cases and circumstances. Paradigm cases serve 
as guides, providing relevant norms, which, analogically, indicate which judgment or 
action to take in the case at hand. When paradigm cases conflict, a casuist would be the 
first to admit that uncertainty follows. Jonsen and Toulmin see moral belief evolving 
incrementally, fi-om clear, resolvable cases to more complex ones. Casuistry, then, 
proceeds inductively and is rooted in case-based judgments that, theoretically, always 
remain open to re-interpretation and exceptions. 
The bioethics of care 
'^ ''Jonsen, and S. Toulmin, 1988, p. 257. 
Jonsen, and S. Toulmin , 1988, pp.329-330. 
'"S. Toulmin, 1994. Casuistry and clinical ethics. In E. DuBoise, R. Hamel, and L. O'Connell eds., A 
Matter of Principles? Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, p. 318. 
As critics have noted, however, one drawback to this method is the risk of being far too accepting of 
previously established beliefs and practices. Why take prior decisions at face value? It may be possible, for 
instance, that court judgments or paradigm cases merely re-enforce unsound policies or institutional 
discrimination. See D. DeGrazia, 1992. 'Moving forward in bioethical theory: Theories, cases, and 
specified.principlism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17:511 -539. 
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The ethics of care emerged out of feminist moral philosophy and has been a vocal critic 
of principle based bioethics. Perhaps more than any other work, Carol Gilligan's In a 
Different Voice has brought the perspective of care into mainstream philosophical 
discussions.'^ '* Gilligan's study noted that the subjects of Lawrence Kohlberg's 
influential work on moral development were all male'^^. By applying Kohlberg's test to 
females, Gilligan found that women employ a different reasoning strategy. Instead of 
applying impartial rules and measuring moral progress in exclusively cognitive terms (as 
Kohlberg suggested men do), Gilligan's tests showed that females paid far greater 
attention to relational and emotional aspects of moral reasoning. Women, she 
convincingly found, focused on the details of context and narrative and sought solutions 
to ethical conflicts that attempted to protect everyone's interests. 
The bioethics of care, as theorized by Rita Manning, has five central components.'^ ^ 
Firstly, moral attention is the obligation to be familiar with the details of a patient's 
situation and feelings.This, as commentators have noted, requires the time to listen to 
patients. Sympathetic understanding entails learning what others want, why they want it 
and how they feel their interests could best be protected. Such awareness requires that 
health care providers remember themselves in an earlier medical crisis to sympathetically 
relate with the patient's current circumstances. Thirdly, relationship awareness is the 
recognition that the person exists not as a lone self but in a web of relationships that are 
central to their identity and can either assist or damage their well-being. Patients are 
'fellow fragile humans' in need of help. Accommodation is the effort to meet the needs of 
all, including the care provider. While Manning notes full accommodation is impossible, 
she argues that there ought to at least be an attempt to give others a sense of being 
involved and considered in the process. Finally, response is the recognition that 'it is not 
enough to stare at the patient and imagine her in a sympathetic way'.'^' Rather, care must 
be translated into concrete actions. 
C. Gilligan, 1984. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge: 
Harvard Press. 
L. Kohlberg, 1981. The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco: Harper and Row. 
'**R. Manning, 1998. A care approach. In P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., A Companion to Bioethics. Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 98-105. 
_ '"Manning, 1998. p. 99. 
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The bioethics of care emphasizes mutual dependency, vulnerability, relationship, and the 
role of power and inequality in health care'^ *. Many care theorists have taken special aim 
at autonomy arguing that the principle, as formulated by Beauchamp and Childress has 
disregarded a patient's self-knowledge and overstated the generalizabilty of medical 
knowledge. These are themes addressed above in my brief discussion of moral 
phenomenology.' 
However, the limits of this approach should be briefly noted. Susan Sherwin, for 
example, warns that feminists should be cautious about care ethics.'™ Questioning the 
role of gender in a sexist society, she raises the possibility that a women's ability to care 
is related to her subordinate status in a system that is still patriarchal. Interestingly, 
Sherwin points out that traits such as nurturing and care are found among formerly 
colonized people of both genders. In other words, a lopsided emphasis on care may re-
enforce oppressive practices. Sherwin argues that while caring is an admirable trait, 
ethicists must constantly explore the social context in which it takes place - a theme 
which keeps cropping up in my analysis and to which I will explore in depth later in the 
thesis. 
The importance of virtue and character 
The final approach I consider has been advocated by theological ethicists. Virtue ethics, 
like casuistry, is rooted in ancient Greek philosophy. Virtues, socially and morally valued 
character traits, held a pre-eminent place in the work of Aristotle, who believed such 
qualities were acquired through learned habit. Aristotle argued that an action could be 
right without being virtuous but an action could be virtuous only i f performed from the 
right state of mind, or mot iva t ion .His thesis was that practice and virtue ought to have 
priority over ethical theory in normative decisionmaking. The revival of character ethics 
For a useful insight into the relationship between feminism and care, see R. Tong, 2003. Feminism and 
Feminist Bioethics: the search for a measure of unity in a field rich with diversity. New Review of Bioethics 
1: 85-100. 
A. Donchin, 2001. Understanding Autonomy Relationally: Toward a Reconfiguration of Bioethical 
Principles. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26: 365-386. 
""S. Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Healthcare. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
"'Aristotle, 1998. Nicomachean Ethics. New York: Dover Press, pp. 23-24. 
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is due, in part, to the work of communitarian thinkers such as Alastair Maclntyre and 
Stanley Hauerwas. 
Virtue ethics asserts that goods are internal to a particular and structured communal life 
(this form of ethics, like care, repudiates liberal individualism). Medicine, as other 
professions, has a historical tradition which requires physicians to cultivate certain 
character traits of care and wisdom.'^^ Unlike principles-based bioethics, which focuses 
on right action, a virtue approach is concerned with what kind of person a moral agent 
ought to be. A character ethicist holds that a virtuous professional can discern the proper 
action without reliance on rules or coercive laws. A virtuous person will desire to do 
what is right. Traits, such as courage, compassion, honesty, and sincerity, are to be 
cultivated through education, role models and habitual exercise. Such virtues, i f 
developed properly, will provide a reliable basis, in practice, for morally correct 
behaviour. In specific relation to bioethics, some have emphasized the importance of 
creating institutional climates where health care professionals desire not to abuse their 
subjects. The rationale is that people tend to trust those who have ingrained motivations 
to perform honest, compassionate actions. Most character ethicists would agree, however, 
that virtue is the means for doing the right thing. Such a method, however, still benefits 
fi-om being integrated with action-based theories. 
In addition to these three alternatives to principles-oriented bioethics, which have 
emerged largely from within philosophy, I now turn to the observations of the social 
sciences. 
The social science critique 
There are a number of ways of characterising the possible relationship between the social 
sciences (although here I mean mainly sociology) and ethics. For instance, they might be 
thought of as essentially competing in their attempts to explain the same phenomena, 
since one could ask which discipline asks the 'better' (more searching, more relevant) 
questions and which provides the 'better' (more complete, more convincing) answers. 
A. Maclntyre, \9i\. After Virtue: a study in moral theory. London: Duckworth, pp. 190-194. 
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This, of course, raises the question of what counts as appropriate questions and answers 
in the first place. Alternatively one could ask how each discipline complements the other. 
Then there is the possibility that an ethical scrutiny of sociology, that is, the ethics of 
doing sociology, raises further questions about the very nature of sociology as a 
discipline, over and beyond that more commonly raised in the narrower discussion of the 
ethics of sociological research methods and practices. Similarly there are questions to be 
raised by the sociological analysis of ethics as a set of interests, practices and 
institutions."^ 
Traditionally, sociology has been seen as the 'handmaiden' or 'junior partner' of 
philosophy, supplying the facts necessary to help make moral judgements.According 
to this rather linear view, the social sciences gather their findings, which are then used to 
help ethicists decide what action to take. This linear model seems to ask that bioethicists 
merely get their facts straight and pay little notice to how those facts might have been 
produced.''^ But Mairi Levitt has observed, 'any basic introduction to sociology suggests 
to students that the "facts" that are uncovered by empirical research will be related to the 
chosen perspective, the theoretical fi-amework, research questions, and methods used. 
Facts do not speak for themselves'.'^^ Thus, there has been a growing unease with 
sociology's role as merely the fact producer. 
A pioneer in these matters has been Renee Fox, whose work I used in the last chapter to 
explain why bioethics moved away from religion and adopted a more secular orientation. 
In short. Fox argued that bioethics sought greater relevance and authority in an 
increasingly secular society and could only achieve it by articulating a fi-amework 
applicable to the widest possible cross section of society (i.e. a common morality). More 
specifically, she has observed how the practical necessity of managing complex decisions 
'^ ^ M. Levitt and G. Williams, 2003. Thirty Years of Bioethics: all grown up now? New Review of Bioethics 
1: 3-5. This paragraph is taken from a paper currently being drafted by Haimes and Whong-Barr. 
'^ ^ J. L . Nelson, 2000. Moral Teachings from Unexpected Quarters; Lessons for Bioethics from the Social 
Sciences and Managed Care. Hastings Center Report 30: 12-17. 
A. Hedgecoe, 2004. Critical Bioethics: Beyond the Social Science Critique of Applied Ethics. Bioethics 
18: 120-143. 
Levitt, 2003, p. 22.1 shall return to this point in Chapter Seven in my discussion of Foucault's 
power/knowledge nexus. 
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and influencing policy encourages a reductionistic method that quantifies variables 
through logical and rational analysis. Bioethicists, according to Fox, are predominately 
trained in analytical philosophy, which is heavily invested in utilitarian and positivist 
methods. She writes, 'An array of cognitive techniques are used to distance and abstract 
bioethical analysis from the human settings in which the questions under consideration 
occur, to reduce their complexity and ambiguity, and to control the strong feelings that 
many of the medical situations on bioethics centres can evoke'.''^ Ethical questions, in 
other words, are distanced from their phenomenological reality. 
However, Fox's argument goes beyond the reductionistic tendencies of bioethics to 
provide what is now considered to be the first major sociological critique of the field.''* 
In many ways her work set the tone, and since her first foray into the field, the 
dialogue/debate between the social sciences and medical ethics has been robust. Since 
Fox, a number of sociologically minded authors have added their voice to the chorus of 
attack on the normative claims made by philosophical bioethics. 
Much sociological writing on bioethics has focused on either its unitary version of 
rationality, its reification of autonomy, or its lack of contextual analysis - all three of 
which are clearly interrelated. As care ethicists, many sociologists argue that in the 
prevailing ethos of bioethics the value of individualism is defined and emphasized to 
such extent that it is cut off from social and religious values concerning the relationships 
between individuals. This includes a severing of moral agents from their duties, 
commitments, and emotional ties to one another, and the societal community to which 
they belong.''' 
The charge that biomedical ethics lacks context means that cases and conflicts presented 
by bioethicists are a type of data 'totally within the control of the writer'.'*" The moral 
'"Fox, 1990, p. 207. 
R. Fox, 1988. Essays in Medical Sociology, Oxford: Transaction Books, pp. 668-670. 
'" B. Hof&naster, ed.. 2001. Bioethics in Social Context. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; R. 
Zussman, 2000. The Contributions of Sociology to Medical Ethics. Hastings Center Report 30: 7-11. 
M. Levitt, 2003. Better Together? Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics. In M. 
_Hayry and T. Takala, eds. Scratching the Surface of Bioethics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, p. 23. 
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complexity of a problem as well as the options and factors influencing the supposedly 
autonomous agent are limited by the writers imagination and/or agenda. Such techniques, 
in Tod Chamber's opinion, are purposefully apsychological, where particular people and 
relations are defined as incidental rather than essential to the eventual outcome of the 
case.'«' 
Sociologists, then argue that one value of their empirical work is that it can show 
bioethicists how social structures, cultural settings, and social interaction influence ethics. 
Adopting a 'sociological imagination' on the practice of bioethics can show how the task 
of bioethics is constrained by disciplinary habits, professional relationships, cultural ways 
of seeing, institutional needs, economic demands and arrangements of power and 
prestige.'^^ 
Erica Haimes has also suggested that the social sciences have an important contribution 
183 
to make to the study of ethics. This includes theoretical and empirical contributions, as 
well as their combination to the enhancement of the understanding of how ethics, as a 
field of analysis and debate, is socially constituted and situated. Haimes attempts to go 
beyond the over-simplistic division between normative and descriptive ethics (as 
indicated above, that which assigns the social sciences the 'handmaiden' role of simply 
providing the 'facts'). Using examples from reproductive medicine, her article establishes 
that the social sciences have a longstanding theoretical interest in concepts central to the 
study of ethics, such as explanations of social change, social organisation and social 
action; that empirical investigations conducted by social scientists exemplify the interplay 
of epistemological and methodological analyses which improves understanding of 
particular substantive issues is extended beyond the conventional questions raised by 
ethicists; and, that through this combination of theoretical and empirical work, social 
scientists go beyond the specific ethical questions of particular practices to enquire 
" ' T . Chambers, 1997. What to expect from an ethics case (and what it expects from you). In H. L . Nelson, 
ed., Stories and Their Limits. London: Routledge, pp. 171-184. 
R. Devries and P. Conrad, 1998. Why bioethics needs sociology. In R. DeVries, and J. Subedi, 1998. 
Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise. NJ: Simon & Schuster, pp. 233-234. 
E. Haimes, 2002. What can Sociology contribute to the study of ethics? Theoretical, empirical and 
substantive considerations. Bioethics 16; 89-113. 
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further into the social processes that lie behind the very designation of certain matters as 
being 'ethical issues'. 
Thus, Haimes seeks to demonstrate that empirical inquiry is not simply an exercise in 
'scooping up the facts', to supply ethicists with the materials from which to conduct their 
formal analyses.'*'' Rather, she views it as a way of accessing human reality and then to 
analytically display, the various ways in which we all act and think and reason ethically. 
Haimes also advocates a 'sociology of ethics', to investigate the emergence, definition 
and delineation of different terms (such as as ethics/ medical ethics/ bioethics/ empirical 
ethics/ evidence-based ethics etc), as well as their appropriation of particular areas of 
interest and concern (and its exclusion of other areas of interest). 
How does a philosophically minded bioethics respond to these charges? Beauchamp and 
Childress make the usual distinction between descriptive and normative ethics. The 
former is 'the factual investigation of moral conduct and beliefs. It uses scientific 
techniques to study how people reason and act'.'*^ Normative ethics, meanwhile, is a 
'form of inquiry that attempts to answer the question, "Which general moral norms for 
the guidance and evaluation of conduct should we accept and why?" Ethical theories 
attempt to identify and justify these norms.''^^ According to this view, knowing what 
people think or believe does not make it right; the social sciences, in other words, do not 
offer action-guides. 
Philosophical bioethicists may also point out the dangers in merely following public 
opinion rather than scrutinising it in light of first principles.'*' They also are critical of 
sociology's relativism and tendency to accept that 'anything goes' and that all moral 
values are of equal worth. These counter-charges all, in effect, come down to the 
fact/value dichotomy - to which social scientists are likely to respond that a rigorous 
In her article, Haimes calls for a dialogue between sociology and ethics, to avoid charges of 
'sociological imperialism' - a phrase which I continue to find baffling despite many conversations with 
Haimes on this topic. I'd suggest that the only people truly concerned about an imaginary 'imperialism' are 
sociologists themselves. 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 2. 
'** Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 2. 
Levitt, 2003. 
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separation of the descriptive and the normative is practically untenable. The dichotomy 
between fact and value or between is and ought could, perhaps, be seen as an artefact of 
the theoretical project of justification and not an intrinsic feature of moral experience.'** 
Summary and conclusion 
The various critiques of mainstream biomedical ethics, as presented, here include: 
• That principlism is a reductionistic method which at best offers no more than a 
checklist of items to consider when judging moral problems and at worse simply 
confuses matters due to a lack of theoretical unity. 
Philosophically based alternatives to principlism include: casuistry which uses 
procedures of reasoning based on paradigms and analogies and past cases rather 
than universal first principles; care, which stresses the realities of dependency, 
vulnerability and relationships of the patient; and virtue which focuses on the 
question of an agent's moral character. 
• The social science critique asserts that bioethics: a) assumes that moral problems 
come pre-sorted and ready for the manipulation of rules, principles, or theories; b) 
ignores the extent to which moral concepts and norms derive their meaning from 
the social and cultural surroundings in which they are embedded; c) neglects the 
ways in which moral problems are generated and framed by the practices, 
structures, and institutions within which they arise; d) and ignores the means by 
which ideology and power relationships both perpetuate the status-quo and, 
conversely, can effect moral change.'*^ 
So far in this thesis, I've argued in the abstract with bioethical theories, methods, ideas 
and historical trends - but not actual issues. In the next two chapters, I look in 
considerable depth at one issue, the use of large scale human tissue collections in genetic 
Hofftnaster, 2001; DeVries and J. Subedi, 1998. 
Hoffmaster, 2001; DeVries and J. Subedi, 1998. 
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epidemiological research. By exploring a particular case I hope to look at bioethics in 
action both in its normative and empirical forms. My case study, in other words, will 
allow me to put flesh on the bones of the previous three chapters and avoid (hopefully) 
the all too common error of setting up a straw figure which I can then conveniently knock 
down with preconceived and pre-packaged arguments. 
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Chapter Five 
Genetic epidemiology: mapping the terrain 
Introduction 
In the following two chapters the thesis takes a turn in direction to investigate an issue 
that has attracted a significant audience in bioethics literature, the social sciences and 
public policy documents. The issue, genetic epidemiology, requires some introduction 
given its complexity and since thus far, the thesis has been silent on the topic of genetic 
science. Therefore, I begin by mapping the terrain and exploring the conceptual issues 
and competing claims in this field. I start with the history of public health. I begin in this 
way since genetic epidemiology is, in my estimation, a case of public par excellence. In 
other words, it is the ultimate attempt to improve a society's health on a wide spread 
scale by combining analysis of DNA with personal medical history. By knowing 
individual genetic profiles and using that information to increase longevity and avoid 
disease, researchers hope to bring dramatic long term improvements to the publics' 
health. This is done on the population level since, as we shall see, it is only through large 
scale DNA collections that such improvement in health can ever be achieved (i.e. 
knowing the genetic profile of one individual tells an investigator little i f there is not a 
larger 'normal' subset with which to compare the profile). 
A short history of public health 
Historically, Western public health was mainly concerned with removing waste products 
fi-om the public and contioUing the outbreak of epidemics. Waste removal dealt with 
things such as street cleaning, sewage disposal and hygienic measures in public spaces 
such as marketplaces. A common technique to deal with epidemics (such as the plague) 
was the quarantine, a method of contiol developed fi-om the contagion theory of disease 
causation - the idea that illness spread from one physical body to another'^". A related 
In the medieval era, many believed that plague was Heaven-sent, and that instead of quarantine, it was 
only through prayer, fasting and flagellation that towns could be cured. See: R. Porter, 1999. The Greatest 
Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present, London: Harper Collins, 
p. 125. _ _ 
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theory of epidemics, favoured by the Greeks, was miasmic theory, the notion that bad air 
and the odours of putrefaction led to disease. 
The growth of the modem public health movement is best understood in relation to wider 
trends in Enlightenment political and social philosophy. Until the end of the eighteenth 
century, notions that the numbers of people reflected the riches and strength of the state 
went largely uncontested.'^' Mercantilist philosophy (referred to as cameralism in 
Germany) emphasized the value of augmenting the power and treasury of the state. It was 
argued that a large population would increase production of crops and goods, provide 
men for standing armies, and yield sufficient income from taxes and rents. The welfare of 
the sovereign was the welfare of society and the prosperity of both could be attained 
through an abundant population. Crudely put, the rationale behind this philosophy was 
that more people meant more revenue. Given this line of reasoning, it is not hard to see 
that the health of the population was a central concern of state authority. To the extent 
that it impeded production, disease was - is - a political, economic and social problem. 
Support for these claims runs throughout eighteenth century literature. In 1714, John 
Bellars, a Quaker cloth merchant, provided an early correlation between lost revenue and 
needless death: 
'[I]t may be reasonably supposed that a hundred thousand ... die yearly of curable 
diseases; for want of timely advice, and suitable medicines ... Labouring people are 
the Kingdom's greatest treasure and strength, for without labourers there can be no 
lords; and i f the poor labourers did not raise much more food and manufacture than 
what did subsist themselves, every gentleman must be a labourer and every idle 
man must starve ... Every able industrious labourer that is capable to have children, 
who so untimely dies, may be accounted two hundred pound loss to the 
kingdom.'''^ 
"'For an overview of mercantilism and public health, see G. Rosen, 1993. A History of Public Health, 
Baltimore: JHU Press, 2nd ed; D. Porter, 1999. Health. Civilization and the State: A history of public 
health from ancient to modern times, London: Routledge. 
^h. Bellars, 1714. ESSAY Towards the IMPROVEMENT of PHYSICK. London: Sowle. Quoted from G._ 
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In noting the importance of the working poor by referring to the food and goods they 
produce, Bellars highlighted much of the rationale behind early public health movements. 
(I use the plural since public health was not a unified campaign, especially in Britain). 
Underlying various public health initiatives was a utilitarian calculation: a country was 
well off i f the majority of citizens were well o f f And since in straight numerical terms, 
most of the people were poor, improving their conditions was a necessary obligation for 
those in power. In other words, the greatest good of the greatest number was important, in 
part, because it had a direct impact on the well-being of the privileged. Only when the 
majority of poor were properly clothed, housed, and treated could they then become the 
vibrant work force that would insure other peoples' wealth. Both public and private 
measures to protect the poor (the latter being common in Britain) were not merely 
humane gestures of enlightenment and progress. They were, in addition, practical 
measures adopted in order to avoid the day when 'every gentleman must be a labourer.' 
John Ferriar, an associate of the medical ethicist Thomas Percival (discussed in Chapter 
Two) was instrumental in setting up regulations to stem epidemics and offer preventative 
advice to the public. Many of Ferriar's circulars, such as Advice to the Poor, was written 
in lay language, so it could benefit 'the persons for whose benefit it was designed'. The 
circular's primary aim was prevention of contagious fevers.'^^ 
Ferriar's advice ranged from 'avoid living in damp cellars' to encouraging families and 
fiiends to report persons afflicted with fever to the health authorities, an act rewarded by 
Rosen, 1944. An Eighteenth Century Plan for a National Health Service. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 
16: 432. 
' " G . Rosen, 1942. John Ferriar's 'Advice to the Poor'. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 11: 223. 
Ferriar's circular provides an excellent example of the two way nature of the medicalisation of the family. 
On the one hand, there is a strong paternalism, on the other, the encouragement of self-governance ('much 
depends upon your own conduct, for preventing the first occasions of sickness'. It should be noted that 
eighteenth century medicalisation was not the one way phenomena that some have characterized it as 
being. See for example, D. Porter and R. Porter, 1989. Patient's Progress: Doctors and Doctoring in 
Eighteenth Century England. Cambridge: Polity Press. The Porters' convincingly argue that patients 
exercised considerable control over medical relations. Yet they do not extend this insight to their account of 
medicalisation, which they seem to oversimplify as a one-way control of doctor over patient. I touch on 
these issues below in my discussion on sociological perspectives of modem public health. 
73 
two shillings for each fever reported.'^ '* At times Ferriar was extraordinarily detailed: 
when visiting sick neighbours, 'you may preserve yourselves fi-om being infected by 
tying a handkerchief across your face, just below the eyes ... As soon as you return to 
your own house, wash your hands and face in cold water, and avoid touching any of your 
family, for half or three quarters of an hour.' '^ ^ 
Ferriar also placed considerable emphasis on the well being of the young. His circular 
goes on to suggest a number of measures for the benefit of children, such as small pox 
inoculation. By inoculating, 'you ought to consider yourselves as performing a duty to 
your children, and to the public'. His general advice included: 'Always wash your 
children fi-om head to foot with cold water, before you send them to work in the morning. 
Take care to keep them dry in their feet, and never allow them to go to work without 
giving them breakfast, though you should have nothing to offer them but a crust of bread 
and a little water.''^^ 
However, it was not sufficient for a state to merely claim the importance of a 
'population'. As a logical next step, it was imperative to have knowledge of peoples' 
habits and lives. The birth and use of social statistics provided the means by which a 
'population' was an entity capable of being known and studied.'^' One of the earliest 
proponents of statistical analysis, William Petty, is famous as the father of 'political 
arithmetic'. Petty collected data on many aspects of the population ~ its trade, education, 
health and disease. He, like Percival, claimed inspiration fi-om Francis Bacon's assertion 
that the strength of the state could be analyzed mathematically.'^* 
Percival had a penchant for applying quantitative tools to the analysis of population and 
health. Indeed it was no coincidence that Percival was as heavily involved in public 
health as he was in medical ethics, given his remit to design a code of ethics for hospital 
medicine. As one historian has noted, 'the underlying premise of new hospitals' was 'that 
""Rosen, 1942, p. 225. 
""Rosen, 1942, p. 225. 
"*Rosen, 1942, p. 225. 
"'See D. Porter, 1999, especially chapter 4. 
_'!'D..Porter. 1999, pp. 49-50; Rosen, 1993, pp 87-
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disease could be controlled, removed, and perhaps prevented by the conscious and 
deliberate application of "enlightened" views about health'.''^ Hospitals were an 
opportunity to provide short-term relief to the working poor who otherwise may not have 
received treatment. They formed part of the promotion of a whole 'politico-economic 
agenda' which Foucault dubbed 'the imperative of health: at once, the duty of each and 
objective of all.'^"^ For his part, Percival presented data on marriage and birth rates, as 
well as the causes of death, which he correlated to age and gender.^ "' In Proposals for 
Establishing More Accurate and Comprehensive Bills of Mortality in Manchester, 
Percival used his records to support a small-pox inoculation campaign and to prove that 
cod-liver oil could successfiilly treat rickets. Later in his career, he explained: 
'The number of inhabitants and progress of population in the kingdom; the increase 
or decrease of certain diseases; the comparative healthiness of different situations, 
climate and seasons; and the influence of particular trades and manufactures on the 
duration of life, are subjects of the highest importance to the community; and 
equally interesting to the statesmen, the philosopher and physician.'^"^ 
Having detailed knowledge of a population provided the means for authorities to 
intervene in the processes of population for the good of state and society. Successfiil 
management of people required a health policy able to affect living standards and reduce 
rates of both epidemics and infant mortality. In the eighteenth century, many urban areas 
became congested and polluted due to an influx of rural labourers and distressed artisans, 
who were in search of employment in new industiies. These conditions were conducive 
to the spread of disease and provided a partial initiative to interventionist sanitation 
campaigns. 
The term medical police was used to characterise the trend of state involvement in health 
matters. Here, 'police' refers not to law enforcement per se but to an active programme of 
"'Risse, 1992, pp. 172. 
^""M. Foucault, 2000. The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century. In J . Faubion, ed., Power: Essential 
Works of Foucault 1954-1984. New York: Free Press, p. 94. 
^"'Unable to locate a copy of Proposals, I have relied upon Haakonssen, 1997, p. 113. 
_^Haakonssen, 1997, p. 113. 
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public sanitation directed by professionals in fields as divergent as government, 
medicine, law and education.^ "^ The greatest proponent of medical police was probably 
Johann Frank, who advocated that governments ought to actively regulate nearly every 
aspect of human life from marriage selection to transportation systems.^ *''' 
In Britain, in the mid nineteenth century, Edwin Chadwick famously promoted sanitary 
conditions for the working poor in order to 'remove waste, inefficiency, and corruption' 
and assist free marketers in leading Britain to prosperity^"^ A Royal commission led by 
Chadwick recommended improvements in drainage systems, the deterioration of which 
resulted in the spread of diseases such as typhoid and cholera.^ "^ By the end of the 
nineteenth century, public health campaigners relied on the new science of bacteriology 
which posited the existence of 'particulate, living, microscopic agents' in both causing 
disease and acting as a means of transmission.^"' Public health in general and 
epidemiology specifically used this theory to build on old contagion and miasmic models. 
As a result epidemiology entered a new phase when 'morbidity and mortality statistics 
could be related not just to specific infectious diseases, but to specific diseases cause by 
specific identifiable agents'.^ "* 
This short history takes us up to the last century when theories of inheritance and heredity 
emerged as tools in public health campaigns. 
Twentieth century eugenics 
The word 'eugenics' is used fi-equently, though its exact meaning is rarely made clear. 
"^^  There exists some debate amongst scholars about the difference between terms such as medical police, 
public health, state medicine and the extent to which events in mainland Europe influenced Britain. These 
debates, like the ones over eighteenth century medical ethics, make for intriguing reading but lie beyond 
the scope of this work. See P. Carroll, 2002. Medical Police and the History of Public Health. Medical 
History 46: 461-494. 
Risse, 1992, p. 173. Frank's work was known as A System of Complete Medical Police. 
^"'D. Lupton, 1995. The Imperative of Health: Public Health and the Regulated Body. London: SAGE, p. 
28; E. Chadwick, 1842. Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain. 
S. Coughlin and T. Beauchamp, eds., 1996. Ethics and Epidemiology: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p. 8. 
L. Wilkinson, 1993. In W.F. Bynum and R. Porter, eds. Companion encyclopedia of the history of 
medicine. London: Routledge. 
.'"'.Wilkinson, 1993. p. 1274. 
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Does it refer only to policies that rely on coercion to improve the quality of a population? 
Or does it include all attempts to better the gene pool, including, say, education, diet and 
so forth? One distinction observers often make is between positive and negative eugenics. 
The former encourages ' f i t ' families (i.e. white, middle-upper class) to breed as much as 
possible; negative eugenics, on the other hand, refers to efforts to prohibit the 'unfit' from 
reproducing at all.^°^ 
Whatever definition one adopts, the racial hygiene campaigns of National Socialism in 
Germany have been well rehearsed. Here, I wish to bring attention to eugenic movements 
in the United States, United Kingdom, and (to a lesser extent) Scandinavia.^'" Eugenicists 
in these countries all shared the conviction that reproduction decisions should be guided 
by social concerns and that biological knowledge was an acceptable tool in assisting the 
promotion of those objectives. Whilst in the early part of the century, Britain 
campaigners never succeeded in passing eugenic legislation, their Galtonian rhetoric had 
a profound impact on society. According to Diane Paul, 'whole sections of British society 
now took for granted that talent and character were inborn and fixed.'^'' Throughout 
Britain, North America and Scandinavia it seems clear that the primary engines which 
drove eugenics were the interrelated factors of rapid social change, immigration, and 
economic insecurity. I shall bring this section to a close with the 'chilling' words, 
expressed in 1914, by the American Charles Davenport, 
'We hear a great deal about infant mortality and child saving that appeals to the humanity 
and the child-love in us all. It is, however, always the saving of the lowest class that is 
contemplated. I recall the impassioned appeal of a sociologist for assistance in stopping 
the fiightfiil mortality among the children of prostitutes. But the daughters of prostitutes 
A. Buchanan, D. Brock, N.Daniels, D. Wilker, 2000. From chance to choice: genetics and Justice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The authors of this excellent text claim that the greatest flaw of 
eugenics was its failure to take justice seriously, However, I'd argue instead that proponents of eugenics 
simply define justice differently from those who view eugenics as unethical. 
'^^  My discussion draw on: D. Kelves, 1995. In the Name of Eugenics. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press; D. Paul, 1998. Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present. New York: Humanity Books; A. 
Kerr and T. Shakespeare, 2002. Genetic Politics: From eugenics to genome. Cheltenham: New Clarion 
Press; G. Brodberg and N. Roll-Hansen eds., 1996. Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization policy in 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland. East Lansing: Michigan University Press. 
^ " Paul, 1998, p. 76. 
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have hardly one chance in two of being able to react otherwise than their mothers. Why 
must we start an expensive campaign to keep alive those who, were they intelligent 
enough, might well curse us for having intervened on their behalf? Is not death nature's 
great blessing to the race? I f we have greater power to prevent it than ever before, so 
much the greater is our responsibility to use that power selectively for the survival of 
those of best stock; more than those who are feebleminded and without moral content.'^'^ 
Sociological perspectives on eugenics and epidemiology 
In recent decades with the rise of genetics and new screening programmes, the issue of 
eugenics has taken a new urgency. However, in genetic epidemiology, eugenics is not 
often cited as a major ethical concern. Genetic technologies such as pre-natal screening 
and embryo selection (in other words, issues in reproductive medicine) raise the spectre 
of eugenics more clearly than biobanking, which is (to date, anyway) limited to major 
infectious and chronic diseases and not physical or mental disabilities. Contemporary 
genetic and ante-natal services do not have eugenic outcomes as their explicit objective. 
Instead (as I discuss below) today's language is couched in terms of choice and 
reproductive freedom. Troy Duster has famously referred to this as 'backdoor 
eugenics'.^'^ Duster's fear is that screening programs designed for serious life-
threatening disorders will become widely accepted to the point where in the struggle over 
where to draw the line, more and more «o«-life threatening disorders will be screened 
and eliminated. His fear, in other words, is not too much government intervention but 
rather too little. Others have expressed similar concerns. Anne Kerr and Tom 
Shakespeare, for instance, argue that eugenics is an 'emergent property' of the prevailing 
structure of reproduction.^''* The problem, according to the authors, is that in reality 
reproductive 'choice' is restricted by the attitudes and ethos of medical professionals, 
who tend to provide prospective parents with biased information regarding their 
pregnancy. 
'^^  Cited in Buchanan, et al., 2000, p. 44. 
T. Duster, 1990. Backdoor to Eugenics. New York: Routledge. 
Kerr and Shakespeare, 2002, p. 6. See also: M. Whong-Barr, 2003. Review of R. Song and A. Kerr & T. 
Shakespeare: Human Genetics and Genetic Politics. New Genetics and Society 22: 117-118. 
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The last ten years have seen a burgeoning sociological interest in the 'new genetics' 
which is not surprising given the ability of ideas around genetics to transform wider 
social and cultural ideas about identity, self, the body and kinship. Even in a narrower 
sense, population and epidemiological genetics (and the development of genetic 
databases as a particular type of tool in this field) transform ideas about health and illness 
in certain ways. However, sociologically speaking, such databases extend and enhance 
notions of certainty in medical knowledge, through the increased surveillance of 
populations and through extending the idea of potential pathology.^'* 
This relatively recent development in population genetics is a further example of a claim 
made some time ago by de Swaan, that the expansion of the medical regime increasingly 
transforms us all into 'not-yet-patients': 
'The medical regime operates in a light and extensive form throughout modem society. 
By now, whoever is not a patient is considered a not-yet-patient: a permanent alert for the 
early warning signs of disease is in operation; mass screenings, routine check-ups, 
physicals for insurance clients, military recruits and job applicants process the entire 
population. Entire categories of apparently healthy persons are declared, a priori, medical 
subjects: pregnant women, infants, senior citizens. Everyone is under constant pressure to 
216 
stay fit and avoid harmful pleasures.' 
In many ways, sociological literature on the new genetics (which grows by the day) 
revolves around two mutually reinforcing poles: coercion/control and choice/citizenship. 
Alan Petersen and Robert Bunton write that 
'The science of epidemiology, for example, continues to construct particular groups and 
populations within a broader values of the Western world. Certain groups and bodies 
continue to be categorised as troublesome, frail or problematic, such as those of women. 
A. Kerr and S, Cunningham-Burley, 2000. On ambivalence and risk: Reflexive 
modernity and the new human genetics. Sociology 34: 283-304. This paragraph and the next are based on 
work in progress from Haimes and Whong-Barr. 
A. De Swaan, 1990. The Management of Normality. London: Routledge, p. 12. 
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homosexuals or black people. These forms of knowledge influence self-knowledge and 
self-formation. As well as providing psychological and experimental forms of self-
knowing, through potential genetic manipulation and "choice", contemporary science 
also provides techniques for what might be referred to as the "biological body'".^'' 
The relationship between control and choice, according to these readings, is reciprocal. 
Public health aims to police the body (individual and social) by collecting and using 
statistical information on health, genes, and lifestyle habits. 'Discipline', though, is 
imposed through webs of liberal social power that obliges responsible citizens into good 
l i f t 
health promotion. The symbiotic relationship between state needs and peoples' desires 
has been dubbed 'neo-liberalism' and is a common feature of govemmentality studies, 
which have become increasingly influential in the sociology of genetics. '^^  
Sociological writings on history and practice of public health are useful in my estimation 
since they tell a slightly different story from medical historians who tend write a linear 
and relatively unproblematic progression of improvement in health promotion. That is, 
they tend to be more critical of medical advances, stressing the losses, costs and dangers 
involved in scientific progress. I shall have more to say on this in Chapters Seven and 
Eight. Now I aim to evaluate in detail the contemporary practice of genetic epidemiology 
and the range of socio-ethical issues that it raises. 
Genetic epidemiology 
Researchers claim that the next major advance in medicine will arise from developments 
in genetic technology. Scientists believe that in order to realise clinical and public health 
benefits from the mapping of the human genome, large-scale population-based studies 
incorporating information on genetics and health are the appropriate next step.^^° At the 
A. Petersen and R. Bunton, 2002. The New Gentetics and The Public's Health. London: Routledge, p. 
82. 
^" T. Osborne, 1997. Of Health and Statecraft. In A. Petersen and R. Bunton eds., Foucault. Health and 
Medicine. London: Routledge, pp. 173-188. 
^" See N. Rose, 1999. Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, led. London: Free Association 
Books. 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2001. Human Genetic Databases. Fourth 
Report. 
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same time, progress in information technology has improved the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of conducting large-scale epidemiological studies, making it feasible to 
conduct a large study incorporating information on genetic factors and an individual's 
health and exposure history.^^' 
As I alluded to in the opening, epidemiology is the study of the distribution of disease in 
populations and of the factors affecting that distribution.^^^ In contrast to clinical 
medicine where emphasis is on the individual, epidemiology involves the examination of 
patterns of disease in groups of individuals. Epidemiology originated from investigations 
of epidemics of infectious diseases in the 19th century. Today, however, epidemiological 
research in western countries is directed largely at chronic diseases, such as heart disease 
and cancer - a point which raises a number of questions about resource allocation and 
global justice, topics I address in Chapter Eight in my discussion on power in bioethics. 
Population genetics studies gene-environment interactions and their role in disease 
causation. To be successful, it requires large-scale population based sample collections 
and access to detailed patient medical information, such as clinical medical records.^ ^^ It 
is thought that an individual's risk of disease relates to three broad areas: their exposure 
to environmental conditions, their genotype, and the role of chance. As more is learned 
about gene-disease associations and genetic polymorphisms, researchers hope that it will 
become possible to understand the relative contribution of genetic risk factors and 
specific environmental conditions that lead to common multi-factorial (i.e. involving 
more than one cause) diseases. 
Genetic databases: definition and terms 
The House of Lords defines genetic databases as 'collections of genetic sequence 
information, or of human tissue from which such information might be derived, that are 
A. Bayat, 2001. Bioinformatics. British MedicalJournal 324: 1018-1022. 
For a readable introduction to epidemiological methods, see: A. Silman and G. Macfarlane, 2002. 
Epidemiological Studies: A Practical Guide 2ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
W, Lowrance, 2001. The promise of human genetic databases. British MedicalJournal. 322: 1009-1010 
or could be linked to named individuals'.^^'' While recognizing debates over terminology, 
I use the terms biobank, DNA bank, gene bank, and genetic database interchangeably.^ ^^ 
Essentially, all terms refer to collections of biological tissue, from which DNA can be 
extracted for genetic analysis and linked to personal medical information.^^^ 
Personal medical information 
Scientists claim that in order to make maximum the use of genetic samples, they need to 
be able to link it to a donor's personal medical history and clinical records. This is 
important since environmental factors, such as smoking and diet, alter one's 
predisposition to illness and could have a profound influence on one's genetic 
contribution to disease. 
In Britain, there are a number of ways for researchers to access a subject's personal 
medical information. These include: direct health interviews, access to GP records, and 
disease registers, which includes personal details of the patient, the site, type, and stage of 
the disease, the management of the disease and treatment, and the eventual outcome. 
These data have proved invaluable in epidemiological studies.^ '^ Another way to access 
patient's history is through the collection of geographical information such as postcodes. 
These enable researchers to link data in order to look for the effects of environmental 
pollution on the health of the population. The value and interpretation of this type of 
analysis, however, is dependent on the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the data. 
Lords, 2001. 
Most writers use these terms synonymously. David King, however, believes the term 'database' can be 
misleading, since it implies that information about a person's genes can be somehow 'fished out' from the 
collection. He correctly points out that information regarding someone's genetic health can only be learned 
by doing genetic research and tests on the DNA samples contained in the database. See King, 2001. 
Evidence presented to the House of Lords Fourth Select Committee on Science and Technology: Genetic 
Databases. 
There are many large biological sample collections from which DNA may be extracted since academic, 
commercial, and clinical laboratories all hold specimens (Lords, 2001). While these collections could 
theoretically provide material for a national DNA bank, this possibility has been dismissed by scientists 
since the collections are not well coordinated and the quality of DNA samples in the samples are varied. In 
addition, many samples cannot be traced back to the donor, making epidemiological analysis difficult. 
Finally, fi-om an ethical standpoint, there would be questions regarding the lack of patient consent for their 




Proponents of genetic research highlight two major aims of biobanking. These are to 
identify interactions between genes and environmental factors that are involved in the 
cause of disease, and to better predict and address adverse drug reactions. In other words, 
the promised benefits involve improved methods of diagnosis and therapy. A third 
benefit may be in scientific spin-offs and in areas of research that 'cannot yet be 
envisaged' (i.e. the design of biobank studies means that the data contained within them 
can be used to address questions of future scientific and public health relevance which 
have not yet come to light.)^^* 
Several benefits have already achieved through smaller scale biobank collections. These 
include using the BRCA-2 gene as a predictive diagnostic for breast cancer and gene-
profiling of leukaemic cells which have enabled the correct type of leukaemia to be 
diagnosed so that appropriate treatments can made. Currently, more than one thousand 
disease-related genes (mainly for single-gene disorders) are documented on specialised 
databases, leading to new screening tests and improvements in diagnosis and disease 
prediction.^^^ 
Diagnostics 
Disease causation is complex. Previous research into asthma and hypertension, for 
instance, has found that it is difficult to distinguish abnormalities which might cause the 
disease from those which are its consequence. However, it is thought that databases will 
help researchers understand how small sequence differences in genes influence gene 
fiinction and hence, lead to disease susceptibility. Pharmaceutical companies believe that 
databases would increase understanding of the natural history of diseases and help 
understand factors associated with things such as: onset, severity, how multiple 
susceptibility genes interact with each other and the environment, and how various health 
Lords, 2001. Of course one spin-off may be 'genetic weapons' which could be dropped on a population 
and designed to eliminate only people of a certain genetic make-up. In this way, genetic epidemiology may 
be less a case of public health par excellence than eugenics par excellence. For this and more happy 
scenarios, see: D. Suzuki and P. Knudtson, 1990. Genethics: The Clash Between the New Genetics and 
Human Values. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 192-221. 
J, Kaprio, 2000. Genetic Epidemiology. British MedicalJoumal 320: 1257-1259. 
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interventions would impact the onset and course of disease. In British research, 
conditions that researchers aim to identify susceptibility genes for include: asthma, heart 
disease, cancer, osteoarthritis, depression, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
migraine, diabetes, Alzheimer disease, and Parkinson's disease. 
To provide one example, over 25,000 people younger than sixty-five die each year from 
heart artery disease in England and Wales. According to researchers, many of these 
cannot be connected to risk factors such as smoking, diet, or blood pressure and occur 
repeatedly in the same families, which suggest a genetic link. It is believed that numerous 
genes are involved in this condition, hence there is a need to find currently unrecognised 
molecular mechanisms by searching for novel genetic variants.^^' By using large scale 
DNA collections and health records, scientists aim to find such variants. 
Therapeutics 
The development of tailor made drugs, derived from population based genetic research, is 
known as pharmacogenetics. It is thought that the development of these medicines are 
likely to take ten to fifteen years from the identification of a susceptibility gene. The main 
idea behind pharmacogenetics is that by comparing the DNA of patients who have 
responded badly to a drug with control groups who did not experience an adverse effect, 
researchers may discover DNA markers which can predict adverse side effects. This may 
lead to the development of drug response profiles which would determine i f a patient is 
likely to benefit and/or experience serious side effects from medication. 
Pharmacogenetics then has the potential to allow physicians to prescribe medicines more 
accurately based on a pre-determined efficacy and safety profile.^^^ 
The possibility of specially suited drugs has received much attention. Professor Sir 
George Radda, Chief Executive of the Medical Research Council, said of Britain's 
attempt to build a national biobank (described below): 'This exciting project may one day 
Lords, 2001. 
Acute coronary event DNA Library Project, 2000. 
Lords, 2001. 
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herald a new era of medicine. In 20 years time, we may see individualised approaches to 
disease prevention and medicine.'^ ^^ 
Doubts and debates 
The promise of biobanks and pharmacogentics has not gone unchallenged. Commentators 
have charged that plans for the British database, for example, are politically motivated 
rather than being scientifically driven.^ '^* They claim that the development and awarding 
of contracts to house the collections have been time consuming and highly inefficient. 
More damaging, some have cast doubt on the scientific validity of genetic databases.^ ^^  
The concern here is that case-control and disease specific studies may yield more useful 
data than large cohort studies that are based on normal populations. 
Others have expressed concern over the 'dubious methodology' of biobanks.^ ^^ Ian 
Gibson MP, worried that databases could lead to an over emphasis on genetic causes 
since genetic input would be the only hard data available to researchers. His concern was 
that many people would have 'patchy recollections' of past lifestyle factors and 
behavioural habits. Gibson's fear was that, in the case of obesity, for example, genetic 
research would lead to a stress on DNA tests and minimise the importance of things such 
as diet and lifestyle. Gene Watch U K , an organisation devoted to monitoring 
developments in genetics, echoed these concerns, adding that 'people don't always tell 
the truth about their habits.'^" 
There have also been concerns regarding the anticipated benefits of pharmacogenetics. '^'* 
Even advocates of this field have admitted that it will take at least ten years for new 
products to be developed. Sceptics worry that given the cost needed to make novel 
medicines and the specificity of them for individual patients, very few will end up 
For these comments, see www.ukbiobank.ac.uk. 233 
V. Barbour, 2003. UK Biobank: a project in search of a protocol? The Lancet 361: 1734-1738. For a 
response, see T. Meade, 2003. The future of Biobank. The Lancet 362: 492. 
^" D. Clayton and P. McKeigue, 2001. Epidemiological methods for studying genes and environmental 
factors in complex diseases. The Lancet 358: 1356-1360. 
Hansard, 2002. Biobank. Houses of Parliament: 365-372. 
K. Staley, 2001. Giving your genes to Biobank UK: Questions to Ask. A Report for Gene Watch UK. 
B. Williams-Jones and O. Corrigan, 2003. American Journal of Pharmacogenetics 3: 375-383. 
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actually benefiting. There are even claims that privately pharmacogenetic companies 
have expressed grave reservations and have actively and quietly sought to undermine 
research - again, given the exorbitant amount of resources needed and the level of 
financial risk involved.^''' 
Al l of these concerns clearly have ethical import. Whilst I will not address them further 
here, later in the thesis I shall have more to say about the financial associations of 
bioethics and the lack of ethical analysis regarding the creation of new technologies. 
Existing and planned biobanks^^° 
National DNA population collections have become common throughout the world.^'" 
What follows is a survey of the best known biobanks, the examples of which I will draw 
on in my discussion of the ethical issues in genetic epidemiology. In the following 
chapter, I shall introduce a regional database based in north-west England. 
The first and most controversial attempt to create a biobank was in Iceland. deCode 
Genetics, a commercial company based in Iceland but licensed in the US for tax reasons, 
received permission from the Icelandic government in 1998 to build a DNA bank (known 
as the Health Sector Database). Much of the controversy arose when it became apparent 
that deCode planned to forgo traditional informed consent procedures and require donors 
to take the initiative to opt out of the study i f they did not want to participate.^^^ Concerns 
were also raised by deCode's exclusive licensing right to market and profit firom new 
products emerging from the database. 
Williams-Jones and Corrigan, 2003, p. 379. 
It should be noted that DNA banks have uses beyond medicine. In police work, for example, the use of 
DNA has been called the greatest advance in the use of forensic science by police since the introduction of 
fingerprints. In 1995, a National DNA Database was established in England and Wales which allows police 
to collect samples both from suspects and from crime scenes. As of August 2000, the database held genetic 
profiles on nearly one million suspects and nearly 100,000 crime scene samples. See the Wellcome Trust 
Web site 'Knowledge Bank' links for details on the grant held by Robin Williams, University of Durham. 
M. Austin, S. Harding, C. McElroy, 2003. Genebanks: A Comparison of Eight Proposed International 
Genetic Databases. Community Genetics, 6: 37-45; G. Cardinal and M. Deschenes, 2003. Surveying the 
Population Biobankers. In B. Knoppers, ed. Populations and Genetics, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 
pp. 37-94. 
H. Rose, 2000. The Commodification of Bioinformation: The Icelandic Health Sector Database. A 
Report for the Wellcome Trust. _ 
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In Estonia, scientists have developed similar plans. A non-profit organisation, the 
Estonian Genome Project Foundation, started a pilot project in 2002 and aims to recruit 
75% of Estonia's 1.4 million population as donors.^ "*^  Participation is voluntary and based 
on opt-in (that is consent based) procedures. In the following section I address some of 
the ways in which Estonian researchers have attempted to recruit participants to the 
biobank. 
Unlike these countries, the United States does not have a government sponsored and 
nationally coordinated biobank. Instead, genetic epidemiological studies are conducted 
across many diffiise private, academic, and public bodies. Many sample collections, 
usually derived from whole blood or buccal cells (taken from cheek swabs), are on-going 
projects. The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, for instance, is a 
continuous study that began in 1999 and collects specimens from approximately 5,000 
people each year. More recently, Howard University announced plans for a genetics 
database that would collect DNA profiles from patients at Howard University Hospital, 
which serves a predominantly black and medically underserved population in 
Washington D.C.^ '*'* Organizers at Howard plan to collect samples from 25,000 patients 
in order to study diseases, such as diabetes and prostate cancer, which afflict African-
Americans more than whites. Finally, to cite another, albeit unrepresentative example. 
Gene Trust, run by DNA Sciences, aims to create a "huge database of information about 
people' in order to 'drastically speed up the rate of medical advances'.^ ''^  Organizers 
claim to have registered online over 10,000 donors in its first year of operation. While 
such private schemes are more frequent in the US than in Britain, the ultimate target of 
population-based genetic remains the same. That is, research predominately focuses on 
the two biggest killers in the developed world: heart disease and cancer.^ *^  
"^^  Cardinal and Deschenes 2003, p. 39. 
A. Goldstein, and R. Weiss, 2003. Howard U. Plans genetics database. Washington Post Online, 27 
May. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com. 
Gene Trust, 2002. See: www.dna.com 
K. Steinberg, J. Beck, D. Nickerson, M. Garcia-Closas, M. Gallager, M.Caggana, Y. Reid, M. 
Cosentino, J. Ji, D. Johnson, D. Hayes, R., Earley, M., Lorey, F. Hannon, H. Khoury, and E. Sampson, 
2002. DNA banking for epidemiological studies: a review of current practices. Epidemiology, 13: 259-264. 
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In April 2002, the British House of Lords approved plans for the world's largest biobank, 
UK Biobank (originally known as Biobank UK). This project is organized and fimded by 
the Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research Council, and the Department of Health, and is 
estimated to cost upwards of £60 million, or $90 million.^'*' Starting in 2003, UK 
Biobank plans to collect DNA samples (via blood) from 500,000 British volunteers. 
Recruits will include men and women aged between 45 and 69, the usual age of onset for 
many common diseases. Apart from the initial donation, patients will be asked to fill out 
extensive lifestyle and medical history questionnaires. In addition, researchers will 
periodically re-contact donors for at least 10 years beyond the original donation in order 
to inquire about the volunteer's health status. UK Biobank researchers will also monitor 
general practice, hospitalisation, and prescription records, as well as disease and 
morbidity registers. 
Having briefly surveyed a sample of the existing and planned DNA banks, I shall now 
turn to the numerous ethical issues raised by these collections. 
Socio-ethical issues in genetic epidemiology 
Genetic donation and the characterisation of national biobanks 
The success of population based collections depends largely on public acceptance of such 
endeavours. In order to win such approval, the organisers of national biobanks have 
undertaken a variety of strategies. However, as Richard Tutton notes, 'there is no neutral 
language' in which to discuss participation. '^** Requests to donate frequently make 
assumptions about people's motivations and are promoted by professionals (ethicists, 
medical researchers, policy-makers) who have clear scientific, commercial and political 
interests. 
In Estonia and in Iceland, the discourse surrounding participation in databases is heavily 
invested in appeals to nationalism and cultural pride, coupled with potential health and 
"^^  UK Biobank, 2002. Draft Protocol for Biobank UK: A Study of Genes. Environment and Health. 
Available at: www.wellcome.ac.uk;. J. Newton, 2004. UK Biobank Briefing Note. 
R. Tutton, 2004. Introduction. In R. Tutton and O. Corrigan eds. Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical 
issues in the collection and use of DNA. London: Routledge, pp. 1-18. 
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economic benefits of luring foreign investment. In Estonia, references to international 
competitiveness have been a common way to frame the Estonian Genome Foundation 
and promote its public acceptability. One observer has noted that, 
'Mini-societies like Iceland and Estonia that are genetically homogeneous and have a 
good health-care system and scientific base can accomplish the leap to the new medicine 
much faster than big countries that are still standing at the starting line ... Estonian Nokia 
may be hidden in our genes.'^ "^ 
Interestingly, the term 'Estonia Nokia' refers to Finland's success in the 
telecommunications market. The success of Estonia's northern neighbour in the mobile 
phone industry is often cited in Estonia as a symbol of Finnish national pride, innovation 
and technological advancement. In this context, the Estonian database is a 'chance' for 
the small nation to compete on a global scale. 
Whilst the Icelandic biobank met fiercer criticism (largely from academics) than 
Estonia's project, nationalism and technological progress were also cited as reasons to 
support - that is, donate to - the database. Hillary Rose has argued that Iceland remains a 
very 'technofile' country and that the popular and nationalist appeal of deCode's CEO 
has done much to enhance the biobank's reputation in Iceland.^^" In addition, worries 
over the future of Iceland's fishing industry has added to the view that development of 
the island nation's scientific infrastructure would a long term economic asset. It is in this 
context then that appeals to participate are made. 
In Britain, the language surrounding UK Biobank and genetic donation has taken a very 
different tone. Here, calls to altruism and gift-giving pervade the literature. For example, 
the Medical Research Council's guidelines on the collection, storage, and use of tissue 
P. Tammpuu, 2004. Constructing Public Images of New Genetics and Gene Technology: The Media 
Discourse on the Estonia Human Genome Project. THAMES 8: 204. 
H. Rose, 2000. 
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samples cite Richard Titmuss's famous study of blood donation^^'. Titmuss argued that a 
US style of blood donation, based on commercialisation, would lead to exploitation of 
minorities and the poor, as well as adminisfrative inefficiency, greater costs, and higher 
amounts of contaminated blood. In confrast, Titmuss argued that voluntary donation 
systems created a sense of solidarity since donors gave their blood altruistically and could 
take comfort in the fact that their blood would be used for strangers, rich or poor, and 
without distinction between class, gender or ethnicity. (Titmuss, as is well known, based 
his work on the anthropology of Marcel Mauss, whom I shall discuss in the next chapter 
in the context of the Cumbrian database). 
MRC guidelines state that the gift approach is 'preferable from a moral and ethical point 
of view, as it promotes the "gift relationship" between participants and researchers, and 
underlines the altruistic motivation for participation in research.'^ ^^ The MRC goes on to 
say, 'Gifts may be conditional (that is, a donor may specify what the recipient can do 
with a gift), and it is very important that the donor understands and agrees to the 
proposed uses of the donated material. The assumption by the donor is that nothing will 
be done that would be detrimental to his or her interests, or bring harm to him or her.'^ ^^ 
The organizers of one of the UK Biobank public consultations (discussed below) also cite 
altruism as a reason for donation. Their final report claims, 'the one primary motivating 
force that stimulates people to volunteer ... [is] altruism'. 
The MRC has several reasons for wanting to characterise medical donations as 'gifts.' 
First, and most obviously, medical research depends on peoples' willingness to donate. 
Second, characterizing genetic donations as 'gifts' enables the MRC to avoid legal 
uncertainties over ownership. In the UK it is not legally possible to own a human body 
per se. However, the law is not clear whether one can own samples of human tissue or 
whether donors can have property rights over their samples. According to the MRC, for 
R. Titmuss, 1970. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
Medical Research Council, 2001. Human tissue and biological samples for use in research: Operational 
and Ethical Guidelines, p. 8. 
^ " M R C , 2001, p.8.. 
People, Science and Policy Ltd. 2002. Biobank UK: A Question of Trust: A consultation exploring and 
addressing questions of public trust. 
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human research, the important consideration is not legal ownership but 'who has the right 
to control the use of samples'.^ ^^ The term 'custodianship' is used instead of ownership to 
imply responsibility of safe storage and control of tissue samples. Thus, by referring to 
donations as gifts, 'any property rights that the donor might have in their donated sample 
would be transferred, together with the control of the use of the sample, to the recipient of 
the gift'.^^^ In other words, theorizing donations as gifts provides the MRC with a 
'practical way' of avoiding the possibility that donors may later claim legal rights to their 
samples. 
As Tutton notes, the portrayal of the gifted material in MRC guidelines is that of human 
tissue and not the genetic information which can be derived fr-om that tissue or the 
personal medical records which also accompany biobank donations. 'This delimits the 
processes of commercialism in a way that insulates participants and their "generous gifts" 
of samples from the activities of the commercial sector in biomedical research, with 
public bodies'. 
The act of donation is related in many ways to consent since it is only through the latter 
(in theory at least, not in Iceland) that donors' give their approval for their tissue to be 
collected and stored for future use. 
Informed consent and sample use 
In chapter four, I drew attention to the early formation of informed consent requirements 
in the Nuremburg Code and Helsinki Declaration(s). However, biobanking and the 
information that derives from it seems to challenge traditional consent requirements on at 
least three grounds.^^' In the following discussion I draw upon the conventional 
MRC, 2001, p. 8. 
"*MRC, 2001, p.8. 
Tutton, 2004, p. 33; R. Tutton, 2004. Person, property and gift: Exploring languages of tissue to 
biomedical research. In Tutton and Corrigan, 2004, pp. 19-38. 
My discussion of consent and the alternatives to it is based on: M. Whong-Barr, forthcoming. Informed 
consent and the shaping of British and US population-based genetic research. In D. Guston & D. Sarewitz 
eds.. Shaping Science & Technology Policy: The Next Generation of Research, Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
R. Chadwick, 2001. Informed consent and genetic research. In L. Doyal and J. Tobias (ed.) Informed 
Consent in Medical Research. London: BMJ Publishing group; pp. 203-210. 
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definitions and notions of consent (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress), however in the 
following chapter, I shall add a social science critique to the discussion in keeping with 
my overall theme regarding the importance of context. 
The first challenge of genetic epidemiology concerns the disclosure element of consent, 
which requires researchers to inform subjects of all relevant facts of the proposed study. 
Generally, this requirement covers areas such as the potential benefits and risks to the 
donor, the researcher's personal interest in the project (e.g. financial connections), the 
aims and methods of the research, and the subject's right to withdraw.^^*' However, in the 
case of biobanking, it is seemingly impossible for the subject to be truly informed of the 
use of the sample when often the researchers themselves do not know the full range of 
studies that might be done. Samples are stored in liquid nitrogen tanks and retain their 
scientific value for well beyond the original donation. Therefore, it is possible that a 
person who donates their DNA today for a study on breast cancer may not be informed 
twenty years hence when their sample has been used to study genetic influences on, say, 
sexual orientation. 
Second, population genetics poses problems for the voluntariness requirement of consent, 
which states that persons must make their decision without being under the control or 
undue influence of others.^ '^ Many believe that genetic information is exceptional in 
nature compared to other forms of medical data.^ *^  Whether one accepts these arguments 
or not, it is certainly the case that individual donors share a portion of their genetic profile 
with family members. Thus, if/when biobank research leds to clinically relevant results, it 
could potentially have enormous consequences for the donor's relatives. In other words, 
the predictive value of genetic information could create a situation where relatives of a 
biobank donor involuntarily learn of their genetic pre-disposition to a certain condition. 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 
^" House of Lords, 2001. 
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Genetic information is exceptional in other ways, as well. Some argue that DNA has 
become the secular equivalent of the human soul.^ '^' In addition, the popular press and 
popular science books often depict the 'gene' as the secret or blueprint to life.^^ Given 
this representation of DNA, what are researchers asking people to donate ~ a mere piece 
of their biological tissue, or an intimate and unique part of their personal identity? 
Third, genetic epidemiology is problematic for the understanding requirement of consent, 
which holds that subjects must be able to justify the beliefs leading to the nature and 
consequence of their decision.^ ^^ There is debate about the extent to which the public is 
or can be aware of genetic science and how that may affect their ability to consent. While 
this lack of understanding may be true of many kinds of academic research, the potential 
for misunderstanding may be greater in genetics. Not only is genetic science new, even 
clinicians have difficulty in keeping abreast of the latest research, due to the sheer speed 
of developments. To make matters worse, some segments of the media cloud the issue by 
confusing sensationalist headlines with what is currently known and achievable. 
Despite the difficulty of understanding genetics, people do seem to have their own 
coherent lay understandings.^ ^^ However, lay understandings may not translate well in 
clinical or research settings (and vice versa). Many people cannot define a Mendelian 
pattern of inheritance nor differentiate between dominant and recessive disorders.^" In 
addition, people have different levels of risk-aversion or tolerance. Lay understandings of 
the difference between genetically determined and genetically predisposed may not 
match clinical definitions of the same terms. 
Such challenges have led observers to re-evaluate informed consent procedures in hopes 
of achieving consent while not sacrificing research priorities. 
^" D. Nelkin, and M. S. Lindee, 1995. The DNA Mystique: The Gene as Cultural Icon. New York: W.H. 
Freeman. 
C. Condit, 1999. The Meanings of the Gene. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 
A. Kerr, S. Cunningham-Burley, and A. Amos, 1998. The new genetics and health: Mobilizing lay 
expertise Public Understanding of Science 7: 41-60. 
M. Richards, 1996. Lay and professional knowledge of genetics and inheritance. Public Understanding 
of Science 5: 217-230. 
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Approaches to achieving informed consent 
Although an increasing number of writers have addressed the issue of consent in 
biobanking, the issue is far from settled. Numerous options have been put forth, most of 
which are not mutually exclusive. A key distinction in these discussions is between broad 
and narrow versions of consent.^ ^^ 
Broad consent would allow investigators to conduct a range of studies, not all of which 
would be explicitly spelled out at the time of taking consent. The UK's Human Genetics 
Commission (HGC) advocates broad consent so long as participants are given a 'clear 
explanation of the potential scope of the research'.The Commission argues that broad 
consent is 'practically necessary in a fast-moving field with constantly developing new 
technology'.^'" As part of its call for written evidence, the HGC claims to have received 
significant support for broad consent - not only from researchers, but from patient 
advocacy groups as well. Part of my argument, detailed later in the chapter, is to support 
broad consent on the basis that it best secures donors' expectations of the benefits of 
medical research. 
In contrast, narrow consent would restrict sample use to studies explicitly mentioned at 
the outset of a research project. I f investigators wanted to conduct further studies, they 
would have to re-contact donors. While narrow consent may help subjects stay better 
informed, the HGC has claimed that re-contacting people to seek further consent would 
impose an unnecessary burden on donors and, more importantly, increase risks of a 
security breach since sensitive medical data would have to be decoded. In addition, 
narrow consent could be an obstacle to research. Not only would it increase costs for 
investigators, but it would complicate matters in cases where the donor had since 
deceased. 
K. Berg, 2001 DNA sampling and banking in clinical genetics and genetic research New Genetics and 
Society 20: 59-68. 
Human Genetics Commission. 2002. Inside Information: Balancing Interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data, p. 93. 
HGC, 2002, p, 94. 
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In Iceland, as previously mentioned, the issue of consent has raised considerable 
controversy. Article 3 of the Icelandic Icelandic Biobank Act distinguishes between 
'free, informed consent' (consent granted in writing of the person's own free will) and 
'assumed consent' (consent that consists of the donor not expressing any unwillingness 
for a sample taken from then for a clinical test to be permanently stored in a biobank). 
Thus, Iceland's Biobank Act mandates informed consent for samples collected as part of 
a scientific study but permits assumed consent for samples collected as part of routine 
healthcare treatment. However, in both cases, the sample is permanently stored in the 
biobank. Thus, people may donate to the biobank without having given consent. 
In Britain, consent requirements have been stricter. The MRC states that 'when obtaining 
consent to take a sample of biological material for research, it is important that donors 
have sufficient understanding not only of the process involved ... but also of what the 
sample is to be used for and how the results might impact on their interests.'^'' The MRC 
recognizes that a sample could be used for new experiments unforeseen at the time of 
donation. In these cases, they suggest a two part consent process, where the donor is first 
asked to consent to the specific experiment planned, and then to give consent for storage 
and future use for other research. Unless the sample is anonymised and unlinked, the 
MRC believes that it is not acceptable to seek unconditional blanket consent by using 
terms such as 'all biological or medical research.'^ ''^  
I f samples can be linked to individuals, then the MRC recommends that possible future 
research should be explained in terms of the types of studies that may be done, the types 
of diseases that may be investigated, and the possible impact of the research on the donor 
personally.^ '^' 
Whether consent is broad or narrow, however, questions still remain as to who is 
consulted and how the process of consent ought to unfold. Answers offered to these 
" ' M R C , 2001, p. 15. 
MRC, 2001, p. 15. 
MRC, 2001, p. 15. 
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questions have included: a re-evaluation of the language and substance of consent forms; 
some level of group or community consent; and public consultation exercises. 
A matter of form? 
One approach, more prominent in the US, has focused on the content and language of 
actual consent forms.^ '^* Recently the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
formed a multi-disciplinary working group to address the issue of consent. Its 
conclusions were not fiindamentally different from existing guidelines in public health 
research, but rather an extension of those guidelines.^ ^^ The CDC panel concluded that 
the best way of protecting subjects' interests and autonomy is by making forms as 
thorough as possible regarding the details of a study. The panel suggested that forms 
contain information on: why the study is being done, what it will involve, how 
information will be kept private, the study's risks and costs, the possibility of receiving 
results, and the status of the sample once the study is complete. An approach that focuses 
on detailed consent forms is designed to exhaust the disclosure element of consent 
requirements. 
It is worth noting that the CDC recommendations direcfly connect the probability of harm 
and benefits to the meaning of the results for the health of the participant. In other words, 
consent ought to be based fi-om the start on an assessment of whether or not the results 
would generate information that could lead directly to an evidence-based intervention, 
such as drug tieatment or lifestyle alteration. The CDC panel concluded that family-based 
research guidelines were not suited to biobank research since they do not distinguish 
between studies that are likely to yield clinically relevant results and ones that may have 
significant public health implications but carry few physical, psychological, or social 
risks to individuals — as in the case of population-based genetic research. By trying to 
ensure that no one learns of a meaningfiil result without having consented, CDC has 
sought to meet the voluntariness element of consent requirements. 
L. M. Beskow, W. Burke, J. F. Merz, 2001. Informed consent for population-based research involving 
genetics. Journal of the American Medical Association, 286: 2315-2321. 
M. Khoury, 2001. Informed consent for population research involving genetics: A public health 
perspective. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov. _ 
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Focusing on the language of forms has severe drawbacks, however. One criticism is that 
this strategy seems to be more for the protection of the interests of researchers and 
Institutional Review Boards than those of the subject.^ ''^  Sceptics argue that forms end up 
looking more like legal contracts than documents of explanation and education and that 
focusing on the language of consent is a legalistic and bureaucratic approach. 
US concerns with the content of forms has drawn frequent criticisms in the UK, as well. 
The British medical establishment has long sought to avoid an American style litigation 
culture. Thus, critics in the UK argue that by focusing on forms, researchers are too 
heavily pre-occupied with the so-called 'audit society', in which institutions are 
monitored for accountability by external review.^'' Such a society seeks accountability 
through observing and ultimately judging the activities of professionals and 
institutions.^'* Another criticism is that an emphasis on forms is the product of a 
consumer-driven culture. 'In a world where medicine has become a good to be 
consumed, where patients are customers to be wooed, informed consent becomes the 
disclosure of the contents on the back of the box'. 
The danger, in my view, is that concentrating on the language of forms runs the risk of 
turning consent into a sufficient ethical justification, which it is not. This is a topic I re-
visit later in the thesis in Chapter Eight. 
Group consent 
Another way of meeting the challenge posed by the exceptional (or familial) nature of 
genetic information is by asking for group or community consent.^ *" This system has 
received more attention in the US than in Britain, perhaps because of the presence of the 
G. Annas, 2001. Reforming informed consent to genetic research. Journal of the American Medical 
Association 286: 
M. Power, 1997. The Audit Society, Oxford: OUP 
O. O'Neill., 2002. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: CUP. 
Wolpe, 1998, p.44. 
H. Greely, 2001. Informed consent and other ethical issues in human population genetics/4nnMo/ Review 
of Genetics 35: 785-800. 
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Native American population and the work of the North American Regional Committee of 
the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP). 
Proponents argue that group consent is necessary since genetic research could have 
implications beyond the individual donor or even local community. Research done on a 
Chinese community in California, for instance, could have consequences for all Chinese, 
no matter where they live or i f they consented. As mentioned above, the fear is that i f 
research ever established that a population was pre-disposed towards developing a certain 
condition or behavioural characteristic such as alcoholism, then it could have adverse 
effects in terms of insurance or employment. In addition, it could unfairly stigmatize the 
population under investigation. 
However, achieving group consent is fraught with so many difficulties that it may be 
impossible to achieve. How does one define the group or community? Should it include 
only the subject community, or should it include all who may be influenced by the 
research? Should the group be limited only to families? Or should it include the so-called 
disease organizations such as American Lung Association? How would the group 
actually express consent? Should researchers liaise with 'culturally appropriate 
authorities', as the HGDP suggests?^*' Or should a vote be held, no doubt at great cost to 
the research project? 
Another factor against group consent is that it may end up re-enforcing controversial 
stereotypes not grounded in reality. It is open to debate whether there are any genetic 
differences between ethnic groups. Some scientists believe that the distinctions are 
miniscule and that race has no real genetic basis. However, asking for group consent from 
a specific ethnicity implies that race does have a genetic underpinning. 
^" Greely,2001. 
E. T. Juengst, 
hazardous, and practically useless. Journal of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics 8: 183-200. 
1998. Groups as gatekeepers to genomic research: conceptually confusing, morally 
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In fairness, proponents argue for community consent as an extra layer of ethical 
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protection rather than as a full alternative to traditional consent requirements. 
However, despite the communal nature of genetic information, most observers do not 
take group consent seriously for the reasons highlighted above. Even in the US, group 
consent seems to have only lukewarm support. Its most vocal advocates in the HGDP 
have reservations about implementing the idea and recognize that in some situations, e.g. 
where communities do not have a culturally appropriate authority, group consent would 
be impossible.^ ^"* 
Public consultation 
UK Biobank organizers have been concerned that public attitudes towards the practical, 
social and ethical aspects of such a project are clearly understood and taken into account 
in the development of the collection. Two public consultations were held. 
In the first exercise, an independent research group - Cragg Ross Dawson - was 
commissioned to consult with a cross-section of the public across the UK, including 
religious and community leaders, and spokespeople for organizations with a special 
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interest in the issues surrounding genetics research. They found that initial responses 
among the public were, in general, favourable but unconsidered: in other words, 
respondents tended not to think through the project's implications. Many people, when 
informed of potential ethical issues, became concerned about UK Biobank's implications. 
However, further information and discussion of these issues and governance of the UK 
Biobank tended to restore their positive views (although, curiously, governance 
arrangements for the database had not been officially planned until long after the 
consultation). People with direct experience of illness and their relatives were more 
supportive and had fewer reservations. Some members of the public and certain religious 
and community leaders were concerned about the use of the term DNA, because it had 
associations with police investigations, criminality and state control. Linked to this was 
C. Weijer, and E. J. Emanuel, 2000. Protecting communities in biomedical research Science 289: 1142-
1144. 
Greely,2001. 
Cragg Ross Dawson, 2000. Public Perceptions of the Collection of Human Biological Samples. Report 
prepared for the Wellcome Tmst and Medical Research Council. 
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some concern about possible misuse of samples - for cloning, eugenics or other 
questionable purposes. Overall, however, the proposed study was viewed positively, and 
the report's largest recommendation was to establish an independent body, designed to 
regulate the collection, storage, use and disposal of UK Biobank samples. 
The second consultation was carried out by People Science and Policy.^*^ The exercise 
was conducted in January 2002, and involved three groups of 20 people aged 45-69 years 
(the proposed age for volunteers for the UK Biobank). The consultations were carried out 
in Hertfordshire, the West Midlands and Glasgow. Respondents were first informed on 
the basic facts and aims of UK Biobank. Most were supportive but findings showed that 
people were uncertain as to the benefits and concerned about the burden of time and 
effort required to travel to and participate in the donation interview. There were also 
reservations about the type of long term commitment involved on the part of donors. 
Finally, focus group member were concerned about anything that would increase GPs 
workload (which would put pressure on CP's to reduce the amount of time spent with 
patients). 
In my view, these consultations are a good example of how social research generally and 
public consultation specifically can be highly problematic.^*' I endorse both, of course, 
but one key factor in any project is the methodology used. In the second consultation by 
People Science and Policy, even the researchers themselves admitted that conducting 
their consultation in a group setting could have impacted their findings - that is to say, 
they warned that readers should be 'wary' of 'participants over-claiming their altruistic 
motivations' when speaking in front of others, especially strangers.^ ** In addition, focus 
group participants were given leaflets regarding the aims and purpose of UK Biobank as 
part of the consultation process. This raises a question that is a general problem for all 
social research: how do investigators attempt to record opinions without influencing 
People, Science and Policy 2002. 
See also: M. Levitt, 2003. Public Consultation in Bioethics: What's the Point of Asking the Public When 
They Have Neither Scientific Nor Ethical Expertise? Health Care Analysis 11:15-25. 
People Science and Policy, 2002, p. 2. 
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those opinions? The short answer is that they cannot.^ *^ This is a topic I will re-visit later 
in the study.^ ^" 
Confidentiality and access 
The fears about confidentiality and biobanks is that at some point in the future, third 
parties may gain access to the genetic information stored in the database. Of particular 
concern is that insurance companies, employers, or the police would seek access. In 
discussing this topic, there has been a good deal on confusion over the terms used. The 
House of Lords refers to this confusion as 'semantic heterogeneity'. But even i f the same 
terminology were used, the words would not necessarily have the same history, context 
or meaning in different research areas or countries. As I discussed earlier, researchers 
require the means of linking data back to the individual, since the whole point was to 
seek associations between phenotypic data, genetic and lifestyle information. Usefully, 
the Lords distinguished three broad levels of anonymisation.^^' 
(a) fully identifiable data, where the clinical/genetic record was linked to an identifiable 
individual; 
(b) de-identified (anonymised) data, where individual identifying information had been 
replaced by a code (which could be made very secure) allowing data and individual 
identifiers to be re-linked under certain circumstances; and 
(c) permanently de-linked data, where any link between the data and the individuals 
fi-om whom they were collected had been completely destroyed. This is truly anonymous 
data. 
In (b), the identifying information (such as name, address, date of birth, NHS number etc) 
would be removed fi-om data and samples at the earliest opportunity after collection. 
R. Ashcroft, Constructing empirical bioethics: Foucauldian reflections on the empirical turn in bioethics 
research. Health Care Analysis 11:3-13. 
See also: S. Weldon, 2004. 'Public consent' or 'scientific citizenship'? What counts as public 
participation in population -based DNA collections? In R. Tutton and O. Corrigan, eds, Genetic databases: 
Socio-ethical issues in the collection and use of DNA, pp. 161-180; and, E. Juengst, 2003. Community 
Engagement in Genetic Research: The "Slow Code" of Research Ethics? In B. Knoppers ed.. Populations 
and Genetics: Legal and Socio-Ethical Perspectives, pp. 181-197. 
"'Lords, 2001. 
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'Sensitive' information such as health and lifestyle data, and samples, would be kept 
separate from identifying information and only linked using a code that has no external 
meaning (e.g. not the NHS Number). Only those with access to the 'key' to the code 
would be able to re-link the participants' identifying information with the data and 
samples. In addition, in some biobanks, information is encrypted. This means that data is 
scrambled with meaningless symbols and impossible to read unless the researcher has an 
additional code to de-crypt the information. 
Benefits-sharing 
In my earlier comments on participation and genetic donation, I noted the importance of 
reciprocity in the gift-relationship. It is also a theme highly pertinent to benefit-sharing: 
the idea that donors (and wider society) will , in time, receive some sort of gain from 
DNA bank research. 
There are several models on benefit-sharing. In the US, PXE International, a patient 
group, have built a system which gives donors to genetics research a say over the 
property rights of samples.^ ^^  The Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) has stated that 
at a minimum research participants ought to receive information regarding research 
outcomes. HUGO also states that the profit making bodies involved should dedicate 
between 1-3% of armual net profit to either health care infrastructure and/or humanitarian 
efforts.^^^ 
The issue of benefits-sharing relates to a general problem in distributive justice. In 
biobanking, it is an especially difficult problem because of the time lag between the 
actual donation and the potential benefit. It is not inconceivable that in some cases the 
donor will have died. So how does one even go about defining 'benefit'? This is a theme 
I will return to in later chapters. 
'^^  P. Terry, 2003. PXE International: Harnessing Intellectual Property Law for Benefit-Sharing. In 
Knoppers, pp. 377-393. 
^" HUGO, 2002. Ethics Committee, Statement on Benefit-Sharing, 9 April; S. Wilson, 2004. Population 
Biobanks and Social Justice: Commercial or Communitarian Models? A comparative analysis of benefit-
sharing, ownership, and access arrangements. THAMES 8: 80-89; C. MacDonald, 2003. Patents and 
Benefit-Sharing as a Challenge for Corporate Ethics. In Knoppers, pp. 505-523. 
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Feedback 
Feedback refers to the process of providing research results to those who have donated to 
a biobank. Disclosure of results is a factor in clinical genetic testing or screening 
programs where the patient is suspected from the outset as being at risk. However, 
population-based research also presents opportunities for disclosure and the issue is no 
less a minefield in the context of research than it is in clinical testing. There are two main 
types of feedback, general and individual. 
General or community level feedback refers to the dissemination of results that are non-
specific to individuals. This form of disclosure is often through peer-reviewed 
publications, newsletters, Web sites, or group communication amongst researchers and 
biobank participants.^ '^* General feedback reports on the progress of research and offers a 
way for donors to keep abreast of how their samples are being used. More importantly, it 
allows donors to keep informed of research that may be of personal interest. MRC 
guidelines state that as part of general feedback, participants should be kept informed of 
research that may have clinical relevance or that may lead to improved diagnostic tests. 
General feedback provides a route for donors to obtain advice and information that may 
be of concern to them or members of their family. This type of feedback is not 
particularly problematic and nearly all parties involved in the UK BioBank support 
disclosure at the community wide level.^'^ 
Individual or personal feedback is when the donor receives information that is specific to 
their sample, hence their own health status and possible disease risk. One way for a donor 
to receive this type of feedback is at the point of their physical assessment whilst making 
the donation. Any abnormal findings that occur during the taking of the sample will be 
fed back to their general practitioner. This would be done with donors' consent. The 
Draft Protocol of UK Biobank states that participants will receive this type of feedback. 
HGC, 2002, p. 106 
MRC, 2001, p. 19; HGC, 2002, p. 106. 
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The most controversial type of individual feedback concerns giving donors specific 
information derived from research done using their sample. On the surface of it, 
providing such results may seem like the best option and an ethical thing to do. Michael 
Dexter of the Wellcome Trust claims that he was in favour of personal feedback when 
plans for the BioBank UK were first drawn up. Since looking at the issue in greater 
detail, however, he is set against feedback of this type. In fact, the consensus view is 
firmly against individual feedback. Organisers of the UK Biobank as well as genetic 
'watch dogs' such as David King are all opposed to providing it. Nearly every 
professional body is opposed. Despite the consensus, the issue has been called 
'potentially one of the most difficult issues involved in setting up the sample collection, 
and one of the least easily resolved ' .One reason why feedback is a contentious issue 
may be that public surveys indicate that at least some sections of the public desire 
feedback. Reasons for providing it range from a) donors may have a 'right to know' 
research results, and may opt to use the Data Protection Act or European Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine to receive feedback; b) donors may want access to 
results in order to make provisions before their death, or even as a spur to make lifestyle 
changes, and; c) providing feedback may act as an incentive to participate in UK 
Biobank. 
However, those who are against providing feedback have offered three primary reasons 
for their stance. These include: a) population based research is not conducive to providing 
diagnosis, and does not have the validity of clinical tests; b) obtaining consent would be 
more 'tricky' i f feedback was required, and would, in effect, turn UK Biobank into a 
screening program, and; c) those obtaining feedback would require genetic counselling 
services, which would increase the level (hence, cost) of resources and staff needed, and 
d) donors may underestimate the psychic impact of being told their risk of developing an 
illness in the future.^^' Again, the issue of feedback relates to consent since it must be 
established from the outset whether feedback will be given. 
Dawson, 2000, p. 58. 
Lords, 2001. 
104 
The consensus view, however, does allow for feedback in certain rare cases. In addition, 
alternative models of giving feedback (e.g. relying on third parties) have been suggested 
by general practitioners. 
Summary and conclusion 
Chapter Five has switched gear from previous chapters and begun to address a specific 
issue in biomedical ethics. I have argued: 
• Genetic epidemiology is best contextualised in light of the modem public health 
movement which itself is best understood in light of social, political and 
economic philosophies dating back to the Enlightenment. Such philosophies posit 
the need for and value of public authorities intervening in the processes of 
population and health for the good of state, society, and individual. Taken to its 
extreme, the rationale of public health results in eugenic movements characteristic 
of the early to mid twentieth century. 
• Eugenics, however, is a slippery concept that is often used without clarification. It 
can, for example, refer to either state coercion in reproductive matters, or it can 
relate only to outcomes of reproduction, meaning that the contemporary discourse 
and practice of choice is in fact no less eugenic than previous eras. 
• Specifically, I have shown that biobanking is a case of public health par 
excellence in that it attempts to identify gene-disease associations by combining 
DNA samples with medical and lifestyle information of the donor. The benefits of 
such methods are said to include better diagnostic techniques (through a better 
understanding of disease causation) and therapeutic measures (through designer 
drugs aimed at reducing side effects). The potential benefits of these fields, 
however are open to question and critics maintain biobanking will fail to produce 
meaningful results, much like gene therapy has yet to produce successful new 
treatments. 
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Gene banks raise a number of socio-ethical issues. First, there is the manner in 
which donation is framed in differing national contexts. Most critically, however, 
there exists a conflict between informed consent and the need to further 
epidemiological research. It has been claimed that patient rights may hinder 
research and that consent requirements may not be sufficient to deal with issues 
that arise in large-scale population genetic research since it is difficult to obtain 
informed consent, when even the researchers do not know all the future uses of 
the samples that they are requesting. The various mechanisms around this 
problem include more detailed consent forms, group consent and public 
consultation. Al l three options carry inherent flaws, however, and to date the 
problem of consent in biobanking has not been theoretically nor practically 
solved. 
Confidentiality is an additional ethical concern since genetic information acquired 
from one individual may unwittingly provide knowledge regarding the genetic 
profile and health of that person's relatives. Another worry is that proper 
safeguards, legislation, and oversight mechanisms may not be in place to ensure 
that data and samples cannot be accessed by third parties, such as the police, 
insurers, or employers. 
• Benefits-sharing and feedback are also potential problems. The former is 
essentially a problem of distributive justice and relates to the handling of both 
financial and medical profits. Feedback refers to the process of providing research 
results to those who have donated to a biobank. With the exception of Estonia, all 
databases have stated that information on the genetic health of donors will not be 
given out, even i f such information were available. Yet this conflicts with the 
expectations and hopes of those surveyed in the UK based public consultations. 
Concern amongst clinicians and researchers is that: donors may misinterpret 
feedback; sufficient genetic counseling services do not exist to cope with demand 
i f feedback were given, and; donors may underestimate the psychic impact of 
being told their risk of developing an illness in the future. 
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Participating in a DNA bank: lessons from a Cumbrian case study 
'In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way round 
London. I have to take you through the city from north to south from east to west, from 
Euston to the embankment and from Piccadilly to the Marble Arch. After I have taken you 
many journeys through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through 
any given street a number of times - each time traversing the street as part of a different 
journey. At the end of this you will know London: you will be able to find your way about 
like a born Londoner. Of course, a good guide will take you through the more important 
streets more often then he takes you down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. 
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In philosophy I'm a rather bad guide.' 
— Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I aim to show the value of empirical study in helping to define and clarify 
a selection of ethical issues in genetic epidemiology.^^^ My focus is on the gap between 
normative theory and actual practice on issues such as informed consent, altruism, and 
donation. In keeping with the overall argument of the thesis, a common theme in the 
chapter is the value of contextual knowledge. The findings and analysis presented here 
are derived from a case study of the North Cumbria Community Genetics Project 
(hereafter NCCGP), a DNA bank formerly operationable in West Cumbria. 
D. Gasking and A. Jackson, 1967. Wittgenstein as Teacher. In K. Fann ed., Ludwig Wittgenstein: the 
Man and his Philosophy. Sussex: Harvester Press, p. 51. 
With the exception of the Introduction, this chapter is based on the following publications: E. Haimes 
and M. Whong-Barr, 2004. Key issues in genetic epidemiology: Lessons from a UK based empirical study. 
TRAMES: Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 8: 150-163; E. Haimes and M. Whong-Barr, 
2004. Levels and styles of participation in genetic databases: A case study of the North Cumbria Genetics 
Project. In R. Tutton & O. Corrigan, eds. Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical issues in the collection and use 
of DNA, London: Routledge, pp. 57-77; E. Haimes and M. Whong-Barr, 2003. Competing perspectives on 
reasons for participation and non-participation in the North Cumbria Community Genetics Project. In B.M. 
Knoppers, ed. Populations and Genetics: Legal Socio-Ethical Perspectives. Leiden: Brill Academic 
Publishers, pp. 199-216; M. Whong-Barr, and E. Haimes, 2003. Why say no? Reasons for non-participation 
in the North Cumbria Community Genetics Project. European Journal of Human Genetics 11, Supp. 1, 
P878. 
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In exploring a particular case and presenting a narrative and conclusions (however 
ambiguous and tentative), I put myself in a vein of inquiry suggested by Wittgenstein in 
the epigraph above. It is not my aim in this investigation to develop a closed and coherent 
theory or system that captures the essence of the NCCGP or genetic epidemiology. I have 
no such theories. Rather, I hope to capture the phenomenological detail and the rich 
ambiguity at play in the lived reality of a Cumbrian biobank. 
The value of the case study method may, for some, present problems of validity and 
generalisation. On this point, I take my cue from an author that I present in some detail in 
Chapter Seven, Bent Flyvbjerg.^'"' He describes and demolishes a number of 
misunderstandings regarding the case method. According to Flybvjerg, much of the bad 
reputation case studies have had lie in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Here, I wish to linger 
and digress on this point since it is crucial to my overall argument in the thesis regarding 
the value of particular case based knowledge. As the reader may have gleaned from 
Chapter Four and will see explicitly in Chapter Seven, my views are fairly anti-Platonic. 
In the following exchange from Meno, Socrates has inquired about the nature of the 
virtues.^"' 
Meno: It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, i f you want the virtue of man, it is easy to 
say that a man's virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to 
benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; 
i f you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage to 
home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a 
child, whether male of female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, i f you 
want that, or i f you want that of a free man or a slave. And there are many other virtues, 
so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every 
age, for every task of ours and every one of us - and Socrates the same is true for 
wickedness. 
B. Flyvbjerg, 2001. 
Flybvjerg uses a similar example. I have edited my use of the dialogue for convenience from: J. Cooper, 
ed., 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 871-875. 
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Socrates: I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, I have 
found you have a whole swarm of them. But Meno, to follow up the image of swarms, i f 
I were asking you what is the nature of bees and you said that there are many and of all 
kinds, what would you answer i f I asked you: 'Do you mean that there are many and 
varied and different from one another in so far as they are bees? Or are they no different 
in that regard, but in some respect, in their beauty, for example, or their size or in some 
other such way?' .... The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even i f they are many 
and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is 
right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what a virtue is? 
Meno: I think courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very 
many others 
Socrates: We are having the same trouble again, Meno .... We have found many virtues 
while looking for one, but we cannot find one which covers all others 
Meno: Socrates, what are you looking for, one virtue for them all? 
Socrates: That is likely .... 
Meno, then, cannot provide a definition or account of the virtues without reference to 
particular cases and different examples. In the Chapter Seven I expand this discussion to 
Aristotle's notion of practical, case based and context-dependent reasoning - phronesis. 
Such reasoning, in my view, ought to form a greater part of bioethics method in analysing 
moral problems. To briefly return to my opening quotation from Wittgenstein: in this 
chapter, I aim to examine the Cumbrian case up close and in detail. By showing the 
'details of an immense landscape', traversing many side streets, and presenting a wealth 
of data, I aim to analyse the underlying tensions, confradictions and limitations of the 
normative policy and regulatory frameworks governing genetic epidemiology.^ *^^ 
'"^  R. Monk, 1990. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. London: Penguin, p. 502. 
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The North Cumbria Community Genetics Project (NCCGP) 
Background and operational procedures 
Like UK Biobank, the NCCGP aims to assist the identification of gene-disease 
associations, and the impact of environmental factors on those associations. The Project, 
which ran from 1996 to 2003, was a collaboration between the Department of Public 
Health and the Institute of Human Genetics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
and the Genetics Unit at Westlakes Research Institute in Whitehaven, Cumbria. The 
impetus for the NCCGP was to develop a population-based resource that could address 
local health issues (such as controversies over leukaemia clustering, addressed below) 
and to promote the scientific infrastructure of Cumbria, reducing the regions economic 
dependence on the nuclear industry (also discussed). 
To build the biobank, the NCCGP collected blood and tissue samples from the umbilical 
cord of newborn babies, commonly referred to as 'afterbirth'; maternal blood samples, 
and personal health information derived from questionnaires and maternity data forms.^"^ 
With the consent of pregnant women, the afterbirth was collected during delivery at West 
Cumberland Hospital in Whitehaven. As of April 2003, when the NCCGP ceased 
operations, nearly 10,000 samples had been collected. Samples are kept frozen and stored 
for future use, so that the NCCGP can provide a resource of DNA samples for other 
researchers to use in genetic epidemiological studies. Studies so far have included 
investigations on breast cancer and prenatal viability, neuro-degenerative disease, gene 
repair of damaged DNA, and neural tube defects. 
Each pregnancy in the NCCGP was given a unique Project number used to identify the 
samples. Blood and cord samples, as well as personal information are stored at the 
University of Newcastle. Personal data is kept 'encrypted, on a stand-alone computer (i.e. 
not networked), password protected and in a locked room with very restricted access. The 
Mother's Questionnaire contained questions on twelve sides of A5, covering the 
D. Chase, E . Tawn, L . Parker, P. Jonas, J. Bum, 1998. The North Cumbria Community Genetics 
Project. Journal of Medical Genetics 35: 413-416; D. Chase, E. Tawn, L. Parker, P. Jonas, J. Bum, 2000. 
The North Cumbria Community Genetics Project 1996-2000. 
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woman's and her partner's socio-demographic profiles, their own health, their history of 
smoking, their emplojonent history and their family histories of long term or serious 
illness. 
The NCCGP enjoyed a high response rate. Nearly ten thousand DNA samples were 
collected, which means that nearly 90% of the pregnant women approached agreed to 
provide umbilical cord samples and maternal blood specimens.^ "'* However, only 60% of 
those approached completed the mother's questionnaire as well as donating samples. In 
addition, a small minority of the women approached did not participate in the NCCGP. 
Consent to donate was usually requested by community mid-wives during the first 
antenatal appointment. 
Ethics and public consultation 
The NCCGP was approved by the West Cumbria Local Research Ethics Committee and 
each subsequent study is approved by the same committee (which is appointed by the 
Local Health Authority). In addition, an Ethics Advisory Group (EAG) advised the 
NCCGP on procedures and the use of samples.^ "^  Perhaps its greatest contribution was a 
statement on the acceptable and unacceptable use of samples. The statement prohibited 
three areas of research: psychiatric illnesses, behavioural traits, and intelligence. As a 
result NCCGP samples have not been used in such studies. 
The NCCGP raised many of the social and ethical issues discussed in Chapter Four. 
In addition, the database raised several issues specific to its own procedures. These 
include the request of samples from a 'captive audience' of women receiving ante-natal 
care, albeit with the assurance that refusal does not compromise treatment.This 
distinguishes the NCCGP from all other dedicated DNA banks and is a critical point to 
which I will revisit. Second, the biobank requested mothers to give consent on behalf of 
Chase etal, 1998. 
J. Garcia, ed., 1990. The Politics of Maternity Care. Oxford: Clarendon Press; M. Jacobus, 1990. 
Chase, et al, 2000. 
 
Women and the Discourses of Science. London: Routledge. 
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their babies, although the child can withdraw their sample at the age of 16.^°' Third, 
mothers were asked to give lifestyle information about their partners, who may or may 
not have been the actual father of the baby donor. Finally, a major ethical issue was the 
involvement of British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) in the initial funding of the 
NCCGP. BNFL operate a nuclear re-processing plant at Sellafield, Cumbria, which has 
been associated with allegations about the effects of excessive radiation causing a higher 
than average incidence of childhood leukaemia. The role of BNFL is a critical point in 
the history of the NCCGP and deserves detailed discussion. 
In 1990, the Gardiner Report found that there were higher than normal rates of leukaemia 
and lymphomas in young people bom in West Cumbria. The report showed a statistical 
association between paternal pre-conceptional irradiation received whilst working at 
Sellafield and the development of childhood leukaemia/non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Since 
then it has been thought that findings may be due to chance or high level of population 
mixing dating from the 1950s. However, subsequent work still has not ruled out the risk 
of paternal pre-conceptional irradiation.^^^ 
The concern over BNFL was that NCCGP results might be compromised or at least 
influenced by the company. An evaluation of the local Cumbrian newspapers from the 
mid 1990s shows that the role of BNFL generated enormous debate and dispute. Some of 
the debate bordered on acrimony, as many of those opposed to the NCCGP were parents 
who lost children to leukaemia. Community groups such as Cumbrians Opposed to 
Radioactive Environment (CORE) and the local branch of Friends of the Earth were 
outspoken in their opposition. Whilst they supported the DNA bank in principle, they 
sfrenuously objected to its links to BNFL. The concern was that research could not be 
independent since 'the nuclear industry has a vested interest' in the results.^"' 
"^^  A. Clarke, 1998. 77ie Genetic Testing of Children. Oxford: BIOS; Mason and McCall Smith, 1999. 
H. O. Dickinson and L. Parker, 2002. Leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in children of Sellafield 
male radiation workers. International Journal of Cancer 99: 437-444. 
D. Siddall, 1994. Whitehaven News, 10 November, p. 1. 
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Another point of ethical contention centred on Westlakes Research Institute, Newcastle 
University's partner in running the NCCGP, which was described as being independent of 
BNFL. Opponents claimed that Westlakes independence was a 'myth' since most of the 
senior staff and directors at Westlakes were former BNFL employees and maintained 
contacts to BNFL as advisors.^ '*' In response to this criticism, NCCGP team members 
argued that they would never have accepted a gag order on their right to publish and thus, 
all results would remain independent. They also claimed that BNFL were taking a 
'gamble' in funding the biobank since i f future research proved the leukaemia-radiation 
links, then it could help CORE shut down the Sellafield.^" 
Ethical concerns over the establishment of the NCCGP received national and 
international press coverage as well. Much of the coverage dealt with the nuclear industry 
and not the science or even ethics of the DNA bank itself '^^  Some claims, in retrospect, 
have turned out to be spurious. For instance, one report claimed that before giving written 
and oral consent, prospective parents would watch a video explaining how genetic 
information from their baby will be used - further inspection showed this was not only 
not true but also a practical impossibility given the nature of the consenting procedures 
(i.e. at the would-be mothers first antenatal appointment). One NCCGP team member 
also claimed that research 'could give the world an important break through in medical 
science - a test to enable mid-wives to spot the gene that pre-disposes infants to cot 
death.' However, ten years later, no such studies have been conducted. 
Prior to the establishment of the NCCGP in 1995, database organisers held two public 
consultations. Apparently, turn out for these events was very low despite what team 
members considered to be extensive advertising. However, how extensive was a 
contested matter. CORE, the community group opposed to Sellafield, considered the 
consultations to be highly inadequate. They conducted a street poll the day after the two 
consultations and found that only 1.5% out of 441 people queried had seen/heard of the 
D. King, 1994. Statement for CORE Press Conference, 13 December. 
West Cumbria Gazette 2 June 1995. 
A. Berger, 1995. Nuclear industry link casts suspicion on gene bank. A^ ew Scientist 17 June, p. 7; J. 
Younger, 1994. UK nuclear company funds broad study of genetic data. Nature 369: 346. R. Waterhouse, 
1994. Independent on Sunday 2 October, pp. 8-12; Times and Star, 11 November, 1994, page 3. 
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advertisements for the consultations and that 72.5% out of the same sample had never 
heard of plans to establish the DNA bank. '^^  
The need to study participation and project rationale 
In light of the Cragg Ross Dawson study cited in the last chapter, the NCCGP's high 
response rate (near 90% up-take on afterbirth collection) raises some questions. Is it the 
case that participants in the NCCGP: (a) were well disposed towards the NCCGP and/or 
were not fully aware of the implications of donating samples and information, or (b) did 
not have the same concerns as those expressed elsewhere, or (c) perceived the benefits of 
the NCCGP to outweigh any concerns, or (d) felt their concerns had been fully addressed 
by the NCCGP team and their anxieties allayed, or (e) have a range of other views, 
interests and concerns that have not yet come to light? 
In designing the fiinding application, it became evident that the extent to which 
participation and non-participation were attributable to primarily local factors (such as 
BNFL) or to other, more widely held, interests and concerns, and the extent to which 
non-participation represents a distinct stance to that of participation, were matters for 
empirical investigation. Such an investigation would, it seemed, open up the Tslack box' 
of the social processes of decision making between the request to participate and the 
actual collection of samples. This seemed important since the NCCGP appeared to work 
in practical terms, i.e. it sustained a high participation rate over the course of seven and a 
half years of sample collection. 
Equally though, it could have been argued that the apparent success of the NCCGP was 
based on misunderstandings by the participants of what it is they were agreeing to, in 
which case the practical benefits were achieved at social and ethical costs. Perhaps non-
participants were better informed about the implications: it has been suggested that those 
who are most informed about bioscience have the most polarised views.^''* Also, the 
CORE Street Poll, 1994. Held in Workington, Whitehaven and Cleator Moor, 27 November and 1 
December. 
G. Voss, 2000. Report to the Human Genetics Commission on public attitudes to the use of human 
genetic information. 
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reasons for 'partial participation' needed examining to see whether participants 
distinguished between the two types of information and, i f so, how and why.^'^ 
Research design and methodology 
The project was a prospective, interview-based, qualitative study. The key research 
questions were: 
(a) What is the repertoire of perceptions, concerns, views, and understandings, that 
women raise as part of the process of deciding whether to participate or not? 
(b) Are there differences in perceptions, concerns, views, and understandings, or in 
the importance attached to these, between those who identify as participants and 
those who identify as non-participants? 
The fieldwork for the study involved semi-structured qualitative interviews with forty-
three women who donated tissue samples to the NCCGP, seven who refused, seven 
NCCGP team members, two members of the NCCGP's Ethics Advisory Group, two 
focus group discussions involving ten community mid-wives, and three members of local 
community groups that opposed the NCCGP when plans for it were first announced in 
the early 1990s. Interviews lasted one hour and began with discussions of the 
respondents' own experience and relationship to the NCCGP.^'^ Interviews were 
preceded by a short survey asking for demographic details such as age, occupation, and 
education, as well as family history of disease. 
P. Martin P. The industrial development of human genetic databases. Submission to the House of Lords 
Written Evidence on Genetic Databases. House of Lords, 1999-2000. 
In order to recruit interviewees, women received an introduction letter and consent form as part of their 
routine discharge packet upon leaving the post-natal ward. I followed up with a telephone call to arrange 
the interview, which usually lasted from 45 to 60 minutes and was taped for accuracy. Interviews were held 
in the respondent's home. As is often the case, non-participants were difficult to recruit to the study. In 
order to try and boost non-donor numbers, a number of options were tried. These included: classified 
adverts in local papers; a feature story on the 'American researcher in Cumbria' in The Whitehaven News; 
short presentations and requests at four different mother & toddler groups in the area; liaising through 
community opposition groups; Uaising with NCCGP mid-wives who presented 'refusers' with an 
introduction letter after they had made the decision not to donate; a BBC Radio Cumbria interview. As lead 
researcher, I took full responsibility for devising and exercising all of these options (obviously in 
consultation with Haimes and the Project Advisory Group). 
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Initial hypotheses 
From the outset of the study, it seemed feasible that interviews with the NCCGP and 
opposition groups (CORE and Friends of the Earth) would yield a range of competing 
normative statements as to why women should or should not donate samples to the 
NCCGP. In addition, it was possible that there were similar competing perspectives 
amongst the women themselves, in their attitudes towards the NCCGP, and how this may 
have influenced their decision to donate or not. However, it was also possible that there 
may have been more subtle shadings of views amongst the women asked to donate rather 
than simply a stance of pro- or anti- NCCGP. There might, for example, have been 
women who were neutral towards the project, those who were indifferent to it, those who 
were ambivalent towards it and those who felt elements of all these. Indeed it was also 
possible that women were simply responding to the request to donate samples without 
having any particular views on the NCCGP itself or its fiinding or the political opposition 
to it. In addition, it was also necessary to question the assumption that just because 
people might hold opposing views on the NCCGP in particular or genetic databases in 
general, that this necessarily meant that they held opposing reasons for participating or 
not. In fact we took the notion of 'participation' as an essentially contested, and thus open 
ended, concept. Therefore in seeking to identify women's repertoire of considerations 
when deciding whether or not to donate, Haimes and I fully expected to find that those 
who did donate could nonetheless cite reasons for not donating and those who decided 
not to donate could cite reasons why donation was a reasonable action. Al l these 
possibilities needed to be considered and informed by data that could reveal the 
knowledge, values and processes of donors' and non-donors' decision making.^" 
Notions of participation 
It was clear from the data that there are varying levels of donation and non-donation and 
that there are different ways in which individuals donate or do not donate to such a 
database. Therefore, rather than use the terms 'donation' or 'non-donation' as descriptors 
which imply a single meaning attached to a simple, one-way act, it seems that the notion 
'^^  P. Spallone and T. Wilkie, 2000. The research agenda in pharmacogenetics and biological sample 
coWtcWom. New Genetics and Society. 19: 193-205. 
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of 'participation' more accurately reflected what was in fact a highly varied social 
process, with multiple meanings. The notion of 'participation' was taken as an essentially 
contested, and thus open ended, concept. It implied a more active process of engagement 
with, and sharing in the creation of, the database. It acknowledged that those who were 
approached to give samples and information had an active role in creating the database 
(including even i f they declined to provide these items since that too shaped the 
database). 
In terms of the design of the NCCGP as a database, ' full participation' would mean that a 
woman contributed umbilical cord samples from her baby, a blood sample from herself 
and health and lifestyle information from herself and her partner by completing the 
'mother's questionnaire'. 'Partial participation' would mean a donation of any 
combination of cord samples, maternal blood, and lifestyle information, but not all three. 
'Non-participation' would mean that nothing was given to the database at all. However, 
during my interviews with the various groups, these apparently clear distinctions became 
increasingly blurred as interviewees sought to explain how and why potential participants 
made their decisions over donation. In addition there were variations in the significance 
attributed to the differing levels of participation. 
Project Findings 
The NCCGP research team 
The NCCGP team included geneticists, epidemiologists, child health specialists, and 
Project mid-wives who liaised between the team and community mid-wives in order to 
develop the infrastructure needed to recruit mothers. Interviews with the NCCGP 
research team indicated a somewhat relaxed attitude to the actual participation rates they 
have achieved. Comments from my interviews with the NCCGP team minimised the 
involvement needed from donors; one said that they assumed that the donations were 
'given and forgotten about' and that they would not want women to be worried about the 
donation nor did the team wish to 'lean on them' to donate (T234). The idea was to make 
potential donors 'comfortable to say no' (T587) and that i f there had been 100% 
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participation rate the team would be worried that they were overselling the project 
(T351). 
One referred to the 'huge body of altruism in the general public' as an explanation for 
such a high response rate, which was not seen as a surprise (T587). Another suggested 
that 'people on average do have an altruistic streak and mostly people are happy to be 
involved in medical research that they can see might be of greater good' (T081). Another 
important element was the trust that most people had in the National Health Service and 
in its professionals (T234), as well as in the fact that the data was being processed by a 
local research institute and a local reputable university (T351). 
However, an overwhelming reason for the high participation was, according to one team 
member, the fact that: 'We are just taking samples that are normally thrown away and I 
feel that's a very strong reason why the NCCGP is so successful. It is no use to them 
unless they want to have a placenta casserole, which very few people do' (T351). This 
was echoed by all the other members of the team as well: ' I think most people feel 
reasonably optimistic that it doesn't impact on them particularly and all they are doing is 
giving samples that would otherwise not be used.' (T177); ' I think it is a neat way of 
collecting materials no doubt about that. Neat, and efficient. There is nothing to lose' 
(T587); 'we are not asking much, people don't have to do very much to be part of it, it 
doesn't take up their time' (T081). 
This last set of quotes shows very clearly that 'participation' in the minds of the NCCGP 
team meant, primarily, giving the blood and tissue samples. Explanations for partial 
participation (that is, the non-completion of the Mother's Questionnaire) were mixed. 
One suggested, 
'That is apathy, definitely. I f they don't have time to do it when you are seeing them, 
quite often things are always in a rush, i f you try to make them make a start on it, I think 
they would then fill it in. I think i f they don't start it, they just can't be bothered. Other 
than that, people do not like to give information, it does ask for addresses, where you 
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have lived for the last five years, a bit about your education. I think a few ladies do feel 
that it is not necessary to have all that information for the research, you could just have a 
postcode or perhaps it could be a bit more anonymous.' (T033) 
Another drew an interesting distinction between the types of donation: 
' I 'm not surprised that people are reluctant to give personal details, because a sample is a 
sample, stick a number on a sample and it doesn't give any information, there's nothing 
personal about it almost. It's giving biochemical genetic information that will be usefiil 
for disease studies research but it doesn't given any personal details. You know, there is 
nothing associated with it that can be linked to the person as it were. The questionnaire, 
yes, I 'm not altogether surprised that people are reluctant to fill it in. As you probably 
know more women fill it in than their partners so they have a lot of what we jokingly say 
is immaculate conceptions, you know, got the details on the mother but not the father.. .A 
minor or smaller factor is probably the fact that there is higher illiteracy in West 
Cumbria. Now i f people don't wish to admit to being illiterate they might not wish to fill 
in a questionnaire' (T351). 
Thus the type of information being asked for and the context in which it was being 
requested (during pregnancy) was seen as an inhibiting factor: 
'Like all questionnaires, people prefer not to fill them in, there are very few people who 
love filling in questionnaires...and the smoking issue is something that is 
interesting.. .they know they shouldn't be smoking, but people don't like actually having 
to admit to it either, I suspect there is an element of that too. I don't know, I have not 
seen it as my role to actually ask too much of participants what they feel about the 
questionnaire because I've .. .taken a hands offline there. I have offered it to them and let 
it at that really' (T587) 
The extent to which this partial participation was seen to 'matter' also varied amongst the 
research team. One view was ' I think it does matter' (T033); another was uncertain. 
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'How it affects the project, I don't know because I don't think we have had a 
collaborative study so far that has used any data from the mother's questionnaire at 
all.. .So I think that you'll probably find that although it was abut 60% to start with that 
filled in all or part of the questionnaire, I believe it's dropped a bit now, since then. As I 
say, I can understand that but I don't know what impact that will have on the project as a 
whole' (T351). 
This lack of demand from other researchers wanting to use the mother's questionnaire 
data perhaps explains the team's relaxed attitude to this aspect of their study: 
'Most of the information that has been sent out has been anonymous with no attached 
data so the questionnaire information hasn't been required. It would be nice to have full 
ascertainment, it would be wonderful, but I mean we can still function as a facility...' 
(T469). 
Similarly, another argued, 
'It is obviously much better to have more complete data and it reduces the power of your 
study i f you have missing data.. .but the compliance rate is pretty high.. .it's a very short 
questionnaire and it captures the minimum amount of information and any really in-depth 
study using health information would need to look at other sources' (T081). 
The NCCGP team was of the same opinion that more invasive samples would have been 
harder to consent for: 
'[There's] something very definite about sticking a needle in a child. It puts people off, 
not surprisingly, they don't like it themselves. So no, I think it is a neat way of collecting 
materials no doubt about that. Neat, and efficient' (T587) 
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'"Again, on a personal basis, i f someone came to me and said, 'oh well you know, we'd 
like to stick a needle in your arm to take a sample', I'd probably go 'Aaagh I'm not sure 
about this!'" (T351) 
'The only trouble with that is whether people would be willing to take part in research 
project for asthma that involved their child having a needle stuck in them. [It] might 
dramatically alter their level of co-operation and i f you did it would weaken the data set 
dramatically ... That was the whole point of the exercise and at very low cost we've got 
DNA from those kids' (T234) 
The team also minimised the reasons for non-participation. One reason was that such 
women were 'lost in the system', another that most people who do not donate simply 
forget, 'there's nothing systematic about it ' (T081). The views were summed up by one 
member who said the 15% non-participation was a 'grey area' which they could not be 
clear about but on the other hand another team member was keen to point out again that 
the team do not ask people why they refiise, as this was 'not suitable' (T587). 
Opposition groups 
Whilst interviewees from the community opposition groups had little to say about the 
different types of donation elicited or the different levels of participation, they shared 
similar views to the research team about the reasons for the high participation rate, 
though they saw reasons to be concerned about this: 
' I would assume that it's that high partly for the reason that we've already said. People 
are assured that what they are doing is being done in absolute total confidence and the 
other part is, "well, this is BNFL and BNFL are not going to mislead us and Newcastle 
[University], why should they mislead us about anything?" People are not going to 
question the motives about this i f it's put to them in a straightforward way, "this is really 
usefiil information, we can build on this, use it in all kinds of helpful ways", people are 
not going to say no to it. In a way, maybe I feel that people are being taken advantage of, 
that maybe the whole thing isn't explained as fiilly as it should be. Maybe i f [one of us] 
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was included on a counselling team and was able to put another perspective of this 
project to the potential donor, then maybe it would be different' (C002). 
This comment is tied to a view abut why those who chose to donate to the NCCGP made 
this decision: a view which, like those of the NCCGP team, is linked to ideas about styles 
of participation too (see next section). On the whole, those who apparently opposed the 
NCCGP were reluctant to make strong statements about the issues surrounding 
participation and why women ought not to participate. They were more outspoken about 
their opposition to the involvement of BNFL rather than to the NCCGP specifically. One 
acknowledged why some women might want to be part of this research: 
'Because I think, well, we all want some research, don't we? We all want to see that 
people are healthy. Particularly when you get emotive words like child cancer and spina 
bifida and all these other horrible diseases, neurone diseases. People say that they are 
doing research into cot deaths [a reference to a newspaper report in the early days of 
NCCGP when this was mentioned as a possible benefit to the research]. Of course we all 
want to be a part of that and i f you think you can help, that's great.' (COOl). 
This wish to help is clearly expressed in the mothers' interviews though interestingly it is 
expressed equally strongly by 'participants' as by 'non-participants' - a point I shall 
address below. 
Potential participants 
Whilst the NCCGP research team was clear (though not as concerned as might be 
expected) about the differing levels of participation, the women were, perhaps 
surprisingly, very uncertain about the range of donations they were asked to give and just 
as unclear about what they did actually give. That is to say, most women who were 
interviewed as participants in the NCCGP were themselves not clear about whether they 
had in fact given all the samples and information that would constitute full participation. 
This is partly attributable to not remembering what they had been asked to give and 
partly to not being able to distinguish between the information and blood samples they 
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were asked to give as part of routine ante-natal care and that asked specifically for the 
NCCGP. 
Donors that I interviewed also expressed a similar attitude towards the afterbirth. One 
woman said, 'Once you get to that stage, you have got your baby and whatever else 
comes out, you know, you are never wanting to see it again.' (M003). Another expressed 
the view that 'the afterbirth wasn't something that I was particularly attached to' (MOOS). 
Others replied that: 'the placenta means nothing to me' (M009), or that 'it's just waste, 
isn't i t ' (M013), or ' i t was of no use to me.' (M029). 
In most cases, mothers never saw the material that they were donating and were, instead, 
pre-occupied with the birth of their child. 'That was the furthest thing from my mind,' 
said one woman (MOOS). Others said: ' I couldn't tell you what it looks like, I didn't see' 
(M009), and 'you don't even know that it is being taken' (MOl 1). I just told them they 
could do what they wanted with it. (M021) 
In contrast to views of afterbirth as a source of donation, women expressed the view that 
a different sample type, such a cheek swab or blood sample from the child, would have 
necessitated greater thought before agreeing to donate. There was a view that no harm 
could be done by taking a non-invasive sample but that 'it would probably have been a 
harder decision' had the request not involved waste material (M036). Examples from the 
interviews include: 
'No, I mean it wasn't as i f they were wanting to stick pins my daughter, you know, I 
wouldn't have liked that very much' (M006). 
' I think i f they had asked for a blood sample from him I would probably have been less 
likely to do it, because it's more traumatic' (MOOS). 
' I probably would have consented to a blood sample, but I probably would have had a 
bigger chat with somebody to know more' (MO 13). 
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Difficulty in remembering what they had been asked to give was a recurring theme. In 
terms of the Mother's Questionnaire, despite its purple colour, many women said they did 
not remember ever seeing it, let alone completing it: 'No, I can't remember seeing one of 
those' (M007); ' I don't think so.. .certainly don't remember any purple paper (laughs)' 
(M070); 'No, I didn't fill out the purple form' (M046). Even those who thought they had 
completed it were vague about its contents and purpose. For example, 
' I can't remember to be honest, I think I did. Is it all about me having a history, yes, I 
think I did' (MOll) 
and, 
' I wouldn't say I was totally clear on it, I can't remember, I just assumed, obviously, that 
they can relate it to medical [matters]' (M030). 
Similarly, with the maternal blood samples, there was a high level of uncertainty as to 
whether they were asked to provide one for the NCCGP, let alone whether they 
consented to doing so: 'No, I don't think so, I don't think I was asked to' (M002); ' I 
honestly don't know' (M044); 'I've no idea i f they took one or not' (M049); ' I f they'd 
wanted one I would have, but I can't remember' (MOlOl); 'No, I just think it was firom 
the umbilical cord' (M046). 
The difficulty many women had distinguishing between that which they were asked to 
provide for routine antenatal care and that asked for the NCCGP database applied to both 
the mother's questionnaire and to the maternal blood samples. One woman said about the 
questionnaire, 
'Well, it's difficult to say because I filled that in at the same time as I filled in my 
medical notes...I had to fill that in as well and I think they were both the same kind of 
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questions.. .so I have trouble thinking which one.. .1 think maybe I did fill something in' 
(M024). 
Another said about the maternal blood sample, 
' I don't know whether I did or not.. .they're taking test tubes off you for this, that and the 
other, it may well have been one of the other. I don't know. I'm sorry I don't recall, no' 
(M003). 
Similarly, 'No, I don't know...well, another test, one more to add to the list. You know, 
the longer you're pregnant, the more things progress, the more tests you have...' (M006). 
And, ' I ' d imagine, yeah. I never refiised anything that they asked me to do' (M026). 
Surprisingly there was even a small element of uncertainty amongst the non-participants 
as to whether a maternal blood sample had been taken for the NCCGP. One said that she 
had not given a sample, at least, 'not knowingly.. .they took a lot of blood at my 
antenatal' (M060). Another said, 'They might have taken one doing some of the antenatal 
stuff but I don't remember it. They took so much blood that they could have' (M067). In 
other words, I do not meant to imply that non-participants were suggesting that the 
NCCGP research team took illicit samples fi-om them. Rather, it simply indicates just 
how difficult it is for any woman to be absolutely clear about who takes what samples, 
and for what purposes, during the context of antenatal care. This is a crucial point which I 
shall expand upon later in the chapter. 
By now, it should be apparent that a simple two-way distinction between women who 
decide to donate and women who decide not to donate does not reflect the complexities 
in the levels of participation, let alone in the reasons why some donate (even partially) 
and some do not. In trying to tease apart the reasons given in the interviews for 
'participation' and 'refusal' it becomes clear that apparently a core reason for donating 
(wishing to help) is rated as equally important by participants as by refusers (again, a 
point I will revisit). In addition, however, those who do donate expressed their wish to 
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help in a number of different ways which suggests that there are different styles to 
donating and 'helping'. 
Why donate? 
Analysis of the participating mothers' interviews revealed two very strong strands: a wish 
to help and a sense that not very much was involved in providing that help. The wish to 
help was expressed in a number of ways with different views as to who it was they 
wanted to help. Some felt their donation was helping the future in some unspecified way, 
others that it would help their own children's generation, others that it would help babies 
and children in general, or simply 'other people' in the future. A couple of women 
specifically mentioned helping Cumbria with their donations. This last point might be 
tied to another very common reason given for donating, which was to assist research into 
the eradication of disease: 
' I would say it was just the sort of research for medical purposes, to help towards 
illnesses, such as cancer, Parkinsons, MS, all these types of things, yes, just to use them 
in connection with treatment in the future' (MO 12). 
Several were aware that they themselves had benefited from research done previously 
and this influenced their own decisions: 
' . . .because we had had the IVF treatment, you think, "well, i f they hadn't done a lot of 
research about that then", you know.. .1 think that was the main reason why we agreed 
that we would donate. We thought that anything that helps, you know helps with cancer 
or anything like that. And there was no harm to me or the baby so we thought, well, "yes, 
it's a good idea".'(M013). 
'My understanding of what the Cumbria Genetics Project is about, it's something that is 
worth doing. My contribution to it is very small for me, it's not as i f it was an ongoing 
thing, it's not as i f I 'm being asked to do something every week or every year, it's a one 
off thing, it was a one off donation but really, you know it didn't impinge on me at all. 
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I'm glad to have the opportunity to be involved in something like this because I think it's 
important but it's not something that preys on my mind. I just think i f you don't have 
medical research you don't move forward' (MOOS). This woman then went on to compare 
what was asked of her for the NCCGP with a project that her husband contributed to as a 
child when his mother agreed to have him be a 'guinea pig' for the measles vaccine -
'and at the end of the day what we did in giving a sample and afterbirth was nothing 
compared to actually having your child vaccinated with a vaccine that was, well it would 
have been through a lot of trials but was still, you know, at the forefi-ont'. 
This quotation is very usefiil in showing how these two strands intertwined. The sense 
that not a lot was involved was expressed in a number of other ways also. Interviews 
included remarks such as ' i t was no harm to me or the baby'; 'there wasn't much 
involved'; ' it was no cost to me'; 'the afterbirth would just be thrown away other wise', 
'it wasn't a big issue', ' i t was an easy decision to make'; 'there was no reason not to 
donate'; ' I don't know why I just did it ' . For example, 
'It doesn't affect me personally, it's only part of the procedure which is done anyway. I 
mean, after you have given birth, that is the last thing on your mind, I don't care what 
they do with it, they can do what they want with it. I don't need it anymore, the baby 
doesn't need it anymore, so you know it's matterless and they had to take blood anyway 
after you've had the baby so I mean it's just a little drop extra' (M006). 
' . . .it wasn't anything detrimental to me so i f it helps somebody else in the future then 
they're more than welcome, particularly i f I don't have to do the work' (M028). 
'It's basically why not? I couldn't think of any good reason why not really' (M034). 
Only one woman expressed regret at donating: 
' "Do you want to donate your umbilical cord?". I think someone said it was for asthma. 
Was it for asthma, I'm sure that what's somebody said it was for, something to do with 
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asthma. And I don't know, at the time I said "yes". I wished I hadn't have done, I must 
admit. I really wished that I had more information and that I was better informed and I 
wish I wasn't put on the spot to make that decision because I don't think that I was in the 
right frame of mind to make the right decision' (M040). 
Why say no? 
Initial discussions with the NCCGP team suggested possible reasons for this: either some 
women are missed out by mistake or some make a conscious decision not to participate. 
Possible reasons for reftisal were thought to include concerns similar to those already 
cited (and a view that the NCCGP failed to address them sufficiently) or an organised 
opposition to the NCCGP because of the involvement of BNFL (Chase et al, 1998). 
Reasons for refiasal fell into two broad categories: local factors regarding the funding of 
the NCCGP and wider concerns over future use and control of the samples. Interviews 
with those who refiised to donate indicate that concerns regarding BNFL were a factor. 
One woman, whose daughter had died of leukaemia, said: 
'It's like when this woman said to us it's privately funded and I said who by, and she said 
it's done by Newcastle University, there is a professor over there or something, and I said 
yes but who is it funded by? I said anything to do with Sellafield? ... Why, have you got a 
problem, she says, with research into cancer? I said I think you are asking the wrong 
person that, my daughter died twelve years ago with leukaemia. I said any research is 
good research but when it is being funded by [BNFL], we are being used as guinea pigs'. 
(M039) 
Another non-participant replied that when she discovered that the project was financed by 
BNFL, 'everything became more clear' (M041). Interviews with the NCCGP's Ethics 
Advisory Group and with community groups opposed to the database raise similar 
concerns that i f BNFL funded the database, 'they would in some way manipulate [the 
research] to their own ends.' (C002) 
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Some NCCGP team members directly addressed this point in their interviews. One said 
about CORE, 'They felt that BNFL were going to control this [NCCGP] and therefore 
they were controlling the DNA and controlling the information, blah blah blah'. (T351) 
Another claimed that, 
'Well, BNFL is not an issue in this community, that's a misconception. There are a few 
vocal people in the community, but this area depends on BNFL. They have lived here in 
proximity to the site for so long that they do not really perceive it as a problem, and I 
think that sometimes people from outside forget that'. (T177) 
Apart from funding issues, some 'refusers' were worried about the use and control of 
their samples. For instance one woman (M060) established the fact that she had donated 
stem cells to another project but was not happy to donate to the NCCGP because she 
thought the purpose of their research was vague and she also did not want to provide 
access to her medical records as she could not understand why this was needed. Another 
woman stressed how guilty she felt about not donating: 
'[They're] storming forward with advances and I thought, " I just don't know enough 
about this". I didn't want to be hurried into a decision and I think at the time they were 
saying.. .it was going to be used to find out, for research on asthma and I felt terribly 
guilty saying "no" because I had four healthy children and I appreciate how lucky I am.' 
(M056). 
This interviewee said she wanted to protect her baby but could not do so i f she donated to 
NCCGP as she had no control over what was done to the samples. Lack of control was 
cited in several accounts as a reason for not donating, rather than not wanting to help. 
One said, ' I feel like I've got some paranoid conspiracy thing going on but there you go. 
It's with not knowing anything about it, I suppose. I find that really spooky' (M035). 
Another said, 'Before I had a child of my own, it was just a general concern about the 
database and what they might abuse in the fiiture - that you might have very little control 
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over that despite the best safeguards and the best intentions in the world. But when 
actually the child is there, it's their consent as well that you're giving.. .maybe it's being 
used for something you're not aware of and you don't know that you ought to withdraw 
your consent on such and such a day' (M071). 
Thus, our study suggests that non-participants are also eager to help medical research and 
feel a generalised cultural pressure or imperative to donate, which is perhaps particularly 
acute during pregnancy when they are recipients of much medical support. However, 
despite their willingness to help, our work shows that 'refusers' felt they could not supply 
samples in this case partly due to the particular circumstances of the NCCGP and partly 
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due to more generalised concerns for their baby's welfare . 
Risk, communication and understanding^^^ 
The NCCGP's literature emphasised that all information would remain confidential and 
only be used for medical research. Interviews found that the written forms provided the 
only detailed source of information for donors about the NCCGP. Little was said about 
the biobank and any risks associated with it during the consenting process. Community 
mid-wives usually spent 'about thirty seconds' on the consenting process since so much 
other information must be passed on to the mothers-to-be (CMW02). In general study 
findings revealed that donors were told little about the database and had a relatively 
limited understanding of the aims of the gene bank and use of their samples. 
Again, it is important to note that the request was usually made during the first antenatal 
appointment, which involved a large amount of information and literature that took 
pregnant women 'a good two or three weeks to work their way through' (CMWOl). 
A third possible reason, of course, is parents' unwillingness to give consent for their child. Whilst this is 
a crucial point in medical ethics generally, interviewees in general attached only variable importance to it. 
For instance, many women expressed doubt that they would even remember to tell their child about their 
donation to the NCCGP. For more on the issue of children's involvement in database research, see: 
Williamson, E. , Goodenough, T., Kent, J., Ashcroft, R., in press. Children's Participation in Genetic 
Epidemiology: Consent and Control. In Tutton, R., and Corrigan, O., eds. Donating and Exploiting DNA: 
Social and Ethical Aspects of Public Participation in Genetic Databases, London: Routledge, pp. 139-160. 
The notion of 'risk', as it is used here, is a social science term. NCCGP forms make no mention of the 
word. The term 'communication' would be characterised on NCCGP forms as 'information giving' and 
'requests for consent'. 
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As one mid-wife in a group interview put it, 
'[Requesting samples for the NCCGP is] only a very very small portion of our care and 
after this we've got so many other things to talk about because they are having diagnostic 
tests on their own baby and we've got a lot to cover so, I've got to be honest, after the first 
interview I don't really bring it up again unless they come back to me with any 
quesfions.' (CMWOl) 
Many women felt that compared to other tests and procedures undergone during 
pregnancy, donating the afterbirth was a minimal risk. One interviewee compared the 
donation to an amniocentesis. 'Because of my age being over 40 I had an amniocentesis. 
[The] amnio could have damaged her but nothing in the database could damage her.' 
(M037) 
In addition, women also seemed to have a limited understanding of the NCCGP's aims 
and the use of their samples. For example, many were surprised to learn that samples 
would be kept for as long as sixteen years, at which point their child would have the right 
to withdraw their sample^^". Many had little idea who would benefit from the research 
and what type of research would be conducted. For example, responses include: 
MWB: ' I 'm starting to feel like I 'm quizzing you' 
Participant: ' I don't know a lot about it, I 'm not really read up in the genetics or 
anything at all. I can't remember [what it was for]' (M007) 
' I don't think an awful lot was said about it ' (M028) 
'Maybe I read it wrong but I thought they were doing it individually, your placenta 
individually, to see how they've worked during the pregnancy. Is that what they are 
The child's right to withdraw is clearly stated in both NCCGP consent forms and further information 
leaflets. 
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doing? To tell you the truth, I just thought I would do it and whatever, see what happened 
when' (M042) 
'They didn't really say anything at all, just like, when you say Genetics Projects, I just 
thought it would help to look for, I don't know, a cure or something. I don't know' 
(M046) 
As one mother said, 'The midwifes didn't provide much additional information because 
for them, the primary concern was helping myself... they said here's a leaflet i f you have 
any questions ask next time you come' (M060) 
'She didn't go into great detail she just asked i f the after birth could be taken away and be 
tested for genetics' (M002) 
Data also showed that women tended to ask very few questions about the NCCGP. 
Consistently, interviewees said that agreeing to donate was an 'easy' decision to make. 
This may be because of the nature of the sample, as I have shown, or it may be due to the 
fact that women, when interacting with their mid-wife, tend to focus on issues involving 
the status of their pregnancy and health of their child. 
Data suggested that women had a limited understanding of the aims of the DNA bank as 
well as of the uses and storage of their sample. Responses include: 
'Just a genetic study, genetic disorders' (M006) 
'" I t could have been a bit more informed ... She was very nice and she answered what 
she could instead of pretending so, but I would have rather have more, you know, 'what 
are the people, what sort of research, what part, what immediate impact on all that 
research', you know, just wanted to know 'where is it going'" (MO 10) 
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'How they put it to me was, when you have the baby, your placenta can be sort of sent 
away and you know they sort of look into it for different things, different studies ... they 
didn't really go into a lot of details, they just said they would take it away for studies' 
(M043) 
'They would monitor my sample for the next 20 years and maybe connect it i f I got 
breast cancer, or i f Jenny had any other anything occurred, to link it back to her genetics' 
(M045) 
In addition, answers varied as to whom donors thought the research would benefit. One 
thought that it was for 'family illnesses' and 'social and medical disease within West 
Cumbria' (M012). Another thought that: 'what I understand it helps, like i f there was 
something wrong with somebody in the family that they're maybe connected to a certain 
gene or something'. (M052). 
One NCCGP team member expressed various reasons for the lack of understanding, 
'Alot of the women who are approached, don't have much of a deep understanding of 
genetics in general and scientists in general. They have more pressing concerns of where 
the next meal's coming from and other more pressing concerns, probably violence, 
poverty, illiteracy'. (T351) 
Project Analysis 
Informed consent 
As discussed in Chapter Four, one key issue in population genetics is informed consent. 
The findings described in this chapter provide empirical insight into this issue. 
Data show that: a) the decision to donate to the NCCGP was a relatively easy one for 
women to make since they felt the afterbirth was of no use to them, or their baby, post 
delivery; b) that donors were informed of the NCCGP's aims and details in the briefest of 
terms and that they asked few questions about the database; c) that women felt they 
would have asked more questions i f the sample had been of a different type, such as 
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blood or a cheek swab^ '^, and d) that donors' understandings of the NCCGP were usually 
limited. Thus, the social context of pregnancy raises the ethical question of informed 
consent: i f women are uncertain about what they donated, how clear can they be about 
the rationale of the research to which they contributed, or about the nature of the uses to 
which their information and samples would be put? Whilst a high response rate is 
important in biobanking, it seems that in future studies researchers and policy-makers 
should attend to the social processes that result in achieving a particular response rate, not 
just the actual rate itself 
The lack of clear memory and that of distinguishing the provenance of requests could be 
explained in terms of mothers' failings as individuals (for example, their poor memory 
and poor understandings because perhaps of poor concentration) but are, it would appear 
fi-om the data, much more likely to be attributable to the fact that they were asked for this 
information and blood sample during pregnancy. 
The point to make here is that pregnant women were obviously alert to issues about the 
health of their child and are likely to be eager to donate to medical research that they 
perceive might benefit themselves or their children and families. Clearly, the high 
participation rates of the NCCGP were due, in part, to the timing and context of the 
request. In other words, the relative ease of the donation and the setting in which it took 
place, may have masked the possible risks involved and influenced donors' levels of 
interest regarding exactly what it was they were donating to and for. It seems, then, that 
the reason for the high participation rate in the NCCGP (the ease of taking afterbirth as a 
source of DNA) is also the reason for concern about the validity of its consenting 
procedures. Whilst afterbirth may be 'waste material' in the antenatal context, and 
described as such by the NCCGP, such material carries significant and lasting value in 
the context of biobanking. 
Of course, if a more invasive sample had been requested, this does not necessarily mean that womens' 
understandings of the gene bank would have been greater. 
For more on consent and database research, see: R. Chadwick and K. Berg, K., 2001. Solidarity and 




Having heard the voices of some of those involved in the NCCGP it is also necessary to 
be aware of those voices that have yet to be heard. Who has a voice in the debates about 
genetic databases and who remains or is forced to remain silent? In particular the voices 
of the children who have also donated to the NCCGP will not be heard for quite some 
time. They are passive participants in the project in a particularly stark way. This is an 
issue that will need to be revisited as these children grow up into teenage-hood and 
adulthood, since their rights need to be considered. The NCCGP has stated that the 
children will be able to withdraw their samples once they reach the age of sixteen but 
until then they are essentially silent donors whose materials will contribute to medical 
research but without their consent. In addition, it is not clear exactly how children will be 
re-contacted or invited to withdrawal. Clearly this relates to other debates within medical 
ethics on the ability of children to consent to research but its importance here needs to be 
remembered. To what extent do they have choices, now or in the future, about their levels 
of participation and to what extent will they later on reflect their mothers' styles of 
participation? I shall re-visit this issue in Chapter Eight. 
Notions of community 
Much work has shown that communities are shaped in particular historical contexts. The 
term 'community' itself can have multiple meanings (for example, in terms of cultural, 
epidemiological, or political significance) and attempts to divide people into communities 
and populations are neither natural nor neutral. 
There is also a question of whether the wider community has, or should have, a voice in 
these discussions. As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, the NCCGP undertook a series of 
public meetings to try to ensure that the community was informed about the project and 
there are varying accounts about the success of these meetings. Even so, the ability to 
consult a community is an issue that remains a challenge for anyone involved in genetics 
research and is a particularly big challenge for the UK Biobank. If it is difficult to 
F. Brunger, F., 2003. Problematizing the notion of "community" in research ethics, in B. Knoppers, ed., 
pp. 245-255. 
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achieve adequate consultation with such an apparently small and stable community as 
West Cumbria is said to be, then the difficulties of doing so on the level of national 
populations might seem insurmountable. Added to this is the need for a more critical 
approach to the term 'consultation', which implies a one way relationship between two 
distinct parties. It is difficult for a community to enter into such a process since this will 
always be a process of talking, in fact, with representatives of that community, as I 
suggested briefly in Chapter Five. How those representatives are selected, and how the 
consultation occurs, is underpinned by political processes which in turn underpin the 
ways in which ethical issues are handled. Therefore even i f the term consultation is 
replaced with a perhaps more evenly balanced and active term such as 'dialogue', the 
problem of just who has a voice in that dialogue remains. 
This reveals another question for these discussions, which is how 'the community' is 
characterised. The very title of the NCCGP emphasises both the location of the project 
(although in fact it is located in West Cumbria rather than North Cumbria) and 
characterises that geographical location as a ' c o m m u n i t y W h y has the title of the 
project been built around these elements, rather than around, for example, the purpose of 
the project or its desired outcomes? The analytical question to ask is: what does that use 
of the location, and its association with the notion of community, achieve? However 
deliberate or otherwise the choice of these terms has been, the effect of this use is to 
suggest a degree of ownership of the project by the community, which in turn suggests 
that they might be assumed to be the main beneficiaries of that project. 
Associated with this question of 'community' is the question of the extent to which even 
the women in the NCCGP study can be said to have shared interests? The NCCGP has 
constituted all mothers of new bom babies in West Cumbria into a constituency of 
apparently shared interests by virtue of their approach to them as potential donors. Thus, 
the women have become implicated in a broader set of ethical issues simply through their 
identification by genetics researchers as potential donors, without active choices or 
According to NCCGP team members, the 'North' in the title represents that fact that it was the North 
Cumbria Health Authority that approved plans for the database. 
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decisions on their own part. This in itself is an ethical issue since it might well have 
consequences for how they think about themselves and their children and families. 
Altruism, reciprocity and benefits-sharing 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a common view is that there is a strong sense of 
altruism in 'gifting' samples to genetics research. NCCGP team members also mentioned 
altruism as a motivating factor. One referred to the 'huge body of altruism in the general 
public' as an explanation for such a high response rate, which was not seen as a surprise 
(T587). Another suggested that 'people on average do have an altruistic streak and mostiy 
people are happy to be involved in medical research that they can see might be of greater 
good' (T081). 
However, this case study sheds light on the extent to which 'altruism' can be considered a 
uni-dimensional concept and raises some questions as to whether this is an accurate 
reflection of people's motivations in donating. When the MRC or when NCCGP team 
members cite altruism as a reason why some donate, the implication is that those who do 
not donate are somehow not as altruistic. But this chapter has shown that the language of 
helping was present in the accounts of both participants and non-participants in the 
NCCGP. In other words, it seems that participants are not as straightforwardly altruistic 
as is usually assumed and that those who do not participate are as equally altruistic as 
their participating counterparts. 
Furthermore, at least some donors are motivated by the expectation that someone 
(perhaps even themselves or their family) would one day benefit from advances in 
medical research. Donation for these women therefore involved an assumption about 
reciprocity and benefit-sharing (even i f not articulated in those terms) and was not simply 
an instance of one way gift-giving. This finding echoes Marcel Mauss' original work, 
which emphasised that the idea of gift giving is based on reciprocity. A 'gift relationship' 
stresses that exchanges are in fact based on interlocking obligations. Refusal to give 'is to 
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reject the bonds of alliance and commonality'.Somewhat provocatively, we may say 
that altruism is rarely, i f ever, uncalculated. In the words of Mary Douglas, 'there are no 
fi-ee gifts ... A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction'.People 
are willing to give, it seems, not as unilateral acts of kindness, but as part of an 
interdependent system of giving and receiving - of sharing. 
My point here is that these data seem to run counter to notions of altruism and gift-giving 
that underlie many discussions about genetic research. It has been claimed that 'donations 
based on economic self interest rather than altruism tend to be devalued'^^'. But my 
argument is that we need to recognise the element of expected benefits that appears to be 
present in some peoples' motivations for donating.^ ^* 
Ethical styles 
Appeals to ethical concepts are often made to explain why ordinary people do, should, or 
would want to, donate to such databases. Biobanks seem to construct an apparent, but 
implicit dependence on certain types of moral behaviour by the general population. The 
data also show that the four sets of interviews suggest that all parties are constructing 
themselves as 'ethical beings', that is, they are keen to show that they appreciate the 
moral dimensions of their role in the NCCGP study. For example, the NCCGP team, and 
the midwives, demonstrate this through their reported insistence on not pressing the 
women to donate; the opposition groups show they understand the imperative to help 
medical research even though they oppose the source of BNFL funding and seek to show 
that their fight is not with the women or even the research but with the flinders of the 
research; participating mothers were keen to show their willingness to help a worthy 
M. Mauss, M., 1997. The Gift. The Form, and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies Translated 
W.D. Halls. London: Routledge. 
M. Douglas, 1997. No free gifts, Foreword to M. Mauss, The Gift, The Form, and Reason for Exchange 
in Archaic Societies, London: Routledge. pp. vii-xviii. 
^" Nelkin, 1998, p. 36. 
I recognise that altruism is a concept not easily captured. Differing views about the 'true' motivation 
behind altruistic acts formed part of the early debates in sociobiology and continue to rage in philosophy, 
evolutionary psychology and the social sciences. See, for example, E. Sober and D. Wilson, 1999. Unto 
Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behaviour, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
My claim is that the data gives voice to the view that donating is often motivated by a degree of rational 
evaluation of potential benefits. For more on altruism in the context of genetics, see R. Tutton, 2002. Gift 
relationships in genetics research. Science as Culture 11: 523-542. 
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cause and non-participating mothers show that this 'language of helping' is as important 
to them as it is to participants, but that it did not apply in these specific circumstances. 
Each version of 'ethical being' put forward by interviewees reflects the social context of 
their actions and motivations as presented by the interviewees. No one referred to an 
overarching set of principles, external to the context, to guide their actions or by which 
they felt their actions were guided, other than the very general notion of 'helping'. One 
possible way of understanding these versions of ethical beings is through Foucault's 
'aesthetics of the self and through his notion of 'practices of the self: that is, the ways in 
which individuals construct themselves ethically 'without recourse to over-riding moral 
norms'.^ ^^ Another way of viewing this is through Thomas Osborne's adaptation of 
Foucault's work in his concept of 'ethical stylisations' which refers to the ways in which 
individuals within certain social contexts construct and sustain an acceptable sense of 
self, the acceptability being based on certain social and cultural frameworks for particular 
groups. Osborne argues that we now have a world of many ethical stylisations but with 
few rules about ethical content.^ '^' 
The importance of context 
Above all, this chapter has highlighted the importance of context in understanding the 
issues at stake in biobanking and in opening up new lines of inquiry. Interview data 
reflects the difficulty of distinguishing between making a genetic donation and requests 
that form part of routine antenatal care. It also draws attention to how local issues (in this 
case the role of BNFL in first funding the biobank) can influence potential donors' 
perceptions and views of the database. The request to donate took place in an 
environment and locality where notions of risk were coloured by the very community in 
which people lived. In regards to Cumbria, it seems impossible to separate a discourse of 
biobank risk fi-om a discourse of nuclear risk and researchers cannot presume to know if, 
how, and to what extent perceptions of one type of risk affect perceptions of the other. 
Therefore, it is clear from this case study that attention needs to be paid to the social 
M. Foucault, 1984. The Care of the Self: History of Sexuality Vol. III. London: Penguin. 
T. Osborne, 1998. Constructionism, authority and the ethical life. In I. Velody & R. Williams eds., The 
Politics of Constructionism. London: Sage: 221 -234. 
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context of the targeted population in case particular (hitherto unidentified) characteristics 
of that population affect levels and styles of consent, altruism, participation and refusal. 
Al l the above points have clear implications for the design and conduct of the UK 
Biobank and similar database projects, particularly in the recruitment of donors and for 
understanding how and why potential donors might participate. Beyond the nature of 
participation, however, the material presented has provided means for greater exploration 
and comments on a number of related themes in population-based genetics research. In 
other words, the point I wish to make regards the value of empirical and sociological 
work as a compliment to philosophical discussion into bioethical issues. 
Value of empirical and interdisciplinary research 
In Chapters Three and Four I presented a series of claims and arguments about bioethics. 
This case study, I believe, has provided a useful example of the benefits that can be 
achieved when using sociological theory and empirical methods to address normative 
bioethical debates. An overall achievement of this work is that it puts researchers in a 
position to ask the sorts of questions raised above regarding the nature and use of 
concepts such as 'donation', 'altruism', and 'consent'. 
From this case study, it can be seen that it is necessary to problematize notions of 
participation and donation and investigate the particular circumstances in which ethical 
issues arise. It is also necessary to attend to the details of genetics research - 'on the 
ground', so to speak. Who is doing the recruiting and in what medical and social context? 
How will they seek consent? In other words, attention must be paid to the processes 
behind donation rates and not just the rates themselves. Whilst much ethical focus is on 
the governance and on the managers of biobanks, this chapter has shown the importance 
of also considering the role of those who are actually taking samples and interacting with 
potential donors. After all, 'the social' is the filter through which the ethical and legal 
issues emerge, take shape, and are given prominence. Thus, only through empirical 
research can we provide much needed evidence to inform normative discussions and 
policy-making in the area of population genetics. 
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Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that: 
• The case study is a valuable method for accessing the rich context and ambiguity 
that characterises ethics in real life situations. I reported on findings from a 
particular study of the NCCGP, a biobank that collected DNA samples from 
pregnant women and their newborn babies and combined those samples with 
health and lifestyle information for the purpose of genetic epidemiological 
analysis. The study was based on the premise that we know little about the views 
of those who have actually been asked to donate to a genetic database. 
The NCCGP raised a number of socio-ethical issues unique to its own history and 
procedures (itself evidence of the need for contextual knowledge in moral 
philosophy). Most critically, it requested genetic samples from women 
undergoing concurrent antenatal care and secondly, it received its initial funding 
fi-om BNFL, a nuclear power company whose plant at Sellafield was blamed for 
causing high rates of childhood leukaemia in the area. 
• The case study provided a more nuanced understanding of the nature of 
participation in genetics research. Data revealed the complexities in the levels and 
styles of participation, which a simple two-way distinction between those who 
decide to donate and those who decide not to donate does not reflect. 
• It also shed light on non-donors reasons for refusal. Some refusers had donated to 
other medical projects but could not supply the NCCGP with samples due to a 
combination of local factors (e.g. funding of the NCCGP) and wider concerns 
over the control of genetic data and the fact that no one (not even the NCCGP 
team) could know future uses of their donation. Interestingly, however, the desire 
to help was rated as equally important by 'refusers', as participants. 
142 
• The study also suggested that participants are not as straightforwardly altruistic as 
is usually assumed and that those who do not participate are as equally altruistic 
as their participating counterparts. Donors are motivated by the expectation that 
they or those close to them may someday benefit from advances in medical 
research. Since reciprocity (as opposed to one way gift-giving) is a vital 
component in donation, the study points to the importance of working out suitable 
methods of benefit-sharing. 
• Interview data also provided empirical insight into discussions of informed 
consent. In the case of the NCCGP, the reason for the successfiil participation rate 
was also a key reason to be concerned. Most women found it easy to donate their 
afterbirth since the material was to be otherwise discarded. However, the ease of 
the decision meant that they asked few questions about the project, which, in turn, 
impacted their levels of understanding of what they were donating to and for. 
• Finally, the project suggested that use of terms such as community consultation, 
consent, and participation must be fully investigated so that genetics researchers 
and policy-makers understand their usefulness and limitations and avoid false 
claims regarding levels of community approval for biobank initiatives. It also 
suggested that researchers and policy-makers should attend to the social processes 
that lead to genetic databases achieving a high level of participation, rather than 
see high participation rates as an unproblematic achievement. Al l the above points 
have clear implications for the design and conduct of the UK Biobank. 
In the next chapter I return to my earlier discussion of bioethical methods, in light of the 
findings and analysis presented above. 
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Chapter Seven 
The importance of context: methodological sketches for a context sensitive bioethics 
'Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. 
— Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction 
Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised the importance of context."^ In the second 
chapter, I argued that the term 'etiquette', often used by historians, did not adequately 
appreciate the moral content of medical ethics and mistakenly applied current definitions 
of 'ethics' to past contexts. Regarding the birth of bioethics, I agreed with those who 
argued that it was necessary to view the development of the field within the social and 
political milieu of the right's movements of the 1960s. I also claimed that the principle of 
autonomy and the doctrine of informed consent ought to be understood in light of the 
post War context and the supreme value of individualism in Western (especially 
American) culture. In evaluating the social science critique of bioethics, I evaluated 
arguments about how standard bioethics is committed to a rational and idealized form of 
inquiry which marginalises the structure, context, and process in which agents are 
inevitably situated. Finally, in the last chapter, I argued that to truly grasp what is at stake 
in the socio-ethical issues of genetic epidemiology, one must attend to the details of the 
particular case. One cannot simply accept claims about high participation rates or public 
acceptability of genetic research, for example. One must deconstruct statements to learn 
where, when and how requests to donate are made. Thus, I provided a concrete case study 
of the arguments put forth by social scientists and in the process, largely agreed with 
many of their claims. 
Cited in Monk, 1990, p. 338. 
Several paragraphs of this chapter are based on: E. Haimes and M. Whong-Barr, Under review. Linking 
sociology, ethics and population genetics: the importance of context. Submitted to Sociology April 2004. 
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However, despite my appeal to the importance of context, the concept remains under 
defined. Of course, one could argue that it is necessarily so. 'Context', inevitably, may be 
impossible to define or theorise since by its very nature, it is dependent upon - well, 
context. However, this line of reasoning seems to me like a dead end. Rather, I suspect 
that many historians, ethicists, and social scientists could benefit from a critical and 
analytical examination of what is meant by the term. This chapter is an attempt to better 
understand 'context' through an extension of the discussion begun in Chapter Four of the 
relationship between bioethics and sociology. My aim here is to explore a set of 
methodological insights that would help situate ethics in a socio-historical context. My 
discussion leads to Chapter Eight, which applies the analytical framework developed here 
to actual issues and cases in biomedical ethics. The approach I advocate would challenge 
the tendency to frame ethical debates in certain conceptual terms (such as 'altruism', 
'informed consent', 'autonomy', 'trust') whilst ignoring or excluding other terms, such as 
'power', 'polities', 'scepficism' and 'authority'. 
One theme to this chapter then is how to extend the discussion about the relationship 
between the social sciences and ethics, in such a way that both facilitates and requires 
greater conceptual clarity and rigour from each. This endeavour is not much helped by 
the use, and indeed institutionalisation, of such common phrases as 'ELSA' or 'ELSI' 
which are shorthand for the ethical, legal and social aspects/implications of genetics and 
the life sciences.^ "^* The considerations encompassed by such phrases tend to blur into one 
general area denoting concern about developments in genetics, without much clarity 
about any of them. Having said that, at least the phrase 'legal' operates in a reasonably 
clearly defined field and the phrase 'ethical' serves to warn us of matters to be concerned 
about. However, the phrase 'social' in this string conveys an i l l defined and blurred 
domain of activities and considerations, almost as i f it refers to whatever is left over once 
the ethical and legal issues have been identified and resolved. Its presence in the phrasing 
'ethical, legal and social' also implies that it is separate from the ethical and the legal. 
However by taking a critical and socio-historically informed view one could argue that 
Haimes, 2002, p. 111; Whong-Barr, 2003, p. 81. 
' E L S r is a specifically funded element of the Human Genome Project in the USA; 'ELSA' is a specific 
element in Swedish national funding for research in genetics. 
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the very designation of an issue as 'ethical' or 'legal' is itself the outcome of a number of 
complex and intertwining social processes. This, I believe, is a fundamental insight from 
the Cumbria research. But there is a need to explore those processes and ask what work 
such labels perform and analyse the consequences of the designation of certain issues in 
this way. It may well be that one consequence of such designations (e.g. as 'ethical') is to 
draw attention to certain areas and to deflect attention away firom other (political? 
economic?) areas. Also, it is worth asking i f the designation of certain questions as 
'ethical' shapes how those questions are addressed and by whom. In other words, does 
the designation of other issues as being something other than ethical mean that they are 
ignored or sidelined. Others have voiced related concerns. Nelson suggests that 
bioethicists are serving particular interests in attending only to certain questions and not 
others."^ Bauman wishes to expose the 'sources of moral power which in modem ethical 
philosophy...were hidden fi-om sight'.^''^ Finally, Levitt and Williams claim that 'Many 
have voiced the suspicion that bioethics is too often a legitimating discipline'. 
What is clear is that far fi-om being the rag-bag of issues left over when the ethical and 
legal questions have been sorted, 'the social' is actually and necessarily the filter through 
which ethical and legal issues emerge and take shape and are given prominence. That is, 
ethical and legal issues are socially constituted. Thus, whilst 'the social' will always be 
contingent, situated and ambiguous, it is because of this very complexity that it must be 
engaged with - in order to understand and to gain access to other, more clearly defined, 
areas of concern. However, this also suggests that the notion of the 'social' needs to be 
more clearly delineated in these debates and not simply tagged on. 
Ethical beings/being ethical 
In the previous chapter I discussed the various ways donors and researchers in the 
NCCGP describe themselves and their actions as ethical. In the course of data analysis 
and in search of a fancy title for a conference paper at the London School of Economics, I 
Nelson, 2000. 
Z. Bauman, 1993. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 3 
Levitt and Williams, 2003, p. 5. 
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came up with the phrase 'ethical beings and being ethical'.^^* As it turned out, the these 
terms have proven useful in forcing a closer examination of the assumptions and the 
language used in empirical research and the relationship between sociology and ethics. 
Arguably, the term 'ethical being' suggests a concern with status; with the individual's 
standing in the moral universe and/or their degree of adherence to a particular moral 
code. One could argue that that is primarily therefore a concern of ethics: the evaluation 
of the individual's standing or at least of their actions. As suggested in Chapter Four, 
virtue ethics is concerned with an individual's moral character and seeks to address 
questions such as, 'what kind of person should I be?'. The prescriptive task of ethics is to 
judge that status and perhaps also to suggest ways of improving it. The term 'being 
ethical', however, suggests a concern with process: with the actions and practices that 
define ethical behaviour in certain settings. Arguably, this is a primary concern for (a 
certain type of) sociology. The analytical task is to provide a reflexive interpretation of 
those processes such that the reader can gain understanding of the ways in which actions, 
practices and settings are mutually constitutive.^^^ 
The importance of context 
However neither notion of status nor process (let alone of ethical beings and being 
ethical) makes sense without an understanding of the context in which each is used: this 
can be seen fi-om the study of the NCCGP, from which the terms were derived in the first 
place. A consideration of context brings together the two notions of status and process. 
Hence the power of Bauman's instruction to engage with 'messy human reality' (a plea 
that one might expect from a sociologist). What is also interesting though is that 
Ethical beings and being ethical: Donor and professional views of population genetics. Vital Politics: 
Health, Medicine and Bioeconomics into the Twenty First Century Conference. London School of 
Economics, September 2003. Co-authored with Haimes, though the phrase is mine and emerged from data 
analysis and interpretation. 
Though it is possible to overstate these distinctions: clearly ethics is interested in process (e.g. the 
analysis of processes of reasoning in some thought experiments, the concern with context and process in 
casuistry, as discussed in chapter four, and narrative ethics) and sociology, particularly classical, has a long 
standing interest in status in many different forms. However, the version of process in ethics can often be 
stylized (that is, manipulated and formalised) and is focussed on the logical progression from one action to 
the next; it is not the contingent, variable, vulnerable process of, for example, symbolic interactionism, let 
alone the robust and moment-to-moment concern with process that characterises ethnomethodology^ 
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bioethicists are also begiiming to make similar calls. For example, Onora O'Neill has said 
that she wishes to be both philosophically constructive and practically constructive. She 
adds, 
'Writing on bioethics exacts intellectually troubling compromises. I f it is to be 
philosophically serious it cannot take specific institutional and professional arrangements 
for granted; i f it is to speak to actual predicaments it must take institutional and 
professional arrangements seriously. Much writing on bioethics fails as philosophy 
because it takes for granted some of the institutions or practices of particular cultures or 
times, such as hospital based medicines or advanced biotechnologies, and fails to 
consider alternatives. Some philosophically interesting writing lacks clear implications 
for medicine, science and biotechnology because it is oblivious to institutional and 
professional realities and diversities. These problems can be avoided but not solved by 
separating philosophical writing from work intended to contribute to policy debates in 
bioethics. That has so far been my practice; its costs are rather high.'^ '*'* 
She continues that she has tried to link serious philosophy with consideration of specific 
policies, practices and institutions, using the latter to illustrate underlying philosophical 
questions and arguments.^ '*' That she has to try to justify this to philosophy colleagues 
and that she notes the 'costs' of so doing, is somewhat revealing. It implies that any 
discussion such as this has other consequences, for example, for what counts as 'good' or 
'proper' philosophy. It also reveals the (usually unstated or indeed unnoted) institutional 
and professional contexts of 'doing' philosophy. To a sociologist perhaps, her argument 
may sound like a call for a discipline that can engage in (that is, interrogate) those 
'realities and diversities' and debates, in order to have public policy relevance. Simply 
put, it seems that O'Neill is suggesting that there is need for an approach that is interested 
in and committed to, a concern with 'context', whilst also trying to remain 
philosophically robust. 
O'Neil, 2002, p. x. 
O'Neil, 2002, p. x. 
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However, I return to my original question: what is meant by context? The term, it must be 
said, is used very widely and loosely, including in the current investigation. 
Decontextualization is easy to diagnosis but much harder to solve.^ "*^  I f sociologists 
and/or ethicists are to advocate its importance, then I suggest it is necessary to be 
conceptually sharper about its meanings and contributions. One very useful analytical 
line comes from Bent Flyvbjerg's work on the notion of phronesis, which explicitly 
brings these concerns together and offers a practical way forward about how one might 
practically do research that attempts to consider all these dimensions. '^'^  
The potential of phronesis 
Flyvbjerg's work is both conventional and innovative. It is conventional because he 
addresses the differences and difficulties between the natural and social sciences. In so 
doing he convincingly questions the possibility of the social sciences ever truly emulating 
themselves on the natural sciences in creating a general theory that is universal and 
predictive. Flyvbjerg's work is innovative because he uses a well known philosophical 
concept - the Aristotelian notion of phronesis - to identify the strengths of the social 
sciences. He considers these strengths to their ability to access, describe and grapple with 
the social context. And although it is not his primary goal, Flyvbjerg also provides 
another way of characterising the relationship between ethics and the social sciences. 
Phronesis lies in Aristotle's three inter-related terms of episteme (scientific knowledge, 
universal and context independent), techne (translated as art or often as technology, 
oriented towards production), and phronesis.^ '*'* According to Flyvbjerg, phronesis is: 
D. Light, and G. McGee, 1998. On the social embeddedness of bioethics. In R. DeVries, and J. Subedi, 
eds., Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise. NJ: Simon & Schuster, pp. 1-15. 
Flyvbjerg, 2001. 
For an insightful discussion on these points, see M. Bertilsson, 2000. From Aristotle to modem social 
theory. In H. Andersen and L. Kaspersen, eds., Classical and Modem Social Theory Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, pp. 488-506. Bertilsson writes, 'The task of finding a moderate balance between Antiquity's 
three ideals for creating understanding, that is, episteme, phronesis, and poietic-techne, is and will remain, a 
greater challenge for modem (social) science than it probably ever was for ancient philosophers.' 
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'Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, context-
dependent. Oriented towards action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original 
concept [unlike episteme and techne] has no analogous contemporary term.'^''* 
Usually phronesis is translated a 'practical wisdom' or 'practical reasoning'. In 
Aristotle's philosophy, it is characterised as one of the intellectual virtues (that is, not one 
of the moral virtues such as courage or temperance.) '^** 'It [phronesis] is a true and 
reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to things that are good or bad for man.'^ '*^ 
Phronesis, as I understand it, is the ability to judge in a particular situation, to 'deliberate 
weir and to make a wise choice.^ '** One cannot rely merely on a set of ethical theories 
and norms but must have a cultivated knowledge of what the good life consists of - which 
can only be gained through experience in life, or praxis.^ "*^  Phronesis involves individual 
cases and is based on an intuitive grasp of the particulars of each case and the 
discernment of the relevant actions that manifest good conduct. One who has attained 
practical wisdom is a phronimos, a mentor of sorts fi-om whom others can learn. The 
phronimos has a cultivated insight into how to apply general moral knowledge to a 
particular situation. In other words, without virtue there can be no phronesis.^ ^" One must 
have the moral virtues as character states before they can be said to exercise phronesis. 
According to one commentator, 'what Aristotle has to say about practical wisdom has 
occasioned more discussion and more controversy than almost any other part of the 
[Nichomachaean] Ethics}^^ At issue, it seems, is whether phronesis, as Aristotle 
employed the term, relates to only the means used to achieve certain ends or whether it 
incorporates both means and the ability to 'deliberate well about what is good and 
Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.57. 
C. Long, 2002. The ontological reappropriation of phronesis. Continental Philosophy Review 35: 35-60. 
Aristotle, Ethics 1140b 5-6. 
Aristotle, £//HC5, 1141b 10. 
As this sentence indicates, phronesis (or ethical particularism, as well) does not - cannot in my view -
dispense with theory. Just as Kant did not deny the need for practical judgement, Aristotle is not dismissive 
of theory or system. See: M. O. Little, 2001. On Knowing the "Why" Particularism and Moral Theory. 
Hastings Center Report 31: 32-40. 
To my knowledge, this point is not mentioned by Flybyjerg - nor his reviewers. 
G. Hughes, 2001. Aristotle: on Ethics. London: Routledge, p. 84. 
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expedient' - that is, the ends, too.^ ^^ Some contemporary interpreters, such as Maclntyre, 
seem to adopt the latter definition, arguing that phronesis is the means by which we apply 
already given moral truths to our own particular present situation.^^^ These truths, in line 
with Maclntyre's overall philosophy, are inherited from a particular tradition, albeit a 
tradition that can be transformed over the course of history. For Martha Nussbaum, 
however, the essence of phronesis is not a means by which to apply historically 
conditioned ends, but rather an end to itself According to Nussbaum, practical wisdom 
is the care and attention one cultivates for the concrete particularities of persons and 
situations around them. The theme of Nussbaum's philosophy is that the moral agent 
develops a sense of moral perception - indeed, phronesis - through the literary narrative 
of plays, tragic poems, and novels.^ ^* 
Beyond the interpretative challenge of the term phronesis, there is also lack of agreement 
whether or not medicine constitutes a phronetic activity. Jonsen and Toulmin, proponents 
of casuistry (discussed in Chapter Four), have argued that that the 'central question' of 
medicine is 'just what specific condition is affecting this particular patient, and just what 
should we do about it here and nowT^^^ According to the authors, the answer relies on 
applying the skills of phronesis. 'Clinical knowledge requires what Aristotle calls 
"prudence", or phronesis: practical wisdom in dealing with particular individuals, specific 
problems, and the details of practical cases or actual situations'.^^' Duff Waring, 
however, disputes Jonsen and Toulmin's account. Waring believes that the authors have 
conflated the notions of techne and phronesis and also failed to see that it is only a 
Aristotle, Nichomachaean Ethics Book VI, Chapter 5 1140a 26-27. In R. McKeon, ed., 1941. The Basic 
Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House. For the contrast, see also Book IV Chapter 12 1144a 8, 
where Aristotle is translated as writing, 'practical wisdom makes us take the right means.' 
A. Maclntyre, 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
pp. 115-116. 
M. Nussbaum, 1990. Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
My brief discussion is not even the tip of the iceberg on this topic. Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Dunne 
and countless others have written extensively on phronesis; there is also an entire academic journal in 
Classics called Phronesis. I cannot profess to know the intricacies of all this literature. My selective 
account here is simply illustrative and designed to show that I recognise that phronesis is open to much 
critical interpretation. However, I believe this fact does nothing to undermine my general argument about 
the importance of context in bipethics or the utility of practical wisdom in unpacking the notion of context. 
My own use of the term is no doubt open to scrutiny. 
Jonsen and Toulmin, 1989, p. 37. Italics are in the original. 
Jonsen and Toulmin, 1989, p. 37. 
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phronimos who can exercise practical wisdom as described by Aristotle.''^* Waring is 
right, I believe, that it is a mistake to see medicine as a phronetic activity rather than an 
example of techne. Aristotle himself is clear on this point: 'the art of medicine produces 
health' and, 'the end of medical art is health.'^ ^^ The goal of medicine, in other words, is 
not contained within the activity itself ^ '^^  
As I alluded in Chapter Four, the concept of phronesis has also been discussed within 
medical ethics, largely in critique of principlism.^^' Whilst commentators differ in 
interpretation and emphasis, most agree that the application of abstract principles in a 
field of practical, ethical knowledge is not sufficient. Biomedical ethics must, by 
definition, rely on practical experience and thus, be phronetic in nature. Of course in 
reality, as we have seen in my discussion of biobanking, numerous ethicists and policy-
makers do not hesitate to make generalised claims that do not fit practical experience. 
Rather than - or perhaps in addition to - advocating practical reason in making actual 
ethical deliberations, I wish to use phronesis as a tool in the construction of a bioethical 
method. Such a method, as I see it, is an amalgamation of philosophy and sociology. It 
gives primacy to context, as does phronesis, and is designed to contribute to 'the reflexive 
analysis and discussion of values and interests which is the pre-requisite for an 
enlightened political, economic and cultural development in any society.'^ ^^ The aim is a 
bioethic that is akin to Flybvjerg's notion of a public philosophy or a successful social 
science - a 'practical, intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks and 
D. Waring, 2000. Why the Practice of Medicine is not a Phronetic Activity. Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 2\: 139-151. 
Aristotle, Ethics 1144a 5; 1094a 10 
For a useful discussion of this point, see F. Svenaeus, 2003. Hermeneutics of medicine in the wake of 
Gadamer: the issue of phronesis, Theoretical Medicine, 24: 407-431; and, R. Polansky, 2000. Is Medicine 
Art, Science, or Practical Wisdom? Ancient and Contemporary Reflections. In Kuczewski and Polansky, 
pp. 31-56. Polansky argues that medicine is an art. 
Beyond Svenaeus and Jensen and Toulmin, see E. Pellegrino and D.Thomasma, 1994. The Virtues in 
Medical Practice. New York; Oxford University Press; D. Thomasma, 2000. Aristotle, Phronesis, and 
Postmodern Bioethics. In M. Kuczewski and R. Polansky eds., Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary 
Issues, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 67-92. 
^"Flyvyerg^2001,p.3. . 
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possibilities we face as humans and societies, and at contributing to social and political 
praxis.'^ ^^ 
The importance of phronesis for an informed and context sensitive biomedical ethics can 
be better explained through a discussion of three methodological elements. These 
elements are not meant to be taken as an exhaustive account of a bioethical method. 
Rather I see them as guidelines, heuristic in nature and meant simply to be, in Flyvbjerg's 
words, 'cautionary indicators of direction'.''^ The elements are, in brief: situation ethics, 
genealogy, and power. The final two, the reader will notice, are borrowed from Michel 
Foucault's toolbox. The remainder of this chapter will explore these concepts in some 
detail.^ ^^ In the following chapter I will extend these elements specifically to bioethics 
and genetic epidemiology. 
Situation ethics 
A theme not far below the surface of this thesis is a problem as old as philosophy itself: 
foundationalism.^^* Much ink has been split on this topic, the so-called 'failure of the 
Enlightenment project' - that is, the failure to find an universal and rational justification 
of morality.^^^ Sociobiologists (now called evolutionary psychologists, since the term, i f 
not ideas, of sociobiology have fallen out of favour) attempt to solve this problem, and 
indeed all problems, through the lens of biology. E. O. Wilson, for instance, writes that 
ethics are driven by 'hereditary predispositions in mental development' and can 
essentially be explained by 'brain circuitry and deep, genetic history.'^^^ One of the many 
problems with this account is that when viewed from the right (albeit remote) distance, 
just about anything can be explained by evolution. Another flaw, of course, is that my 
Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 4. 
Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 129. 
Obviously each element could be the subject of an entire thesis, thus I remind the reader of my self-
deprecatory caveat in the Inft-oduction. I am an intellectual gypsy and this comes, I know, at a certain price. 
Although it is not a problem for Richard Rorty. To read how a pragmatic ethic deals with the question of 
foundations, see R. Rorty, 1999. Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin, pp. xxvii-xxxii; 72-90. 
Maclntyre, 1981. Maclntyre's response to this issue is to look for ethical values in relation to specific 
communities. However, whilst such values may apply universally within a community, they may well not 
apply outside of it. 
E . O. Wilson, 1998. Consilience: The unity of knowledge. New York: Alfi-ed Knopf, pp. 240; 261. 
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(supposed) inner drive to make babies offers little help in distinguishing between right 
and wrong behaviour in actual cases. 
A more sophisticated response to the problem of foundations in ethics is a radical version 
of anti-foundationalism, that is an irreducible pluralism. This line of thinking can be 
found in the the work of thinkers such as Alice Maclean and Tristam Englehardt. 
Maclean, for example, attacks utilitarian bioethicists such as John Harris and Peter 
Singer. In a polemic writing style worth repeating here, she writes that 
'The objection I wish to make to the bioethical enterprise is a fundamental one. It is that 
philosophy as such delivers no verdict upon moral issues; there is no unique set of moral 
principles which philosophy as such underwrites and no question, therefore, of using that 
set to uncover the answers which philosophy gives to moral questions. When bioethicists 
deliver a final verdict upon the issues raised by medical practice, it is their own verdict 
they deliver and not the verdict of philosophy itself; it is their voice we hear and not the 
voice of reason or rationality.'^*^ 
For Maclean, then, there is no truth in ethics, only attitudes. Engelhardt is as equally as 
radical, but from a post-Christian point of view. According to his analysis, the loss of 
religious tradition has removed any hope of providing secure basis for ethical action. As a 
result. Western society is faced with a 'hunger for moral guidance' led by 'secular 
priests' who are all too ready to accept that no particular 'moral narrative can be 
generally normative'.'™ 
Flybvjerg rejects both relativism and foundationalism as the theoretical frameworks. 
Rather he replaces them with contextualism or situational ethics: 'that is by context; 
norms are contextually grounded'.'" However, in rejecting the more confining paradigms 
of relativism and foundationalism, it is not the case that 'anything goes' since 'the present 
A. Maclean, 1993. The Elimination of Morality: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics. New York: 
Routledge, p. 5. 
™^ T. Englehardt, 2003. The Foundations of Bioethics: Rethinking the meaning of morality. In Walter and 
Klein, eds., p. 101. 
"'Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 99. 
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effectively limits the possible preferences; humans cannot think or do just anything at any 
time'.^" 
Flybvjerg writes that, 
'They take their point of departure in their attitude to the situation in the society being 
studied. They seek to ensure that such an attitude is not based on idiosyncratic morality or 
personal preferences but instead on a common view among a specific reference group to 
which the researchers refer. For phronetic researchers, the socially and historically 
conditioned context - and not the rational and universal grounding which is desired by 
certain philosophers, but which is not yet achieved - constitutes the most effective 
bulwark against relativisim and nihilism. Phronetic researchers realise that our sociality 
and history is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And that 
this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate for our work as social scientists.'^'^ 
Society and history are themselves fully adequate as foundations. As Paul Veyne has 
written, 'try asking the Romans to abolish slavery or to think about an international 
equilibrium.'^'* In short, norms are based on historical and personal context and cannot 
be given an universal grounding independent of those contexts. In this way, one can see 
how the idea of situation ethics helps us to understand the importance of context. 
Genealogy 
Nietzsche once wrote that 'we wished to awaken the feeling of man's sovereignty by 
showing his divine birth: this path is now forbidden, since a monkey stands at the 
entrance'."^ The meaning, I believe, is that history (properly told) can make for 
uncomfortable reading - it can, in other words, be untimely. In using the genealogical 
Flyvbjerg,2001,p. 100. 
Flybvjerg, 2001, p. 130. 'Certain philosophers' is a reference to Habermas and his theory of discourse 
ethics. 
'^'* P. Veyne, 1997. The Foucault and His Final Ethics. In A. Davidson, ed., Foucault and His Interlocutors. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 230. 
F. Nietzsche, 1881. The Dawn of Day, no. 23. 
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method popularised by Foucault, Flyvbjerg wishes to establish a practical approach that 
parallels the insights of phronesis. 
'Like Aristotle when he speaks of phronesis, the genealogist emphasises a focus on the 
particular because the genealogical experience says that what is general is often empty 
and banal, whereas it is often in the deep, concrete detail that genuinely important 
interrelationships are expressed...the genealogist seeks the large from within the 
small.'"^ 
In this section I wish to explore a certain aspect of Foucault's philosophy (or was it 
history?).^^' Like numerous others who have used Foucault's ideas (including the hero of 
this chapter, Flybvjerg), I begin with a caveat. My use of genealogy is pragmatic, an 
attempt to better understand the history and failings of biomedical ethics, and how both 
genealogy (and in the following section, power) may be usefiil to my investigation. Such 
a strategy is very much in the spirit of how Foucault wanted his work to be used - as 
tools and not as an agenda. I begin with a discussion of his methods, archaeology and 
genealogy.^ ^* 
First, and contrary to what some commentators have written, it is important to note that 
archaeology is not technique for questioning the possibility of norms. Instead, it seeks to 
reveal how a discipline has developed norms of validity and objectivity.^'^ In Foucault's 
own cryptic terms archaeology 'describes discourse as practices specified in the element 
Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 114., 376 
Ironically, it is sociologists who make the most use of Foucault today, thanks to the burgeoning field of 
'govemmentality' studies. 
' ' I am not unaware of the many criticisms and drawbacks of Foucault's work. At times Foucault does 
appear to want to stand nowhere, as Taylor rightly points out (especially in Foucault's early works). I also 
agree with Taylor that 'we have a history' irom which we cannot escape. Yet I am not sure that Foucault 
would dispute this notion either, despite Taylor's characterisation of him. Habermas's arguments against 
Foucault are of a similar nature but I am less convinced of their force. Perhaps it depends upon how one 
defines 'relativism' or 'normative foundations'. One could easily argue, I think, that Habermas's discourse 
ethics lack a rational and universal grounding - the same charge he makes against Foucault. Either way, my 
use of Foucault is limited and pragmatic. Thus, I need not endorse his entire project in order to draw fi-om 
his thought. The relevant sources here are: C . Taylor, 1984. Foucault on Freedom and Truth. Political 
Theory 12: 152-183; and, J . Habermas, 1990. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, pp. 238-293. 
^''in bioethics, for example, the immediate concern would not be if autonomy is an appropriate or true 
criteria as a determining norm, but how it became so historically, how it acquired the status of 'truth'. 
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of the archive', the archive being 'the general system of the formation and transformation 
of statements.'^ *" In slightly plainer English, archaeology is a way to unearth the order 
and principles of discourse. Specifically, Foucault 'sought to make the history of the 
human sciences intelligible in terms of rules, which, unknown to the actors involved, 
regulated and governed all their serious speech acts.'^ *' Archaeology seeks to describe 
the conditions in which certain statements (or certain norms, such as the criterion used to 
determine i f someone was mad, or the standards used in classifying disease) could appear 
as true. It sought to uncover the rules of formation which govern particular configurations 
of knowledge and to highlight the epistemological breaks which mark one movement 
from another. These rules, according to Foucault, are not formulated by the participants 
of discourse and are not available to their consciousness. Rather they constitute what 
Foucault calls the 'positive unconsciousness of knowledge': a level which eluded the 
consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse.^ *^ 
Foucault believed that statements can come into being and relate to one another only 
under certain conditions, termed 'historical a priori'.^^^ This is not a priori in the formal 
philosophical sense of knowledge attained prior to experience, a type of 
transcendentalism or 'atemporal structure.' Rather, a priori refers to the necessary 
conditions for the emergence of certain statements, conditions which themselves have a 
history. In other words, these a priori rules are themselves mutable and able to be 
transformed. For example, before it became possible to state that someone was 'mad', as 
we understand the term today, a whole series of conditions relating to psychological 
theory had to be in place. 
Genealogy also seeks to reveal how a discipline has developed norms of validity and 
objectivity while bracketing the question of the 'truth' of those norms. The key difference 
^ ' " M . Foucault, 1972. Tlie Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. Alan Sheridan, London: Tavistock 
Publications, p. 130-131. 
^ " H . Dreyfus and P.Rabinow eds. 1983. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
Chicago, I L : The Harvestor Press, p. 102. 
^'^M. Foucault, 1966. The Order of Things: An archaeology of the human sciences. New York: Vintage, p. 
X I . 
383 Foucault, 1972, p. 127. 
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between it and archaeology, however, is that in his genealogical investigations, Foucault 
moves beyond the level of discourse and discursive rules to considerations of non-
discursive influences. Here, non-discursive refers to social processes and issues of power 
manifested in institutions such as the family, hospital or prison.^ *'* 
Genealogy, as a method, opposes itself to both metaphysics and traditional history. 
Foucault understands metaphysics as based on a commitment to the pursuit of the 
'origin', meaning in a belief that things have an atemporal essence or a unitary 
perfection.^*^ According to Foucault, genealogy is opposed to both a transcendental 
subject and the correspondence theory of truth ~ ideas which Foucault sees as popular in 
traditional history. Denial of a transcendental subject refers to a refusal to believe in a 
human subject who makes history and assures its continuity. In this way, Foucault has 
much in common with the Aimales school which focused on periods of such length (la 
longue duree) that it was impossible to attribute change to a human subject. Instead, the 
Aimales school placed emphasis on material conditions of climate and geology as the 
engines of historical continuity. For Foucault, it is the role of discourse in his early work 
and power/knowledge in his latter books that displace the notion of a transcendental 
subject which shapes history.^*^ The correspondence theory asserts that a belief or 
statement is true i f it corresponds to a fact. However, opponents of this theory charge that 
humans have no access to facts (or to history) independently of belief and statements. 
Foucault saw both metaphysics and traditional history as committed to the notion that 
truth is the accurate correspondence of words and things. Genealogy, by contrast, is a 
method that doubts the possibility that words said universally and fully represent external 
things. 
"''David Owen, in a re-vamped PhD thesis done at the University of Durham, has written that a useftil way 
of viewing the shift in archaeology to genealogy is to note Foucault's change in terminology from an 
episteme to a dispositif. The former relates to the level of discourse only, while the latter (known in English 
as an apparatus) refers to both discursive and non-discursive practices. See D. Owen, 1994. Maturity and 
Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason. London: Routledge, 
^ " M . Foucault, 1998. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In J . Faubion ed., Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 2, New York: The New Press, pp. 3 6 9 - 3 9 1 . 
' '*0f course there are real differences between the Annales school and Foucault. For one, Annales concerns 
itself with continuity in history while Foucault prefers to stress discontinuous breaks in knowledge. See G. 
Gutting, 1989 . Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 . 
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According to Foucault, genealogy also differs from traditional history of ideas in its 
account of historical change.''^ ^ In accounting for causal factors of change, he had little 
regard for notions such as 'influence or spirit of the times,' or Weltanschauungen. Like 
most historians Foucault, saw the cause of change in non-discursive factors such as 
economic or social process. But, contrary to many standard accounts, Foucault 
maintained that these causes could not be fit into some teleological scheme (e.g. the rise 
of the proletariat, the ambition of Hitler, etc.). Rather, he held that non-discursive 
practices change because of a vast number of small, often unrelated factors (chance 
technological discoveries, ad hoc adjustments of some existing procedures). Gary Gutting 
notes that these are the sort of 'petty causes' that Nietzsche identified in his genealogy of 
morality. Thus, changes in non-discursive practices that make up a societies 'power 
structure' must be understood as due to an immensely complex and diffuse variety of 
micro-factors. In other words, this approach does for non-discursive practices what 
archaeology did for discursive ones: it eliminates the role of a central controlling subject, 
emphasizing instead chance and accident. 
The difference between genealogy and traditional history can be seen in Foucault's habit 
of calling his brand of inquiry a 'history of the present ' .This did not mean that he was 
trying to capture the meaning or significance of a past epoch or get the 'whole picture' of 
a particular institution or person in an earlier era.^ *' Nor did he commit the common error 
discussed previously - that of 'presentism', reading the present in terms of the past. 
Rather, Foucault begins with a diagnosis of a current situation or problem, then locates 
the manifestations of a certain type of power to see where it arose took shape and gained 
importance. For example, Foucault took a present situation regarding sexuality and 
isolated the power of confession as a important force in constituting the 'truth' of one's 
sexual nature and desire. Of course, he did not claim that Catholic confession had the 
same meaning in previous centuries that it has today. But he asserted that confession was 
Foucault, 1998 , p. 2 7 1 . 
" ' M . Foucault, 1995 . Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison , trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: 
Vintage Press, p. 3 1 . 
^''Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983 , pp. 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 . 
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still a vital part of modem power and he asked how it functioned in present sites such as 
psychoanalysis. In other words, he isolated a central component of a current 'political 
technology' and traced it back in time. In this way, histories of the present seek to disturb 
the taken-for-grantedness of the current situation to 'show that things weren't as 
necessary as all that'.''^" 
In the next chapter I shall use the ideas presented above to disturb many of bioethics' 
assumptions and claims about the necessity of its own origins. In the next section, 
however, I discuss the final element in the phronesis-genealogy-power toolkit. 
Power relations 
The final methodological element I wish to emphasis in this chapter is power. As 
Flybvjerg notes, discussions of phronesis are usually devoid of the issue of power. 
Arguably, however, a firamework of power would assist in the application of phronesis 
since the practical wisdom is concerned with action and 'understanding how power works 
is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power' - according to 
Foucault's analytics, as we shall see below. 
Of course there are many different ways to theorise power and at least one reviewer has 
criticized Flybvjerg for being too restrictive in his reliance on only Foucault's 
conceptions.''^ ^ To be fair, Flybvjerg does discuss the work of others, such as Robert Dahl 
and Stephen Lukes, and claims they are important studies not to be dismissed. Yet his 
criticisms of these power theorists is that they focus exclusively on who holds power and 
the outcomes or effects of power. They theorise power in terms of 'possession, 
sovereignty, and control - power as an entity.'^'^ One problem with these versions of 
power is that they overlook the fact that 'seizing power' may in itself not bring any real 
change. This (as Marxists have learned) is because old patterns of government and 
" " M . Foucault, 2000. Questions of Method. In J . Faubion ed. Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-
1984. Vol. 3, New York: The New Press, p. 226 
Flybverg, 2001, p. 107. See also: N. Rose, 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
P. deLeon, 2003. Book Review of Bent Flyvbjerg's Making Social Science Matter. Policy Sciences 36: 
203-208. However, deLeon writes that Flybvjerg's emphasis on power in general is 'completely justified.' 
'"Flybvjerg, 2001, p. 116. _ 
160 
authority may simply be reproduced: 'the class that succeeds in overthrowing the ruling 
class becomes the new ruling class.'^ '^' In contrast, Foucault thought power was 
'everywhere'. It was not an institution, nor a structure, but rather the name that one 
attributed to a complex strategic situation in a particular society. 
Foucault was not concerned so much with developing a theory of power but rather in 
separating its 'constituent elements' and in determining its features and the domains 
formed by its relations ~ an 'analytics of power'.^'^ In defining power Foucault was 
purposefully elusive, emphasizing what it was not as much as what it was. His reason for 
doing so (other than to confuse his readers) was to capture its fluid, productive nature. To 
show the contrast, Foucault distinguished Power from power. The former was a 
commodity, a state Power which oppressed people with institutional arms of sovereign 
might. The latter was a 'multidirectional' and 'mobile' matrix of force relations that ran 
throughout all persons and society.^ ^^ Power with a small 'p' was rooted in social 
networks and exercised from manifold points. It enabled actions to 'structure the field of 
other possible actions.'^^' Thus, power was exercised rather than possessed and endowed 
itself with a flexibility which allowed it to adjust to each new situation. 
The above description, I realise, must sound rather cryptic. To better understand this, it 
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helps to consider power as the capacity to do or become certain things. Power in this 
sense is exercised by individuals or collective human bodies when they act upon each 
others actions; in other words, when the actions of one effect the field of possible actions 
of another. For instance, where the actions A have succeeded in modifying the field of 
possible actions of B, we can say that A has exercised power over B. Of course there are 
many ways in which agents can exercise power over other agents, only some of which 
can be detrimental to the interests of the one over whom power is exercised: I can affect 
"'Flybvjerg, 2001, p. 122. 
M. Foucault, 1990. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley, Vol. 1, New York: 
Vintage Press, p. 82. 
"'Ibid, p. 94. 
Foucault, 1983. The Subject and Power. In Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 222. 
" 'The following explanation is from P. Patton, 1998. Foucault's Subject of Power. In J. Moss ed. The Later 
Foucault: Politics and Philosophy, London: S A G E , pp. 64-77. 
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the actions of another by providing moral support, or by passing on certain knowledge or 
skills. Al l of these exercises are cases of power but are not necessarily objectionable. 
Moreover, it is only in exceptional circumstances where A can be assured of achieving 
the desired effect on B. In these cases, when the possibility of effective resistance has 
been removed, then the power relation becomes unilateral and one sided ~ in other 
words, it becomes domination. As Foucault indicated: 
'What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act 
directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions'^ ^^ 
and, 
'Power is not a substance. Power is only a certain type of relation between 
individuals. The characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less 
entirely determine other men's conduct - but never exhaustively or coercively.''""' 
Power relations, then, are not external to other types of relations (such as economic 
processes or knowledge) but are immanent to them. Traditionally, power has been 
conceived as an obstacle to autonomy. Seen in the vein of Foucault, however, power is 
constitutive of autonomy. Our will , in other words, is constituted through relations of 
power and ethics."* '^ 
Foucault thought that power played a determinant role in the creation of knowledge. 
Knowledge, rather than being universal, can be seen as an instrument used in the creation 
of true discourse. Simply put, it is manufactured by relations of power. 
' " M . Foucault, 1983, p. 220. 
*'"'M. Foucault, 2000. OMNES E T S I N G U L A T I M : Toward a Critique of Political Reason. In Faubion, p. 
324. 
•""Owen, 1994. It is worth noting that one type of power that Foucault studied was 'biopower', which refers 
to the increased organization and knowledge of both individual bodies and the collective population for the 
sake of productivity and wealth - topics touched on the beginning of Chapter Five. 
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'Perhaps we should abandon a whole tradition that allows is to imagine that 
knowledge can develop only outside its [power] injunctions, its demands, and its 
interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that the renunciation of power is one 
of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit that power produces knowledge; 
that power and knowledge imply one another; that there is no power relation without 
the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations ... It is not the activity of 
the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to 
power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of 
which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge."'"^ 
Power/Knowledge, then, is a term Foucault used to highlight the fact that every 
description also regulates what it describes. This means not only that every description is 
somewhat 'biased', but also that the very terms used to describe something reflect power 
relations. Discourses promote specific kinds of power relations, usually favouring the 
'neutral' person or professional using the discourse (the lawyer, psychiatrist, professor, 
doctor, ethicist, etc.). In other words, to know is to participate in complicated webs of 
power. According to Foucault, knowledge can only be understood in connection with the 
historical conditions of its emergence and the actual forces that establish, maintain and 
amplify its authority. Power is not merely or exclusively a negative force. It is productive 
through the generation of knowledge. 
Again, whilst I have spent some time on Foucault's ideas, I do not wish to assert that they 
are the only ones applicable to bioethics. They are, in my view, especially useful but 
before closing this discussion, I also wish to draw attention to one other form of power 
recently developed by the political scientist Joseph Nye.'*"^  Nye distinguishes between 
'hard' power and 'soft' power. Example of the former include military might, whilst the 
latter relates to the power of things such as knowledge and culture. Hard power has less 
" " ' M . Foucault, 1990 , pp. 2 7 - 2 8 . 
J . Nye, 2 0 0 2 . The Paradox of American Power. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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to do with biomedical ethics than soft, which I believe is relevant to the current study. For 
now I merely wish to draw attention to Nye's ideas. I shall return to them in Chapter 
Eight in my discussion of bioethics association with the soft power of the financial 
networks of pharmaceutical companies. 
This chapter has by no means answered all the questions it has raised . Clearly, despite 
raising the question, the answer to 'what is context?' is still somewhat vague. The 
imperative to 'consider the context' does not in itself define for us what is meant by that 
term: for example, how immediate is context? How wide is context? Whose context? 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I have extended my earlier discussion of the relationship between history, 
sociology and bioethics by defending a set of methodological tools to guide a context 
sensitive bioethics. I argued from the outset that such tools were needed in light of 
evidence from Chapter Six which showed that in DNA banking, there were often 
conflicts between competing normative and empirical claims and a lack of appreciation 
of context. Specifically, this chapter has argued that: 
• Phronesis may be a valuable concept to both clarify the meaning and use of the 
term context. Translated as practical wisdom, phronesis stresses that deliberations 
are inevitably made in relation to particular cases. I highlighted three elements 
that would serves as 'cautionary indicators of direction' for a phronetic bioethic. 
• Situation ethics rejects both relativism and foundationalism by arguing that norms 
are contextually grounded and that society, culture and history together constitute 
a fiilly adequate basis for ethical norms of reasoning. Bound by tradition and 
context, it is not the case that 'anything goes' in situation ethics. Genealogy 
serves as the way in which bioethics may uncover how its norms are contingent 
upon chance, not the result of inevitable historical processes. Power emphasises 
that knowledge and truth are not independent of context but are themselves the 
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result of certain forms of authority. In this way, power is a productive force in that 
its exercise enables certain discourses to establish themselves as 'true'. 
In Chapter Eight I seek to apply these insights directly to biomedical ethics. 
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Chapter Eight 
Towards a phrenetic bioethic 
Surely, then, no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, seeks or orders what is advantageous to 
himself, but what is advantageous to his patient? We agreed that a doctor, in the precise 
sense, is a ruler of bodies, not a money-maker? Wasn't that agreed?''^'' 
— Socrates 
In the previous chapter I presented a rough methodological sketch that a bioethics 
sensitive to issues of context would adhere to. Perhaps, at the very least phronesis could 
act as a fi-amework for the initial guidance of a piece of research or as a way of bringing 
together a set of ideas about context, values and social actions that, whilst important, lack 
cohesion. Of course it is possible to go back through any piece of analysis and review 
what is added by the application of a phronetic fi-amework and in that way one can use 
Flyvbjerg as providing a set of tools with which to sharpen the initial analysis. In essence 
that is what my co-author and I have done: having conducted an extensive analysis of our 
data we found ourselves wanting to bring together a set of considerations about ethics, 
values, contexts, social action and power into a fairly coherent framework. This is not to 
say that Flyvbjerg's model answered all our questions but it provided a way of 
identifying those which can hold together and those which required more detailed and 
possibly separate consideration. For example, one reviewer has claimed that Flyvbjerg's 
analysis effectively politicizes social inquiry and implies that Flyvbjerg has not fully 
considered the consequences of this. '"'^  The same argument can be made against my 
alternate rendition of bioethics as phronesis. Yet, as most observers would hopefully 
admit, bioethics is already a heavily politicised field. However, this fact is often not 
admitted to or even recognised by those working in the area. Political, indeed ideological, 
content is often sneaked in through supposedly objective judgements. There is nothing 
wrong with this per se; I 'd argue that it is inevitable. However, a phronetic bioethic 
would simply make the political nature of the field blatant and ask bioethicists to be more 
*^ Plato, The Republic Book 1342d. In Cooper, 1997. 
•""For a critical but also positive evaluation of Flyvbjerg, see: T. Schatzki, 2002. Making social science 
matter./nq'M/rv 45: 119-138. 
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'reflexive' (to use a popular sociological term) about their own interests and the 
perspective from which they work. 
In the current chapter I aim to 'apply' to biomedical ethics the loose set of guidelines 
previously presented. I do this in order to sketch the contour of an alternate bioethical 
agenda. I indulge in this task not because I have any illusory notions about the influence 
of what I write or even publish. Rather, for me, this is an exercise in learning how to 
think differently, an heuristic tool to try and better understand the limitations of the field 
I've worked in for the last five years. It is also a way to clarify a set of concerns for future 
work. And, of course, it is a way of bringing the current investigation to a close. My tone 
and style in this chapter is (upon reflection, not intention) slightly less formal and more 
personal - but I hope still reasonably academic. 
I begin by re-visiting my discussion of donation and consent in light of my reading of 
Flybvjerg, then move on to consider bioethics' lack of an adequate theory of power. My 
discussion in this section eventually leads me away from epidemiological ethics to a 
larger set of concerns about international health inequalities and bioethics' involvement 
with the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, I conclude by developing a firmer critique of 
the history of biomedical ethics (including my own work on the London Medical Group) 
with the aid of a genealogical method. 
Practical reasoning, donation, and consent 
In Chapter Six I reported on donors and non-donors views of the NCCGP. In retrospect, 
the concept of practical reasoning has proven to be a useful way to talk about 
interviewees' intuitions about donation. This is important since it is easy as a researcher 
to become finstrated at the apparent lack of reasoning behind some interviewees' actions 
and thoughts. For example, when asked why they had donated to the NCCGP many 
women gave responses such as 'it just seemed right to donate'; ' I just trusted what the 
doctors said'; ' I couldn't see any reason not to donate'; or, the inverse, 'it didn't seem 
right to donate my baby's tissue'. When encouraged to expand upon these answers about 
why it 'just seemed right' to act and think in the way they did, many respondents did not 
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seem able to provide any clear reasons. As an interviewer, I found this as fascinating as I 
did fiiistrating. On the one hand, I wanted to acquire the most interesting data possible 
and such responses seemed, at first, to be rather unsatisfactory explanations of peoples' 
motivations. Using every technique I could think of, I tried my best to get the 
interviewees talking in order to elicit more expansive answers.'*^ ^ When this often failed, 
I began to realise that far from being the result of a lack of reasoning or care about the 
matter in hand, this sort of response was in fact evidence of the embedded nature of that 
reasoning - such that not only was it difficult to extract, it was also difficult to articulate 
in the first place. 
Flyvbjerg reports Hubert Dreyfus saying to him, 'people are supposed to justify what 
their intuitions are. In fact nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you have to 
make up reasons, but it won't be the real reasons.''*"^  Thus an approach influenced by 
phronesis would take an individual's intuitive sense of the appropriateness of an action to 
be an indication of their context-dependent experience and knowledge, meaning that they 
feel they just know what the right thing to do is and which in turn means that they cannot 
necessarily articulate fiiUy why they do what they do. Thus, identifying what constitutes 
intuitive action and what counts as counter-intuitive or indeed what counts as surprising 
or troubling action and ideas, is an important part of the process of understanding the 
social context in which people operate and indeed how they contribute to the shaping of 
that context. Phronesis, I believe, can help bioethicists in understanding these issues and 
in closing the gap that sometimes exists between theory and practice.'"'^  
For this reason I did my best to integrate myself into Cumbrian life. For example, instead of renting a 
car, I used public transport to move between interviews and frequented the same cafes in order to build a 
'relationship' of sorts with people there. Since many of my interviewees were younger than myself, I even 
visited the local night club - the first and last time I've done so during my six years in Britain. 
Flybyjerg, 2001, p. 80. The early chapters of Flybvjerg's book provide a detailed description of the so-
called 'Dreyfus model', a phenomenology of human learning. This model delineates five levels of learning, 
from novice to expert - whereby a reliance on formal rules gradually gives way to a greater ability to 'think 
on one's feet' to an eventual level of intuition and virtuosity. The model can apply to all aspects of daily 
life: from riding a bicycle, to performing brain surgery, to learning how to play chess. Flybvjerg uses the 
Dreyfus model as a basis for his presentation of a context-dependent social science. 
A phronetic bioethic, for instance, would give the 'yuk' factor its 'proper and serious due' and not 
dismiss the whole moral psychology surrounding people's fears over genetics, cloning, and biotechnology. 
See: D. E . Cooper, 2002. The 'Frankensteinian Nature of Biotechnology. In Maehle and Geyer-Kordesch, 
pp^ 139-149. 
168 
Neither my co-author nor I have ever argued, of course, that donating is necessarily the 
right or wrong thing to do. Rather, a researcher's task is to identify what interviewees 
define as right/good or wrong/bad, how they define this and how these map onto their 
wider interests and concerns, within the context of the request to donate and the wider 
biographies of their lives. This is why as 'thick' a description as possible is needed so 
that responses to interview questions can be placed within a more detailed understanding 
of the context in which those particular articulations, and not others, are given. 
Following Flybvjerg, then, intuition, is the ability to use one's experience - bodily, 
emotional and intellectual - in order to recognise similarities between experiences and to 
adapt to new situations and requests. It is not devoid of reason, but places rationality 
along side of ones' gut feelings about the right thing to do. An expert acts without much 
conscious deliberation and in deciding whether to donate ones' parts to a DNA bank or 
not, many people, it seems, are experts. That is to say, whilst they may not be phronimos, 
they are virtuoso at deliberating in relation to particular circumstances that affect them. In 
retrospect and in light of phronesis, this finding is not surprising at all. 
Further evidence for these findings and analysis comes from the work of Klaus Hoeyer, 
who evaluated a biobank in northern Sweden.'*"' He found that out of twenty-one persons 
who received information sheets on the project they were donating to, only eight claimed 
to have actually read them. Yet donors did not feel that they had an insufficient 
understanding of the biobank and when asked about their reasons for donating, many 
people echoed the rather simple sounding sentiment that 'research is good'. Importantly, 
Hoeyer also found that donors did not reason independent of the context. In this case, 
donors' relationships with the nurses who requested samples and their views of the wider 
Swedish biomedical establishment led them to make what seemed like fairly quick 
judgements. He also argues that the history of the Swedish welfare state, which has 
continued to prosper into the new century, has helped to create a 'narrative of progress' 
K, Hoeyer, 2003. 'Science is really needed - that's all I know': informed consent and the non-verbal 
practices of collecting blood for genetic research in northern Sweden. New Genetics and Society 22: 229-
244; K . Hoeyer, 2004. Ambiguous gifts: public anxiety, informed consent and biobanks. In Tutton and 
Corrigan, pp. 97-116. 
169 
which contributes to a climate of acceptability of scientific research. Of course none of 
this is to say that donors' decisions are not reasoned - only that lack of detailed 
explanations does not mean lack of considered judgement. 
The notion that only a particular individual can make wise deliberations about a 
particular request in a particular time and place may seem fairly obvious. Yet it runs 
counter to recent bioethical obsession with informed consent: How much should 
researcher's disclose on the consent form? What should the layout of the form look like? 
Who should be asked for consent? There are questions I addressed in Chapter Five. But 
as it turns out, many are content to donate without knowing much at all. And those who 
have refused do so because of something particular to their situation - they knew 
someone with leukaemia, for instance. The point is that people decide, it seems, in light 
of the context at hand and their own specific life stories. In other words, people do not 
seem to make decisions based on abstract theoretical calculations. In her recent work on 
genetic donation, Helen Busby has argued that many participants feel 'that genetic 
research was now very much on the agenda and could be seen as an indicator of good 
modem science, and so in a sense was not particularly novel, troubling or noteworthy.'''"' 
She also goes on to add that 'policies, discourse, and institutions of bioethics have often 
seemed to float above the specificity of the lives, circumstances and histories of 
individuals and communities.' Arguably, this is another way of saying that bioethics, as 
an academic form of investigation, could benefit from a greater appreciation of the role of 
phronesis in ethical decision making. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, one consequence of these findings regards the 
suitability of informed consent guidelines. Whilst I do not want to argue too strenuously 
for any specific policy, I do not agree, for example, with some of the suggestions made 
by Jane Kaye on this matter. She argues for a consent system in which 'every individual 
would have to re-consent to the use of the data in the population collection every five 
•*'" H. Busby, 2004. Blood donation for genetic research: what can we learn from donors' narratives? In 
Tutton and Corrigan, p. 47. 
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years.'"*'' Whilst this may encourage researchers to better explain how they intend to use 
samples, it may also impose a degree of burden upon donors. Throughout the data on 
participants' views there is a clear theme of 'letting them get on with it ' - that is, of 
entrusting the research establishment to do the work they were trained to do. Kaye seems 
to believe that putting research information on the Internet and in health centres would 
enable donors to exercise choice in opting in or out of specific studies. Her system is 
ideal, perhaps, but I am not sure it is entirely practical. So far anyway, it seems that the 
evidence suggests a large majority of donors would simply not take notice of such 
information. As O'Neill has phrased it, 'donors and relatives, like patients, may find that 
being confi-onted with the full detail of research protocols provides excess, unassimilable 
information, to which they can hardly hope to give genuinely informed consent... there 
is a good deal of evidence from other areas of life that insisting on consent to every detail 
may not be the most serious or convincing way of seeking genuine consent.''*'^  O'Neill 
notes that most people, even when not i l l or in a clinical setting, have little time to read 
all the fine print details on things such as insurance policies, or financial transactions. 
Thus, asking them to constantiy keep up with the details of medical projects may not only 
be unrealistic, it may, ironically, undermine trust in the service of an 'audit culture'. As I 
suggested in Chapter Five, consent is not an ethical panacea, but part of a much wider set 
of obligations and rights that underlie ethically acceptable medical practice. Part of this 
equation is proper institutional structures and professional competence, both of which 
relate to the issue of trust - or the perceived lack of it. 
In her work, O'Neill makes reference to a series of MORI polls conducted in the UK on 
biotechnology and medicine.'*'^  Paradoxically, large swaths of the public claim to have 
lost trust in science, industry and politicians and yet continue to place trust in those very 
same professionals. 'Reported perceptions about trust are not mirrored in the ways in 
which people actually place tioist'.'*''* One explanation for this maybe the influence of the 
media which often reports stories of professional irresponsibility, combined with most 
J. Kaye, 2004. Abandoning informed consent: the case of genetic research in population collections. In 
Tutton and Corrigan, p. 131 
'^^  O'Neill, 2002, p. 157. 
"'^  O'Neill, 2002, p. 9. 
O'Neill, 2002, p. 9 
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peoples' experience of receiving good care from their particular health care provider. Of 
course another very plausible explanation may be that we simply want, indeed need, to 
trust our own physicians. Speaking for myself, no matter how many horror stories I heard 
on the news, I would still have a vested interest in trusting my own doctor to do the right 
thing and until that particular trust was broken, my recovery and general health would 
depend (in part) upon it and my continued faith in my physician. ^'^ The same can be said 
for my involvement in medical research studies. And, crucial to the current discussion, 
having to read or sign more detailed consent forms would do little to influence my 
perceptions. To conclude, O'Neill writes that, 'consent forms are not fundamental for 
restoring trust. Evidence that refiisal is possible and respected, as well as tone, attitude 
and recognition of generosity are of greater importance. The generosity of those who give 
tissues, who allow research use of tissue that has to be removed and the generosity of 
relatives who give tissue post mortem, deserves gratitude. The best 'thank you' is not a 
legalistic form or an audit trail.'"'^ 
To conclude this section, a bioethics with a phronetic outlook would (as O'Neill 
suggests) pay attention to donors' motivations and intuitions and place less emphasis on 
legalistic consent documents. (Crucially, I hasten to add that this does not mean 
regulation and governance are unimportant. To the contrary, enforceable governance 
mechanisms are vital. But sharing every last detail with potential donors may not be the 
best way to protect their overall interests).'*'^  
Power and justice in bioethics 
A frequent criticism of biomedical ethics is that it pays insufficient attention to issues of 
power and justice. Again, Flyvbjerg's framework is a reminder of the need to look more 
closely and more explicitly at communication and power within the NCCGP study. The 
actual power relationships in NCCGP (or in developments such as the UK Biobank) do 
not just lie with the researchers but with potential donors too, particularly the power to 
Of course technically speaking, in the UK GPs are not 'doctors' in the strict sense of the word unless 
they have gone on to complete an MD. 
O'Neill, 2002, p. 160. 
"'^  For more on this, see O'Neill, 2002, pp. 145-164. 
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withhold their samples. In the study of the database, it would have been useful to try and 
identify the power relationships that exist, for example, throughout the wider community 
within which NCCGP operates (such as, within the West Cumbria community itself and 
within the local press and media networks) and also within the NCCGP researchers' 
wider professional community and in the funding systems for the research itself 
One way of understanding the power relations is to get closer to the actual 
communication between the researchers and the potential donors (as well as between the 
potential donors and their wider community) in order to evaluate the communicative 
processes that take place. What versions do the various parties seek to present of 
themselves during the request for samples? (This would be especially interesting, 
perhaps, for those cases in which women refused to donate). Does the antenatal setting 
for consent produce an unequal power relationship between those asking for the consent 
(or interestingly in medical parlance, those 'taking the consents') and those giving it, the 
pregnant women? How power relations operate and in what directions requires 
clarification, particularly in relation to informed consent. One weakness of the study was 
that I did not gain access to the actual settings in which the NCCGP requests for donation 
were made or to the settings where consent was actually given (or was considered to have 
been given). Whilst vital to understanding the process referred to as 'informed consent', 
actual observation of that process was not allowed on the grounds of patient 
confidentiality. Thus, a concern for ethical practice acted as a barrier to research on 
ethics.'*^* 
Another critical area related to issues of power and justice was alluded to in Chapter Six 
- the 'silent' voices of children who had donated to the NCCGP through the proxy 
consent of their mothers. As interviews showed, many parents claimed that they probably 
would not remember to tell their children about their donation. In addition, the NCCGP 
A topic not addressed in my thesis is the ethics of social science research itself - although I have worked 
on this as part of my PEALS position and the recent ESRC consultations to develop national social science 
ethics guidelines. A useful piece related to this is C. Bosk, 2001. Irony, Ethnography and Informed 
Consent. In Hofftnaster, pp. 199-220. Bosk argues that it is impossible to do hospital or lab based 
ethnography without violating informed consent and breaking promises about confidentiality. He argues 
that as strangers come and go, you cannot break the flow of interaction to tell each newcomer they've just 
entered a 'research zone' and ask them for their informed consent. 
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team has not yet decided how or even if they will re-contact donors once they reach the 
age of sixteen. It has been said that biomedical ethics is 'adult-centric', and the evidence 
largely supports this claim.'*'^ Only very recently have researchers attempted to engage 
with children's views despite the fact that children have been used in medical 
experiments since (in all likelihood) the dawn of medical experimentation. 
In recent study of epidemiological donors, the EPEG project (standing for Ethical 
Protection in Epidemiological Genetic Research: Participants' Perspectives) highlighted 
several relevant themes for the issues of power, control and justice.''^^ Their findings 
support many conclusions of the Cumbria biobank study, but also had the added element 
of interviewing children who had donated material to a genetics project. Interestingly, the 
EPEG team found that parents and their children had different views on what constituted 
personal information. (This is important since the reader will recall that in 
epidemiological studies, health and lifestyle questionnaires must be completed). Children 
attached significance to information that they perceived to be potentially embarrassing or 
uncomfortable, whilst parents incorrectly assumed that their child's views of what was 
personal would not conflict with their own. Parents identified financial information, 
medical history, contact details and sexual past as sensitive information. Children viewed 
private information as that having to do with friendships, parental relations, being bullied 
or hurt, feelings/emotions, and body image. Such findings, the authors argue, question the 
adequacy of proxy consent in epidemiological studies because of the 'transitory' nature 
of childhood.'*^' The goal of consent, as everyone claims, is to minimise harm. Yet 
'protecting children from harm they may not fully appreciate does not explain why the 
concerns which children do identify are not taken seriously.'"^^ As one author puts it, 
'Inquiry about matters related to health clearly intrude on one's privacy. Control over 
knowledge about oneself and particularly about one's body is basic to respect for the 
P. Alderson, 2002. Utopia or dystopia? The new genetics as an environment for childhood. In M GoUop 
and J. McComiick eds., Children and Young People's Environments. Dunedin: Children's Issues Centre, p. 
10. 
E . Williamson, T. Goodenough, J. Kent, and R. Ashcroft, 2004. Children's Participation in Genetic 
Epidemiology: Consent and Control. In Tutton and Corrigan, p. 139-160. 
Williamson, et al, 2004, p. 157. 
Williamson, etal, 2004, p. 157. ^ 
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person and is often constitutionally protected. Young people, with their growing wish for 
self-determination, are particularly sensitive to infringements of privacy, and may 
strongly object to others learning particulars about their personal lives or behaviour. Loss 
of control over such information, whether through compelled disclosure or breach of 
confidentiality, subjects many young individuals to embarrassment and degradation.'''^^ 
Thus, in epidemiological ethics, power relations within families, as well as between 
families and researchers, deserves fixrther attention to ensure that mechanisms designed to 
protect children do not end up inadvertently harming them, psychologically or otherwise. 
Even aside from epidemiology, I wish to assert that justice is an overlooked and 
undervalued concept in bioethics generally. Despite being one of the four principles laid 
out by Beauchamp and Childress, many observers argue that justice has not received its 
proper due. For example, Alastair Campbell writes that 'on the topic of justice, bioethics 
has been at its weakest and most unclear. Yet, in terms of overall human welfare, it surely 
must be the most important topic of all.''*^* Campbell traces the slow increase of interest 
injustice in the Congresses of the International Association of Bioethics (LAB). He notes 
that global health inequalities and poor health services in developing countries has only 
recently emerged onto the bioethical agenda and even then has not received enough 
attention. In part, Campbell believes that this is because bioethics lacks the conceptual 
tools and theories to address health issues in an era of globalisation. 
Earlier in the thesis I noted that throughout the history of medical ethics (excluding 
original trends in bioethics, as the LMG study showed) much focus has been on 
physician-patient relations rather than on societal issues - thus, in the face of genetic 
medicine and economic globalisation, we see academics and practitioners struggling to 
find a language and vocabulary to meet the ethical demands of a changed context. In her 
address to the Sixth Annual LAB Congress, Solomon Benatar also noted that traditional 
bioethics, to the extent that it addressed power, did so through the lens of the doctor-
S. Leikin, 1996. Ethical Issues in Epidemiological Research with Children. In S. Coughlin and T. 
Beauchamp eds., Ethics and Epidemiology. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 209. 
A. Campbell, 2003. Secularised Bioethics and the Passion of Religion. New Review of Bioethics 1: 124 
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patient relationship. Benatar's article (originally delivered as the lAB Presidential 
address) makes a number of useful points and directs the way towards a bioethic that 
incorporates power. In what I suspect was a deliberate attempt to provoke, she writes that 
'we live in a morally depraved world, one that promotes preference for continuing 
economic growth and the acquisition of luxuries for a small proportion of the world's 
population over ensuring the production and access to essential subsistence requirements 
for the majority.'"" 
Nowhere are these issues more pressing than in the developing world. Benatar's 
argument that medical research agendas are determined by markets in developed 
countries rather than by health needs in the developing world is hard to dispute.''^ ^ For 
example, between 1975 and 1999, only 1% of new drugs produced by the pharmaceutical 
market were for tropical diseases and tuberculosis, illnesses which account for 12% of the 
global disease burden.**^ ^ Nearly 80% of investments in the year 2000 and DNA patents 
in genomics in the period between 1980-1993 were held in the United States alone, the 
so-called birthplace of bioethics.'*^^ This trend has been exacerbated by commercial 
genomics, whose bottom line is, all too often, the bottom line.'^^' It would take a brave 
bioethicist to deny this, which, quite possibly, is why bioethics remains so deafeningly 
silent on the topic.'*^^ 
Of course, to be fair, some international bodies have stressed the importance of justice, 
solidarity and equity in medical research. The Human Genome Organization, for 
S. Benatar, 2003. Bioethics: Power and Injustice: lAB Presidential Address. Bioethics 17, p. 391. 
Although Benatar does not explicitly make the point, one can easily argue that addressing the power 
imbalance in global health is in the long term interest of the affluent. The connection, for example, between 
disease, security, migration, and political instability has been well documented. See M. Whong-Barr, 2003. 
Singer's world: Review of Peter Singer's One world: the ethics of globalization. International Studies 
Review 5: 406-408. 
Global Forum for Health Research, 10/90 Report on Health Research 2003-2004. See 
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/pages/index.asp 
Editorials, 2002. Genomics and Global Health: Hype, reality, and a call for action in the developing 
world and developed world. British Medical Journal 324: 1051-1052. 
L. S. Cahill. 2003. Biotech and Justice: Catching up with the Real World Order. Hastings Center Report 
33: 34-44. 
The exceptions prove the rule, I think. For one exception, see: J. Floury and P. Kitcher, 2004. Global 
Health and the Scientific Research Agenda. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32: 36-65. 
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instance, claims that 'justice is a central issue' in genomics''^ V Yet, in practice, justice is 
hard to achieve due to differing socio-economic, cultural and political contexts and the 
lack of enforceable global regulations. Some individual bioethicists have also begun to 
shift away from frameworks of autonomy to values of solidarity and the common 
good.'*^^  Whilst I support such moves, I also think a true shift in consciousness is 
extraordinarily hard to achieve. Flybvjerg quotes Paul Valery as saying that 'long years 
must pass before the truths we have made for ourselves become our very flesh.'''^'' 
Unfortunately, attempts to theorise a new social contract will always run into the realities 
of local context and power imbalance. Arthur Kleinman writes that 
'Beneficent social contracts make good philosophical theory, but they deny empirical 
evidence in local social worlds ... real communities are sources of suffering at least as 
much as of assistance. They do not contain explicit social confracts, but they are filled 
with different interests, status division, class divisions, ethnic conflicts, and 
factionalism.'''^'' 
In India, for example, a key issue regarding justice is gender discrimination. Although 
existing laws prohibit sex selection, many in-vitro fertilization (FVF) clinics have been 
accused of screening embryos to select for males. The 2001 Census showed that the child 
sex ratio in the age group of 0 to 6 dropped from 962 females per 1000 males in 1981, to 
927 females per 1000 males in 2001''^^. Thus, rather than empowering women, it seems 
that India's 1971 Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act has led to increased gender 
discrimination since the abortion of female foetuses is often the result of greater genetic 
knowledge. In pre-arranged marriages, families are increasingly seeking information on a 
potential spouse's pre-disposition to genetic disease. In effect, this makes some women 
unmarriageable or puts them at risk of harm i f they give birth to a disabled child. While 
justice is frequently cited in official Indian guidelines, in practice, reproduction takes 
HUGO, 2002. Statement on Human Genomic Databases. 
See for example, Chadwick and Berg, 2001. 
Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 141. 
A. Kleinman, 1995. Writing at the Margin: Discourse between Anthropology and Medicine. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p. 48. 
••^  Census of India 2001. Provisional Population Totals (0-6). 
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place in a context of unequal power relations.^ ^^ In addition, the lack of effective 
regulation of IVF clinics provides a resource for India's growing stem cell research. Such 
research, however, is in tension with other urgent health needs such as 'vaccines, drugs, 
and clean water''*^ .^ Again, these topics rarely see the light of day in mainstream bioethics 
literature. But their effects are felt beyond India given the reality of economic, scientific 
and political globalization. 
The effects of a globalising world brings new importance to the concept of soft power 
(described in the previous chapter as the power of culture, finance, or ideas) for bioethics. 
Bioethics would do well to study the effects of power relations in international public 
health since these type of studies would expose the roots of corruption and the practices 
of marginalisation that contribute to and help sustain health inequalities. 
Although Carl Elliot does not explicitly mention the term 'soft power', the phrase also 
neatly captures his well known attempts to implicate bioethics in the business of big 
business. Elliot believes that bioethics is in danger of becoming a 'medically 
knowledgable, media savvy, academic-corporate wing of the advice industry' 
Following the critiques of others, Elliot writes that bioethics suffers from 'intellectual 
arrogance and moral weakness'.''^ ^ For example, 
'Commenting on the testimony of a bioethics expert witness in Florida, a district judge 
wrote: "His testimony was often very abstract, describing such things as the 
"metaphysical" and "epistemological" issues associated with a "post Kantian world'". 
The judge went on to classify the bioethicist's remarks as "harmless error", noting: "It is 
not surprising that all of the lawyers essentially ignored this testimony during the closing 
arguments".''*'*'^  
"'^ Indian Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Science/Technology, 2002. Ethical Policies on the 
Human Genome, Genetic Research and Services. 
R. Lakshmi, 28 August 2001. India Plans to Fill Void in Stem Cell Research. The Washington Post; 
Page A07. 
C. Ellliot, 2002. Diary. London Review of Books, 28 November, p. 37. 
ElHot, 2002, p. 36. 
^ Elliot, 2002, p. 36. 
178 
I f such abstractions were not bad enough, however, Elliot's real problem with bioethics is 
its with alliance with business and its pandering to science. He approvingly quotes 
Francis Fukuyama as saying, that the 'most permissive position' of anyone discussing 
ethical issues in medicine, is usually the 'professional bioethicist'.'*'*' (One must wonder 
i f this is the reason why there are so few bioethicists on President Bush's Council on 
Bioethics?). One cause of such pandering, Elliot believes, is the nature to which bioethics 
relies on medical and commercial funding. 
A key problem for bioethicists is the extent to which their public acceptability (especially 
in the US, it must be said) has led to a financial conflict of interest. This is because the 
pharmaceutical industry seeks out ethicists (who are all too willing, of course) to advise 
them as pseudo-regulators. This allows drugs companies to promote their public image as 
being ethically sensitive - but all the while, they are paying handsome consultation fees 
to those who are supposed to be giving them impartial ethical guidance. 'Once 
bioethicists begin to take money from the corporations whose actions and policies they 
are supposed to be judging, it is no longer clear that their moral judgement on those 
actions and policies can be trusted in the same way.''*'*^ 
From my limited experience in bioethics, Elliot's critique rings true. The problem is not 
just as he identifies, but that ethics centres rely on the medical establishment (including 
pharmaceutical companies) for access to clinical settings in which to conduct their 
research. One published article that is perceived as being too critical of the practitioners 
in question, and the researcher must go looking elsewhere for a site to study and for 
patients to interview. (As Elliot puts it on a slightly different topic, ' I only know that I 
have never read an industry-funded ethics article that is critical of the industry that funds 
it ' .^^) In addition, with the marketisation of academia, medical ethicists are sometimes 
reliant on commercial funds for the very buildings in which they work. For instance, 
^' EUiot, 2002, p. 36. 
C. Elliott, 2004. Six problems with pharma-funded bioethics. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35: 125-129. The issue of this journal also contains responses 
to Elliot defending bioethics against his charges. Whilst contributors nearly all agree with his diagnosis, 
they also assert that bioethics is not a unitary field and that their experience in moral reasoning can often 
help companies negotiate ethical quandaries. 
Elliot, 2002, p. 37. 
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SmithKline Beecham recently gave Stanford University $1 million to start a new program 
in ethics and genetics.'*'*'* Increasingly, commercial funds are needed i f universities are to 
secure high quality faculty, facilities, financial scholarships, and research grants. Whilst 
this trend is prevalent in fields other than just bioethics, it is arguably the case that 
bioethics is particularly susceptible to business influence given its associations with the 
medical and scientific establishment. 
For example, one is reminded of two recent cases in which industry withdrew funds 
because of published material it did not agree with. David Healy, a psychiatrist based in 
Wales, recently published a piece in the Hastings Center Report which was critical of the 
anti-depressant drug Prozac, made by Eli Lilly & Company.'*'*^  As a direct result of the 
article, Eli Lilly suspended a $25,000 grant to the Hastings Center and Healy's new 
appointment at the University of Toronto was revoked. An even worse case was that of 
Nancy Olivieri, who lost her post at the University of Toronto (perhaps I've confused the 
nature of causation here?) after showing that a drug made by the pharmaceutical 
company Apotex caused harmful side effects.'*'*^ Apotex, it seems, was close to making a 
$12.7 million donation to the university and was clearly threatened by Oliveri's intention 
to publish her results. After an acrimonious investigation, she was re-appointed but by 
then, in my view, the game had clearly been given away. 
Understanding how bioethics is embedded in cultural values may help to explain why it 
mirrors rather than challenges society and has remained relatively inattentive to issues of 
power and justice. The work of Renee Fox and Carl Elliot is useful in establishing how 
bioethics is embedded in and limited by a narrow range of concepts, norms and cultural 
values. But the question remains as to the historical reasons for bioethics' silence on 
these topics. This is where a critical and effective history may prove valuable. 
Towards a genealogy of biomedical ethics 
S. Stolberg, 2001. Bioethicists find themselves the ones being criticised. New York Times online 2 
August. Available at: www.nytimes.com 
D. Healy, 2000. Good Science or Good Business? Hastings Center Report 30: 19-22. 
R. Horton, 2004. The Dawn of McScience. New York Review of Books 11 March, pp. 7-9. 
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Perhaps it is a bit late in the day to be introducing the work of another thinker. However, 
the thought of Gerald McKenny is where my PhD study began five years ago so it is 
fitting that it is where it should also (begin to) draw to a close.'*'*' Thus, in this section I 
aim to bring the thesis full circle by re-visiting the history of biomedical ethics. In 
Chapters Two and Three, I presented a rather standard version of the development of 
biomedical ethics. With the exception of my research on the London Medical Group, 
much of my thinking and writing in those chapters relied on fairly conventional and 
received views. I argued that bioethics began when medicine ceased to be able to regulate 
its own affairs. I sympathised with those accounts that connected the emergence of the 
field within the context of the civil and social rights movements of the 1960s. Yet this 
can hardly be the whole story. Here, in line with my sketch of a phronetic bioethic, I aim 
to show how the history and historiography of biomedical ethics may be re-drawn. 
McKenny's work is important because he is one of the few authors to bring a 
genealogical perspective to bear on bioethics - although this is not his real aim.'*'*^  Rather, 
his book develops a Christian bioethic grounded in the body and redemption of Christ. In 
laying the groundwork for his Christian rendition, however, McKenny outlines a fairly 
complex but insightful explanation of why biomedical ethics has been so successful and 
yet such a failure. 
According to McKenny, there exists a deep but implicit moral agreement between 
bioethics and the effort to overcome human subjection to fate or natural necessity. He 
writes that Western society has developed an obsession with bodily perfection, an 
obsession dangerously linked to a moral imperative to eliminate suffering and expand the 
realm of human choice. Modem medicine, with its ability to intervene into the body, 
continually holds out the promise of fulfilling this imperative. 
G. McKenny, 1997. To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics. Technology, and the Body. New York: 
SUNY. Having originally been accepted to do a PhD in theology, I defected to philosophy since I was not 
eager to write about Christianity or the narrative of Christ. Yet I am grateful to Robert Song for drawing 
this book, which formed much of my early thought about the history of biomedical ethics, to my attention. 
But see also: N. Rose, 1994. Medicine, history and the present. In R. Porter and C. Jones, eds.. 
Reassessing Foucault. London: Routledge, pp. 48-72. 
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Not surprisingly, McKenny disputes most standard models of the history of bioethics. 
One model, the reader will recall, asserts that bioethics was a product of new 
technological developments that made the field necessary in the face of obsolete medical 
traditions. Technology, this story goes, has made it possible to intervene into natural 
processes in ways that religious and medical traditions never anticipated, producing 
moral dilemmas which those traditions were not capable of resolving. As a result, society 
was forced to make moral choices that required a new approach. Hence, a philosophically 
grounded bioethics became necessary and replaced the older traditions with a core of 
common, secular principles. A second model held that the bioethics movement originated 
with an 'outsider' ethic, characterized by general principles and rules, that were able to 
replace a traditional 'bedside ethic' (an anecdotal case ethic taught largely by example, 
such as in John Gregory's Lectures). Allied to this account was a third model stressing 
the role of the rights movements of the 1960s in pushing medicine to be more transparent 
in its decision making and priority setting. 
McKenny argues that it is in the interests of bioethics to find its origins in these cultural 
and political needs. ' I f technology presents moral problems that standard bioethics alone 
can resolve or i f standard bioethics can claim a public moral authority that traditional 
moral schemes have lost, then as long as technology and contested moral authority are 
inevitable features of our culture, the agenda of standard bioethics - the questions, the 
range of concerns, and moral issues it addresses - would be rationally vindicated.'^''^ 
McKenny the refers to the 1968 Harvard declaration on brain death to show why he 
thinks the received accounts of the origins of bioethics are mistaken. The declaration was 
a response to moral difficulties created by the ability to sustain respiratory functions 
through mechanical ventilation. On the surface, the Harvard declaration appears to 
support the view that technology created an unprecedented problem requiring a novel 
solution. However, McKenny doubts this conclusion on two fi"onts. First, he argues that 
rabbinic Judaism arrived at a similar position on 'brain death' without recourse to the 
tools and principles of secular bioethics. In other words, traditional moral and religious 
McKenny, 1997, p. 10. 
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systems were just as capable of reaching insights to problems posed by technological 
medicine as bioethics, despite the latter's attempts to push traditional systems to the 
margins of the bioethical discourse. McKenny claims that however novel problems seem, 
they are often not as 'unprecedented' as claimed. Concern about how to define death has 
a long history in medicine and religion. The same can be said for many other issues such 
as euthanasia, abortion, and eugenics. Secondly, McKenny notes that continuing 
controversies over the definition of brain death show how impossible it is to generate 
moral principles and apply them to cases without involving oneself in deeply held 
cultural or religious beliefs and practices. His overall point is that while technology has 
been a major factor in medicine and ethics, the 'reign of technology' does not necessarily 
require 'the reign of standard bioethics.''*^'' 
McKenny argues that the degree to which bioethicists cling to claims of a common 
morality is indicative of a modem anxiety regarding an actual lack of moral agreement in 
an era of diversity. According to proponents of standard bioethics, a secular rationality 
supplies moral unity where religion failed. However, McKenny believes that bioethics 
fails in its attempt to arrive at a morality that is substantive enough to resolve moral 
disagreements, yet common enough to compel the rational agreement of all. In other 
words, it fails to resolve the crisis of moral authority on its own terms: through shared 
reason. Yet the question clearly remains: why do so many professionals and lay people 
still find bioethics compelling? McKenny argues that it has little to do with its alleged 
rational authority and much to do with its success in articulating and supporting certain 
modem moral convictions. He asserts that the deeper roots of the crisis of moral authority 
involve the loss of tradition in the West. 'The loss of tradition means the loss of a certain 
moral discourse — one that places the pursuit of health in the context of a pursuit of a 
good life within limits set by fate or necessity ~ and its replacement by a new moral 
discourse ~ one that is dedicated to overcoming the human subjection to natural 
necessity. This places the narrative of the origin of bioethics squarely within a narrative 
of the emergence of modem moral theories.'"^' 
McKenny, 1997, p. 12. 
McKenny, 1997, p. 15^  
183 
The loss of a religious tradition means that society has lost a way to describe how bodily 
health is related to the ends and goals of life, and a way to understand how suffering 
thwarted or helped one to realize those ends. Previously, when technology brought new 
areas of life under medical intervention, both the goals themselves and certain norms and 
prohibitions within the tradition would question the continual pursuit of health and the 
means by which it was pursued. Specifically, McKenny is concerned that we have lost 
the tradition of medicine as an art (or techne, one could say). Medicine as an art requires 
not just general knowledge of excellent bodily fiinctioning but also awareness of the 
relation of this fiinctioning to the capacities and roles of each particular patient and the 
limits of restoring excellent bodily functioning for that particular person. McKenny 
believes that religious and medical traditions helped human beings accept that they were 
destined to suffer disease and eventually die. Yet today, he argues, health seems to have 
become an end in itself rather than a component of a virtuous life. The wisdom of 
learning the limits of healing have given way to Bacon's assertion that no disease is 
incurable and medical knowledge is to be dedicated to the prolongation of life. Finally, 
the loss of tradition seems to bring with it a loss of limits as to what can be done to the 
body in the name of curing suffering. 
Unquestioned commitments to technological control of the body for the sake of 
eliminating misery constitute what McKenny calls the 'Baconian project' - that is, a 
project 'to relieve the human condition of subjection to the whims of fortune or the bonds 
of necessity.''*^^ According to McKenny, medicine is Utopian to the extent that its task in 
the modem era seems to be to indefinitely expand our choices and end suffering, thus 
relieving our subjection to fortune and finitude. Given the degree to which medicine 
participates in modem values, McKenny thinks there is a cultural expectation that 
medicine should eliminate whatever people consider a burden or to provide whatever 
anyone might require for one's natural fulfillment. In other words, choice, per se, 
appears at times to be the highest good and to be immune to criticism. This sketch of the 
modem moral discourse makes it possible to identify the major cultural values that both 
McKenny, 1997, p. 19. 
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medicine and bioethics draws on and why the latter is silent on questions regarding the 
proper limits of medical science - or to cite Fukuyama, why bioethicists are so 
'permissive'. 
McKenny asserts that the 'modem moral discourse [which bioethics participates in] 
provides no vocabulary with which to deliberate about the meaning of corporeality, what 
moral purposes the body serves, what goods health should service, or what limits the 
control of our bodies by technology should observe. Hence, it allows for no discussion of 
what kinds of suffering should be eliminated, what kinds of choices human beings should 
make, and what role technology should play in all of this.''*" 
According to McKenny, any challenge to the agenda of bioethics is difficult to undertake 
because the 'reign of technology' is not neutral but rather expresses and is produced buy 
the deepest moral commitments of our time: to relieve the human condition and expand 
our self-determination. Modem technology does not render traditional moralities 
obsolete, or call for a new morality so much as it expresses and carries out an existing 
modem morality. In short, technology is infiised with moral purpose - which makes 
questioning it inherently difficult. 
McKenny draws upon the philosophy of Charles Taylor to show the historical sources of 
why certain moral convictions are attractive or worthy to those who adopt them. His 
historical explanations are schematic at best and can be faulted on any number of grounds 
for the leaps, bounds and assumptions that it makes. Yet it carries immense intuitive 
appeal. In stressing the modem drive to eliminate suffering, McKenny outlines the 
project of Francis Bacon who sought the development of a scientific method that would 
benefit the condition of humanity. Bacon's philosophy, as is well known, adopted the 
view that humanity could be liberated from disease, toil, and suffering through the 
control and domination of nature. This instrumental view of nature received theological 
support from the conviction that God had ordered nature for the enhancement of human 
life. It also took a secular bent with the Enlightenment, utilitarian philosophy of Bentham 
""McKenny, 1997,p.21. 
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and Mil l , who developed the idea that the prevention of pain was intrinsically good. As 
Taylor argues, this created a new standard by which to judge moral, legal and religious 
orders: do they lessen or increase suffering in the world?''^ '* Unsurprisingly, this new 
moral agenda coincided with a decrease in the belief of divine providence. By combining 
a mechanistic approach to nature with a loss of a religious explanation of suffering, the 
latter became not only avoidable but something that human beings had the responsibility 
and means to end. The second current contributing to our moral discourse concerns what 
Taylor refers to as 'inwardness.'"*'^  The roots of this idea run through Augustine (the 
belief that self-affirmation was achieved through a Trinitarian God) to the Romantics (the 
importance of meeting one's own natural fulfilment) to Kantian philosophy (in the form 
of self-determination and autonomy). In the last century, autonomy became equated with 
rights of entitlement and immunity.'*'^ 
According to McKenny, 
'In the modem discourse, moral convictions about the place of illness and health in a 
morally worthy life are replaced by moral convictions about the relief of suffering and the 
expansion of choice, concepts of nature as ordered by a telos or governed by providence 
are replaced by concepts of nature as a neutral instrument that is brought into the realm of 
human ends by technology, and the body as an object of spriritual [sic] and moral 
practices is replaced by the body as object of practices of technological control.''*''' 
I have dwelled at length on McKenny. The essence of his argument, to me, is the insight 
that the prevailing moral discourse leaves us without a framework or vocabulary to 
deliberate on the role and limits of medicine and technology. One reason his version has 
intuitive appeal is because of my study of the Cumbrian DNA bank. Many interviewees 
"'"C. Taylor, 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 331. 
McKenny, 1997, pp. 111-207. 
"'^McKenny's account no doubt misses many elements of this phenomena. It may be worthwhile, for 
example, to connect the right to entitlements with the rise of the nation-state and the expansion of self-
choice with the growth of market economies. McKenny does neither, however - again, his model is highly 
schematic, a fact that he readily acknowledges. 
^"McKenny, 1997,p.21. 
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expressed a desire to 'help' medical research. Although none of the donors put it in such 
terms, I often got the sense that there was a 'research imperative' at play in their 
accounts. In other words, the sentiment amongst donors seemed to be that 'science needs 
to advance' and 'any research or testing that could be done can only be beneficial.' 
(M067; M003). Cmcially, along side this imperative, was a distinct feeling of 'why have 
a disabled child i f you don't have to?' (M006). One woman expressed this view in the 
following way: 
'It sounds awful but she [a disabled relative] is going to have a hell of life basically. She 
has got a lot of problems now but she is going to have a hell of a lot more before she gets 
older and as I say with genetics it could have been avoided, you know with tests. 
Although some people argue that it is God's will isn't it, but you know i f you believe that, 
it's hard on the parents, it's hard on the children.' (M006) 
In my own experience, I have absolutely no doubt that it would be hard - extraordinarily 
so. To me, that is precisely the point. We've lost the resources to make sense of our 
vulnerability. At the same time, we've developed powerful new resources to fool us into 
thinking that we never should have been vulnerable in the first place. 
Of course McKenny's claim regarding bioethics' inability to question the use and limits 
of technology has been made by many others (though few in bioethics, at least, have 
attempted to trace the historical reasons for it)."*^* Daniel Callahan, for example, writes 
that bioethics task ought to be to determine 'what is right and wrong, good and bad, about 
the scientific developments and technological deployments in medicine.'"^^ He argues 
that the decline of religious input in bioethics has led to a 'paucity of concepts, a thin 
imagination and the ignorance of traditions, practices' and alternative forms of moral 
analysis. According to Callahan, bioethics was meant to be grounded in a broad 
examination of all the larger problems of the meaning and purpose of human life and 
religion helped us think about those meanings. Yet one can search in vain in the bioethics 
I am all too painfully aware that I've ignored the growing literature on the philosophy of technology. I 
shall touch on this in the Conclusion. 
Callahan, 1999, p. 276; p. 280. 
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literature for any real effort to connect questions of meaning to questions of ethics. 
Instead, these questions take second place to regulatory matters and individual 
preferences and choice. To make this point, Callahan relates a popular joke amongst 
analytical philosophers: 'Life has no meaning. Only propositions do'. 
Following on from my presentation of genealogy in the previous chapter, my argument 
here is that the growth of the bioethical discourse has brought with it a certain range of 
norms of reasoning, moral concepts and categories that have re-placed and marginalised 
earlier discourses and ways of relating the medicine and the body to moral life goals. As 
a consequence, the secularity of bioethics masks many essential issues and contributes to 
a tendency to define certain ideas and concerns as outside its orbit. While each decade a 
new series of problems arise, little effort is spent on the underlying social structures or 
priorities that cause such issues to arise in the first place. 
Let me put this another way: historical work into biomedical ethics ought to extend 
beyond mere description and narrative to a critical evaluation of the wider social and 
cultural context, including the deep historical and contingent trends that have made us 
what we are today. The history of bioethics needs to be embodied. It must involve an 
understanding of some of the causal factors - the attitudes, beliefs, and existential 
commitments, as well as medical, scientific and commercial pressures - which have 
governed developments not only in ethics, but crucially in medicine and technology, as 
well.'*^ Such a history would be what Foucault called a 'curative science' ~ a way of re-
covering some of the costs and losses involved in framing the bioethical agenda as we 
have done.''^' It would be a proper genealogy and it would be phronetic in that it would 
focus on what is variable in human affairs. Crucially, it would also be aimed at praxis. 
In some ways, my own history of the London Medical Group was as far from 
genealogical as one could get. That is, I wrote a straight forward old fashioned oral 
history narrative. But a descriptive account, as I have provided, can only be the start. 
R. Song, 2002. Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future. Darton, Longman and Todd. 
Foucault, 1998, p. 382. 
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There is also a need for a history of bioethics that extends beyond a traditional narrative 
account of the great men and great events that have defined the discipline. Important as 
they are, such narratives primarily offer grist for the mill of critical analysis. 
Unfortunately there has yet to be a history of medical ethics that refuses the 
ethics/medical divide: the idea that somehow the social/ethical are distinct and can be 
studied separately fi-om the biological/technological. Both, in fact, are part of larger 
processes and larger histories, which shape and mutually influence each other. Medical 
technology itself is a result of various social processes of 'emotion, communication and 
cultural valuation' - it is not a 'caricatured and one dimensional bogeyman, an assumed 
culprit imposed upon, [but] not of society.''*" 
When, for example, the emphasis in medical ethics education is on what to do, there is 
less room for critical analysis, which seeks to explore the historical constitution of the 
systems of knowledge that both define ethical problems and offer 'solutions' to those 
same problems. The field of bioethics may benefit i f fiirther work into its history begins 
to understand some of the ways in which ethics and science are both embedded in socio-
political practices - practices that are so obvious and seemingly necessary, that we forget, 
they too, have a history. 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that: 
• One way to make sense of NCCGP donors' apparent inability to elaborately 
discuss and justify their donations is by viewing their actions in light of phronesis, 
that is practical reasoning in a particular context. Viewed in this way, people 
possess expert knowledge over their own lives and over their own bodies. 
Additional data fi'om very recent studies of genetic donation seems to confirm the 
notion that many people are content to donate without knowing much detail 
regarding the nature of the project they are donating to. Rather then viewing this 
""^  G. Belkin, 2002. Review of Hofftnaster. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 57: 373-
375. 
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as ignorance or apathy, it seems that people have clear ideas - intuitive notions -
of right and wrong and need not ponder endlessly or pour eternally over detailed 
informed consent documents. A phronetic bioethic would recognise the embedded 
nature of moral reasoning and that it cannot separate from people's life stories and 
institutional, local, national and even international context. It would refrain from 
unfounded claims regarding people's motives in donating tissue samples or the 
importance attached to informed consent. 
Power (and to a lesser extent justice) is notoriously undervalued in bioethics. 
Taking these notions seriously would lead to a bioethics that gave as much 
consideration to the plight of people in the developing world as it did to people in 
developed countries. A phronetic bioethic would expand its agenda to the less 
well-off, to the hidden connections between research into obesity in America and 
the famines of Africa, or the development of cosmetics for use in Britain and the 
lack of clean water in India. It would look at how the embedded nature of 
bioethics into systems of finance, power and knowledge blinds the field from 
seriously critiquing the unrealistic expectations people have of technological 
medicine and how ethics participates and contributes to those false expectations. 
A critical and effective history would use the tools of genealogy to write a 
strategic history of the field, looking at underlying assumptions, structures, and 
mechanisms which have made the bioethical phenomenon possible. It would 
examine the ethics of technology itself, and the cultural desire for perfection, as 
well as the loss of traditions which previously provided a framework that enabled 
us to make sense of loss and vulnerability. 
In short, I advocate a bioethics that mirrors the diversity and complexity of lived reality. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion: why baseball is integral to bioethics 
Jacques Barzun once remarked that if you want to understand America, you must first 
understand baseball. There is some truth to that remark - some truth about baseball, to 
be sure, but also some truth about how American concepts, and American problems, are 
inseparable fi-om their broader cultural context. For instance, non-Americans 
occasionally find it difficult to understand all the fiiror over the "right to die " debate in 
America, and the vehemence with which it is sometimes argued. Why would anyone want 
to continue treating a patient in a persistent vegetative state with virtually no chance for 
recovery? Ah well, I usually explain, you must also understand how the right to die is 
related to the right to life, and to the debate over abortion, and to American churches and 
to the role of the church in small-town life; you must also understand something about 
American hospitals and feminism and libertarianism and fundamentalism and natural 
rights and John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, and so on and so on, ad infinitum. To 
understand America, I explain, you must first understand baseball. '"'^ 
- Carl Elliot 
Like baseball, bioethics is entwined into the fabric of life.''^'* I have examined the history 
and philosophy of biomedical ethics and its limits according to the social sciences. I have 
spent sixteen months testing a particular case against competing claims. I have then 
returned to the questions 'what is bioethics' and 'what is bioethics not?' and struggled to 
forge a conception of the field that could take better account of its own epistemological 
and methodological assumptions. In the process, I have left much unsaid. 
In the Introduction I mentioned that one of the costs of my broad stroke approach to this 
topic was that I touched on many issues without exploring them in depth. For instance, a 
solid reading of phenomenology and the philosophy of technology are not where the bulk 
C. Elliot, 1999, p. 157. 
Elliot, 1999, p. 157. 
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of my investigation took me but, it seems, this is where it has left me. Paradoxically, both 
are peripheral to biomedical ethics per se, and yet, I've discovered both are central to it as 
well. Both are relevant in that one cannot divorce questions of ethics from these larger 
'background practices.' Yet such is the rapid growth of bioethical literature (both clinical 
and research) that one can easily get away with calling themselves an ethicist whilst 
having never opened Husserl or Heidegger. 
Another area that I am cognisant of ignoring is the normative assumptions built into the 
social sciences. Although I have said very little in this regard, it is not because I think 
sociology or ethnography somehow stand apart. To assert this would run against the grain 
of everything I have tried to articulate. The moral convictions and assumptions of the 
social sciences (i.e. about the nature of the subject, or relationships, or society) are as 
embedded as the assumptions of bioethics - or as my own for that matter. 
Finally, I have said too little about the utility of theory. Charles Bosk writes that 'there 
are not many areas where we equate theoretical and practical wisdom ... the idea that 
moral theory can be used to solve practical problems cuts against so many beliefs 
prevalent in the medical, academic, or larger political culture that we might wonder about 
its centrality to the bioethics enterprise'.Whilst I am generally sympathetic to this line 
of thinking, I also believe that bioethicists should not entirely dismiss theory. Thus, a 
central plank of my fiiture research agenda is to think through and better articulate the 
relationship between theory and context, principles and practice. 
And on that note, I draw to a close a study whose cenfral task, I fear, has been a crude 
attempt to kick bioethics in the assumptions. 
465 C. Bosk, 1999. Professional Ethicist Available: Logical, Secular, Friendly. Daedelus 128: 55. 
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Appendix I 
A Study of Participation and Non Participation in the North Cumbria Community 
Genetics Project, October 2001 to February 2003. 
A project grant funded by the Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Division 
In September 2001 I attended a Wellcome Trust sponsored summer school on 'Genetics 
and Society'. In anticipation of establishing UK Biobank, the Trust was keen to 
encourage research into population-based sample collections. As part of the summer 
school, I developed some initial ideas for a study of the NCCGP and formally presented 
those ideas to summer school participants and tutors. 
Since I lacked an academic post or the skills to obtain fixnding, I sought out Professor 
Erica Haimes (Newcastle) to work with on the application. Though the initial idea for the 
grant was my own, I could not have served as principal investigator or even co-applicant 
since I did not have an academic post. Nor would I have been able to secure the funding 
with out the experience of Haimes. 
The grant began in October 2001 and ran for sixteen months, to February 2003. Haimes 
served as principal applicant, I served as named researcher. My full duties included: 
initiated and co-wrote (with Haimes) successful fimding application 
co-negotiated Local Research Ethics Committee approval (in Whitehaven) 
co-negotiated interviewee recruitment through NHS facilities 
co-developed interview aide-memoirs 
conducted all interviews 
co-analysed interviews (see below for details) 
managed £73,003 budget 
coordinated day to day operations of the project 
co-wrote Final Report 
co-authored all publications 
The interview schedules were devised by both team members in consultation with the 
local research ethics committee and the projects' own advisory group (which consisted of 
Richard Ashcroft, Martin Richards and Angus Clarke). Interviews were transcribed by 
the University of Newcastle Data Preparation Service but all transcripts were re-checked 
by myself for accuracy. Haimes annotated/coded transcripts. I loaded all coded data onto 
NVivo 2.0 software to assist with category building and identifying themes. Both Haimes 
and I had responsibility for analysis, which developed through personal discussions as 
well as national and international conference presentations. 
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Appendix II 
Mothers' Interview Aide-Memoire 
A Study of Participation and Non Participation in the North Cumbria Community 
Genetics Project, October 2001 to February 2003. 
Opening notes: 
Greetings and introduction 
Thanks for helping the project 
Reminder of why project needs their help and is interested in their views, as people who 
have actually been asked to contribute to a genetics database 
Repeat request to tape 
Assurance of privacy and confidentiality regarding all names, addresses and information 
This looks like a huge set of questions but don't worry, I won 7 be asking them all! 
Any questions before we start? 
SECTION 1: 
Demographic information: 
I'd just like to ask you a few general questions about yourself so we have a broad picture 
of those people helping us with the project: 
(Complete the telephone survey questions) 
SECTION 2: DECIDING TO PARTICIPATE OR NOT 
2.1 Being asked to participate: 
OK, now I'd like to ask you a few questions about the genetics project, starting with when 
you first heard about the project. 
When did you first hear about it: was it when you were asked to participate or had you 
heard about it before then? (eg press/tv/ newspapers/leaflets/friends/community 
groups/WI?). 
What had you heard about it before you were asked yourself? 
2. la Do you remember first being asked to take part in the project yourself? 
Who asked you to take part in it? 
When did they ask you to take part? How far into your pregnancy? What was this 
appointment originally for? How did you feel about being asked to take part in the 
genetics project during this appointment? (Appropriate/inappropriate?) (Why?) 
Was it with this most recent baby or for an earlier child? 
2.1b Can you remember what they said? 
What did they say the project was for? 
What did they ask you to do? 
Did they say why they were asking you in particular to donate? 
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Did they say why they needed these? 
What were they going to use them for? 
Overall, can you say what the genetics project was about/was for? 
2. Ic Were you surprised that they asked you to take part or were you expecting it? 
(Why?) 
Do you know why pregnant women in particular were being asked to take part? 
Some people say pregnant women are good people to ask to donate to a genetics project 
because they are having so many tests and screening that one more thing won't make any 
difference; others say they are the worst people to ask, for exactly the same reasons: what 
do you think? 
Did you know why they needed samples from babies? 
2. Id Did you ask any questions about the genetics project? (What? Why were these 
issues important to you?) 
Did you ask any questions about the samples they wanted to take? (What? Why were 
these issues important to you?) 
Who did you ask? 
What were their answers like? (Clear? Confiising? Satisfactory? Led to more questions?). 
Did they help? Did they address your concerns? 
Did you have any other discussions or questions at that first mention of the project? 
2.2 Making the decision to donate or not (most recent baby): 
2.2a Did you decide to take part/refuse there and then, or did you leave it for a bit? 
(Why?) 
Was it an easy decision to make? (Why/why not?) 
Did you feel that you had the option to say 'no'? 
Did you feel under any pressure to say 'yes'? (Why? From whom?) 
Did you feel able to discuss this with them? (Why/why not? What was their response?) 
2.2b Did you want to discuss this with anyone else first? (Why/why not?) 
Did you have the chance and time to do this? (Why/why not?) 
What did you want to discuss? Why? Why were these issues important to you? 
Were you worried about anything? What? Why? 
Who: Did you discuss it with anyone else? Who? Why them in particular? (Why not?) 
Did you discuss it with the baby's father? (Why/why not?) 
What about with your own family - mother, father, siblings etc? (Why/why not?) 
Were there any particular reasons why you chose to discuss it/not to discuss it with these 
people? (What? Why?) 
Was there anyone you wanted to avoid discussing it with? (Why?) 
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Did you know anyone else who had been asked to take part in the genetics project? Did 
you discuss it with them? Did they take part or did they refiise? Do you know why they 
made their decision this way? Did you agree with them? 
2.2c Were these discussions helpful? Why/why not? 
Did they raise any other issues you hadn't thought of? What? How important were these? 
Did the conversations with others influence your decision in any way? How? Why? 
2.2d Was there anyone who influenced your decision particularly strongly? Who? How? 
Why? What did they say? Why was this important? 
2.2e There were some people who publicly opposed the Cumbrian genetics project: did 
you have any contact with them at all? Did they influence your decision in any way? 
How? Why? Have you heard of CORE? Any contact with them? 
2.2f Did you have any fiirther conversations with the antenatal staff 
doctors/nurses/midwives about the project? What about? Was this helpfiil? Did they 
lessen your concerns at all? Did any concerns remain? What and why? Was there any 
particular member of staff who was particularly helpful? How? Why? Who did you have 
most contact with about this? 
Did you read any of their leaflets? Newsletters? Did this influence you any fiarther? 
2.2g Overall, what do you think was the most important reason why you decided to 
donate/not donate? Why was this so important? What are the benefits and risks of 
donating? For you? Your baby? Others? 
Have you made the same decision for all your babies? Why/why not? What was different 
about this latest birth? 
2.3 The samples 
Can I ask you a bit about the samples that they were asking you to give? We 're interested 
in whether this makes any difference to why women agree or not to take part in the 
genetics project. 
2.3a What samples were you asked to give? 
Clarify: So it was tissue from the baby's after birth and....? (To see if they 
know/remember the full range of tissue samples, cells, plasma, blood) 
Could you tell me why they wanted each of these? 
What did they want to do with them? 
Did you have any questions about the samples that they wanted? I f so, what and why? 
Did you ask anyone? Who? What did they say? Were you happy with this? 
2.3b Baby's samples: 
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Did you mind the idea of giving a sample from your baby? (Why?) 
How did you feel about them asking to use the afterbirth? Did you mind? Did you care? 
Is it important to you? To the baby? 
How would you feel i f they had asked for a blood sample from the baby? Why? Is this 
different from the afterbirth sample? In what ways? Is it the material itself or the way of 
taking the sample (from the cord versus an injection?). 
It is possible to take a cheek swab from the baby (by using a cotton bud on the inside of 
the mouth): would you have minded that? Why? Is that different from the after birth? 
How? In what ways? Or different from a blood sample? How? In what ways? 
So, do you have a preference what sort of sample they take from the baby? (Why?) 
Did the type of sample influence your decision to donate or not? How? In what ways? To 
what extent? Can you say more about this? 
Have you ever given samples for any of your other children before? What was that for? 
Was this the same or different? Why? 
Did you feel that it was appropriate for you to give permission on your baby's behalf for 
these samples to be given? Did you have any doubts about that? 
2.3c Mother's sample: What about their request to use the blood left over from your 
antenatal blood tests: did you mind that? Why/why not? 
What i f they had asked you to donate more or other samples, such as a cheek swab or 
hair: would you have minded that? Why/why not? 
So, do you have a preference for which sort of samples they take from you? (Why?) 
To what extent did this influence your decision to donate or not? 
Have you ever given samples from yourself before (eg blood, urine, biopsies)? Was this 
the same or different? In what ways? 
Did you feel differently about giving your own sample to giving one from your baby? 
(Why? How? In what ways?) Did this influence your decision to participate in the 
genetics project? In what ways? 
2.4 Mothers' questionnaire: 
As well as being asked to donate samples from your baby and yourself, you were asked to 
complete a questionnaire about you and your partner's lifestyle (show sample). I'd like to 
ask you a bit about this q 'naire. 
2.4a Did you receive a q'naire? 
2.4b What did you think about the contents? Was it easy/difficult to answer? 
Did you understand why they wanted this information about you? (ethnicity; exams; jobs; 
smoking; medical conditions) 
Did you understand why they wanted this information about your partner? (ditto) 
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Did you understand why they wanted this information about your wider family? (medical 
conditions) 
2 Ac Did you mind the idea of sharing this information with the genetics project? 
Did you discuss giving this information with your partner first? Or with your wider 
family? 
Did they mind the idea of giving this information? 
Did you or your partner or family have any questions about the q'naire? If so, did you ask 
anyone about them? What was their response? Were you happy with this? (Why/why 
not?) 
2.4d So, did you actually complete the q'naire? Why/why not? (Difficulty? 
Intrusiveness? Repetition? Relevance? Family objections?) 
Had you completed one before for your earlier births? 
Do you know how they are intending to use this information? 
Do you know why they need this information as well as the tissue and blood samples? 
(Seek their explanation). 
2.4e Did the q'naire influence your decision to participate in the genetics project or not? 
How? In what ways? Why? Was this an important consideration? How important 
compared to the other factors? 
Which is the most important to you: the baby's sample, your own blood sample or your 
personal information? Why? 
2.5 Consent form: 
Everyone who agrees to take part in the genetics project has to fdl in a (yellow) consent 
form (show sample). Do you remember receiving a copy of this? Can I ask you a couple 
of questions about the form? 
2.5a Did you receive a copy? 
When did you receive it? 
Did you read it all the way through? What did you think of it? 
Was it clear to you? 
Did the consent form reassure you about any uncertainties? In what way? 
Did it raise any other uncertainties? What? Why? 
Did you ask any questions before deciding whether to complete it or not? Who did you 
ask? Were their answers clear? Were you happy with their answers? (Why/why not?). 
Did the consent form influence your decision to take part or not? I f so, in what ways? 
2.5b For participants: 
Did you complete it straightaway? Was there anything on it that puzzled you or that you 
didn't understand? (What and why?). Did you ask anyone about this? 
When did you actually complete it? 
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Can you remember what you have consented to, in signing it? (Collection, storage and 
use of samples from afterbirth; collection, use and storage of mother's blood sample; 
q 'naire about mother and family; 'may involve reference to the health records of my baby 
and me'). 
Why do you think they need each of these pieces of information? {Seek explanation). 
Are you happy about each of these items? Are there any that concern you? 
Did you realise that the project also wanted to use your health records, as well as the 
samples and questionnaires? Was that OK with you? (Why/why not?) 
Did you keep your copy? Do you know where it is? 
2.5c For non-participants: 
Was there anything about the consent form in particular that put you off from taking part 
in the project? What was that? Why? 
Did you discuss this with anyone before deciding not to fill it in? Who was that? What 
was their response? What did you think of their response? 
2.6 Actually giving the baby's sample: participants 
You did (eventually) decide to donate to the genetics project - why was that? Who or 
what was the biggest deciding factor? 
Was it an easy or hard decision? Why? Which parts? 
When did you actually decide? 
Had you decided before the day of delivery or did they ask you again then? Who asked 
you? How did you feel about being asked then? Why? 
Had you changed your mind at any point during that time? 
Did you have any final minute uncertainties or were you quite happy by then to give the 
samples? 
2.7 Actually declining to give baby's sample: non-participants 
You did (eventually) decide not to donate to the genetics project - why was that? 
Who or what was the biggest deciding factor? 
Was it an easy or hard decision? Why? Which parts? 
When did you actually decide? 
Had you decided before the day of delivery or did they ask you again then? Who asked 
you? How did you feel about being asked again then? Why? 
Had you changed your mind at any point during the pregnancy? Why? What happened? 
Did you have any last minute uncertainties about your decision? What? Why? 
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Section 3: BROADER SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
It has been said that there are other factors, beyond those that concern the mother and 
baby directly, that might influence why people do or do not donate to a genetics project. 
Can I ask you about some of these to see how you feel about them and how important or 
otherwise they are to you? 
3.1 Use of samples: 
3.1a Do you know what the samples of the baby's after birth and your blood will be used 
for? 
Do you know who they will be used by? 
Do you know how the q'naire information will be used? Or who by? 
Do you know what your medical information will be used for? Or who by? 
3.1b Do you know what research work has been done using the Cumbrian genetics 
samples? 
Do such studies have any particular importance to you or your family? In what ways? 
Why? 
Do you know what research work will be done in the future? 
Do you think these are appropriate uses? Are you happy for your baby's samples to be 
used in these ways? 
Have you had any feedback on the studies that have been done? Would you like that? 
3.1c Are there any particular studies that you would like them to do? That you would like 
your samples to help with? What? Why? 
3.2 Storage: 
3.2a Do you know how long the baby's samples will be stored for? Your baby will have 
the right to withdraw their donation when they are 16 - do you think this is important? 
Do you think s/he is likely to want to do that? Why? 
Do you know how long your blood will be stored for? 
Do you know how long your q'naire information will be stored for? 
Do you know how the samples/ the information will be stored? 
Do you know where they will be stored? 
Do you know how long the genetics project will have access to your medical records for? 
3.2b Was it explained how the samples / q'naires / records would be stored? 
Were the time of storage and the storage system explained to you? 
Was this something that bothered you? Why? How? 
Did you ask any questions about this? How were they answered? Were you happy with 
their answers? Why/why not? 
3.3 Confidentiality: 
3.3a Was it explained who would have access to these stored samples/ q'naires/ records? 
Were you happy about that? Why/why not? 
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3.3b Do or did you have any concerns over what might happen to your samples? and 
personal info? Why? Did you ask about this? How were your questions answered? Were 
you satisfied with this? 
3.3c Are you aware that you can ask for your baby's sample to be withdrawn from the 
study - can you ever see yourself doing that? Why? Under what circumstances? 
3.3d Were you worried about third parties gaining access to these materials? (prompts as 
above) 
Did you trust the security systems they described? 
3.4 Possible misuse of databases: 
Some concern has been expressed that once these samples and information are stored on 
a genetics database that others might have access to that database either legally or 
illegally - is that something that worries you? In what ways? Why? 
(Concerns break down into: who might gain such access; how they might use it; whether 
the donors might be identified and consequences of that) 
(Prompts to use below: did this influence interviewees' decision about participating in 
any way? In what ways? How strongly?). 
3.4a There are some things that the Cumbria genetics database won't be used for - do 
you know what these are? Do you know why there are limits on the uses of this 
information? Do you agree with those limits? 
3.4b In particular some people are concerned that insurance companies might seek the 
right to access this information: does that worry you? In what ways? Why? 
3.4c Others have mentioned that employers might want access to this information? 
Again, does that worry you? In what ways? Why? 
3.4d Some have argued that the police might be interested in having access to such a 
large database: does that concern you? In what ways? Why? 
3.4e It has been suggested that there should be a special organisation regulating and 
protecting databases to avoid misuse - do you agree with this? Why/why not? 
3.5 Role of BNFL: 
3.5a The Cumbrian genetics project is unusual in that it was partly fiinded in the 
beginning by BNFL; did you know that? Does that surprise you? Was that something that 
concerned you? In what ways? Why? Do you know anyone who was concerned by that? 
Did this influence your decision about participating in any way? 
3.5b It has been suggested that BNFL is such an important employer in the area that 
people don't mind their involvement in projects such as these? Another view is that 
because they are so important they shouldn't have a role in projects such as these since 
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people might feel that they've got to donate - do either of these positions apply to you? 
In what ways? 
3.5c What about the fact that the genetics project was partly run by Newcasfle University 
- did this make any difference to you? 
3.6 Commercial uses 
Another issue that has been raised is the possibility that private companies, like drug 
manufacturers might use genetic databases to develop their products - does that bother 
you? What about the fact that someone might be making a profit using samples that have 
been given for fi-ee? Do you feel that donors should be paid for their donations or that 
these should be given for fi-ee? Would you want something in return? Some people say 
that these donations are a gift - is this what you think? A gift to whom? How does that tie 
in with companies possibly making a profit fi'om such gifts? Who do you feel owns those 
samples now? And the personal information - same or different? 
3.7 Feedback: 
Another issue that worries policymakers about genetic databases is whether those people 
who donate their samples should be given feedback about their own genetic health. 
3.7a Was this something that interested you? Was this something that you wanted? In the 
NCCGP you cannot have access to this information - did that bother you? 
3.7b Did you understand why the genetics project can't provide that? Did you want it? 
Did you ask about this? What was said? 
3.7c Can you imagine any difficulties with individual mothers and babies being given 
such feedback? 
3.8 Re-contacting donors: 
Another area that has caused some concern is whether people who have donated samples 
to a genetics database can be recontacted in later years to see how they are getting on, 
healthwise 
3.8a Would you mind this happening to you or do you feel you've done your bit and 
don't want to be bothered further? 
3.8b What about your baby being recontacted? Do you think that would be alright? 
3.9 Previous knowledge/views about genetics 
3.9a Another suggestion has been that people with lots of previous knowledge or 
experience of genetics (eg through a family illness) might be more happy about donating 
than those with less knowledge. 
3.9b Does this apply in your case? Do you have any interest in genetics? Have you heard 
any of the stories associated with genetics (Dolly; human cloning;GM crops). What do 
you think of these developments? 
3.9c Were you influenced at all by things such as family illnesses? Have you heard much 
about genetic databases before? Had you heard about genetic databanks before being 
asked to help the Cumbrian genetics project? Where did you hear about them from? 
3.9d Some people view anything to do with genetics as being 'bad', others as being 
'good' - where do you fall on this? What makes you think this? What are the bad aspects 
and what are the good aspects of genetics and genetics research? 
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3.9e Have you had an increased interest since being approached? Has this encouraged 
you or discouraged you in participating? 
3.10 National genetics database: 
3.10a It has been suggested that the government should fund a national database, ie not 
just taking samples from West Cumbria but from people around the whole country - had 
you heard about this? what do you think of this idea? Would you favour it? Would you 
have any reservations about it? 
3.10b What about the issues just mentioned - would you think they were more or less 
likely to cause concern i f a national database were set up? 
3.10c Would you contribute to a national database? Would it make any difference to you 
i f the samples were collected and stored by people not based in Cumbria or Newcastle? 
In what ways? 
3. lOd I f we had a national database would you think that people should be made to 
contribute to it or should it be up to them? Why? 
3.11 Genetics in the wider scheme of things: 
Related to the previous questions, it has also been suggested that these questions about 
the ethics of genetics (storage, confidentiality, misuse etc) are not all that important to 
people being asked to donate to the databanks - is that so, in your case? 
3.11a The general line is that people have far too many other things to worry about (jobs, 
money, family, health, housing etc) to worry about such matters - does that apply to you? 
One suggestion is that these other worries mean that people aren't all that interested in 
donating because they've got these other things to worry about; the other line is that 
people don't mind donating because it is such a little thing to ask - do either of these 
apply to you? In what ways? 
3.1 lb Another suggestion is that women are happy to help the Cumbrian genetics project 
simply because they want to help with research in general - is that the case for you? And 
that it's so easy to give the samples, which are of no use to them anyway that's it's no big 
deal - is that true for you? Why/why not? In what ways? 
3.1 Ic Do you think it's a good or bad idea to ask pregnant women to donate to a genetics 
project? Some people have suggested this isn't a good idea because they are so busy 
preparing for their baby; others say it's a good time because that's when ideas about 
genetics, family likenesses, inheritance, etc are most on women's minds: what do you 
think? 
3 . l id Are there any things that run in your family that you and relatives talk about? Eg 
hair colour, physical features, illnesses, abilities? Is it a big topic for you and your 
family? Did this influence your decision to participate or not? 
3.12 Cumbria as a community 
// has also been suggested that people in West Cumbria are happy to help as they are a 
settled, stable community. Also that they are an important community to study because 
they are so stable. 
3.12a How do you see West Cumbria? Do you think it is like/unlike the rest of England? 
Britain? How would you describe the people here? Do you think this picture is accurate? 
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3.12b The majority o f women have been happy to help the genetics project - does that 
surprise you? Why do you think so many women help? Can you understand why some 
women might refuse, even so? 
3.13 Advice to others: 
There are lots of people interested in the views of people such as yourselves (ie the 
government, the doctors and nurses, other researchers etc): 
3.13a What would you say to these people about genetics databases? What's the most 
important lesson you want them to hear from you? 
3.13b What i f another pregnant woman asked your advice about whether to donate from 
your baby - what would you tell her? Why? 
Concluding notes for interviewer: 
Ask i f the interviewee has any questions 
Thank her for her time 
Reminder about confidentiality 
Reminder that w i l l distribute anonymised report after the study is finished. 
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